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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
LEFT BEHIND: A FARMER’S FATE IN THE AGE OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
by 
Cristian Javier Melo 
Florida International University, 2010 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Gail Hollander, Major Professor 
Globalization is eroding the livelihoods of small farmers, a significant and vulnerable 
class, particularly in the developing world. The cost-price squeeze stemming from trade 
liberalization places farmers in a race to the bottom that leads to displacement, poverty, 
and environmental degradation. Scholars and activists have proposed that alternative 
trade initiatives offer a unique opportunity to reverse this trend by harnessing the power 
of the markets to reward producers of goods with embedded superior cultural, 
environmental, and social values. Alternative trade via certification schemes have 
become a de facto prescription for any location where there is a need to conciliate 
economic interest with conservation imperatives.  
Partnerships among commodity production farmers, elite manufacturers and 
wealthy northern consumers/activists do not necessarily have win-win outcomes. 
Paradoxically, the partnerships of farmers with external agencies have unexpected results. 
These partnerships develop into dependent relationships that become unsustainable in the 
absence of further transfers of capital. The institutions born of these partnerships are 
fragile. When these fledging institutions fail, farmers are left in the same situation that 
viii 
they were before the partnership, with only minor improvements to show after spending 
considerable amounts of social and financial capital.  
I hypothesize that these failures are born out of a belief in a universal 
understanding of sustainability. A discursive emphasis on consensus, equity and mutual 
benefit hides the fact that what for consumers it is a matter of choice, for producers is a 
matter of survival. The growth in consumers’ demand for certified products creates a race 
for farmers to meet these standards. My findings suggest that this race generates 
economically perverse effects. First, producers enter into a certification treadmill. 
Second, the local need for economic sustainability is ignored. Third, commodity based 
alternative trade schemes increase the exposure of communities to global shocks. I 
conclude by calling for a careful reassessment of sustainable development projects that 
promote certification schemes. The designers and implementers of these programs must 
include farmers’ agenda in the planning of these programs.  
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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
My interest in the sustainable flavor of development dates back to 1995, when I 
joined the Ecuadorian non-profit organization then known as Corporacion de 
Conservacion y Desarrollo (CYD). At the time, I was a surveyor/data 
processor/analyst/extensionist/porter for the MDs hired for a USAID child-nutrition 
project in the North of the Province of Esmeraldas, Ecuador. Biologists were cheaper 
than Doctors, we had experience working in remote areas, and we could do statistics and 
programming in a pinch. We could also weigh babies. 
I remember the faces of those children today. One week, they were healthy and 
growing. They were smiling, and making eye contact, and weighing them was like 
herding cats: babies do not like to stay in one place when the world is so large and there 
are so many things to do. I remember writing weights in a color-coded growth charts, 
giving proud mother a smiley face sticker, dispensing a bottle of vitamins and minerals 
(if available), and promising to get back in a month (or so). Sometimes the next month, 
things were not so rosy. Disease and generic malnutrition take a toll on those babies. A 
cold turns into pneumonia, diarrhea weakens them, malaria and typhoid double-whammy 
kills them. The noisy, funny and happy baby of one visit became a sickly tired little 
human being, struggling to get air into his or her lungs. Some of them got better. Some of 
them lost the fight.  
When a baby dies, the tradition of Esmeraldas’ Afro Ecuadorian is that women 
mourners sing the baby farewell early in the morning. The combination of twilight, the 
hypnotic sounds of percussion instruments, and women’s voices embedded with sadness 
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generate a chant—a memory burned in my brain. While poverty in Esmeraldas has many 
roots, I saw a correlation between the activities of logging companies and the frequency 
of Arrullos. In Esmeraldas—as in other places— poverty and industrial-level timber and 
hardwoods extraction go hand in hand. Once the forest is gone, there is no longer food on 
the table.  
After looking at the effects of poverty, I embraced sustainable development as the 
only alternative to tame wild capitalism. I was involved in projects ranging from 
Ecotourism to Ecocertification, all of them with the ultimate goal of fighting poverty and 
increasing the welfare of people by engaging consumers who were willing to pay 
premiums for environmentally and socially superior goods. I saw certification as a tool 
for change. It provided a framework for cleaning banana production, while providing 
workers with the guarantees and services above the minimum provided by Ecuadorian 
Banana production bylaws. It was useful for regulating environmental impacts of tourism 
in Galapagos, while addressing issues about the impact of human activity on the social 
structure of the communities there. In addition, I saw that certification had the potential to 
create a market for small-farmers’ shade-grown cocoa.  
My involvement with this initiative started with a 1997 visit to the El Progreso 
Association of Cocoa Producers, then a member of the Ecuadorian Federation of Cocoa 
Producers. At the time, what I saw had an eerie resemblance to other areas. Small farmers 
were losing their shaded Nacional farms, burdened as they were by the impacts of the 
1997-1998 El Nino. Land consolidation and land cover change was proceeding at what I 
saw was an alarming pace. Given that cocoa prices were at historical lows, some farmers 
sold their shaded cocoa farms. The new owners converted the land to bananas. Farmers 
 3 
 
resorted to extracting whatever timber trees they had on their farms—just to see how 
intermediaries pay them miserly values for princely hardwoods or for the scarce cocoa 
extracted from their flooded plantations. Young people left their communities, to become 
immigrants abroad. From a conservationist perspective, this was a nightmare scenario 
given that shaded cocoa farms were the habitat of whatever remained of the biodiversity 
of the region. From my own perspective, natural resources degradation, land 
consolidation, displacement, and poverty came hand in hand.  
As part of the CYD Rainforest Alliance certification department, and later as the 
interim Co-director of this department, I saw certification as a tool to link environmental, 
economic and social development. For example, the certification norms called for 
phasing out fuel-wood-based cocoa-bean driers. LPG-based driers were too expensive for 
individual farmers, so I directed a small research project to design and test a solar drier 
made with greenhouse plastic and locally available materials. These solar driers were an 
instantaneous hit. These solar driers allowed farmers to ferment and dry cocoa even under 
a drizzle, a common occurrence at the time of harvest. Selling dried or semi-dried cocoa 
increased family income, by reducing the margin of discount imposed by intermediaries.  
By 2002, at the time I left Ecuador to continue my studies, the cocoa project was 
full of promise. In the time it took me to earn my Master’s, three things happened that 
suggested this initiative would come to full bloom. First, by late 2004 the Rainforest 
Alliance certified farmers affiliated with FEDECADE were receiving a premium of 26% 
over the market price (about $1900 per MT when the Ecuadorian FOB market price was 
$1505 per MT). Second, there was a race to certify and to add certifications on top of one 
another. The premiums and markets for Organic were said to be better than the premiums 
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for Rainforest Alliance certified cocoa, thus FEDECADE was looking to add organic 
certified cocoa to its products line. It also was looking for achieving Fair Trade 
certification, which was portrayed as the ultimate certification tool for small farmers. 
Third, CYD and Citigroup launched FEDECADE’s Cocoa Trust Fund, which was to 
inject capital in FEDECADE’s commercialization system.  
It took me three years to get back to FEDECADE. When I was conducting 
preliminary research in December 2007, FEDECADE commercialization system had had 
a record year. However, the profits margin for Rainforest Alliance, Organic and Fair 
Trade certified cocoa were lower. Some farmers—who have been stalwarts of 
certification efforts— had dropped out of the commercialization system after  realizing 
that “keeping the system working” was not worth the trouble. Furthermore, the cost of 
establishing a CCN-51 plantation was lower and some of them spoke about the value of 
combining CCN-51 with passion fruit, oranges, and other crops. The compelling 
argument of a farmer was that “having more than one source of income was better.” I saw 
a similar phenomenon in my visit to the Association of Organic Producers from Vinces 
(APOV). The income of the APOV farmers was boosted by selling organic bananas from 
banana trees grown within Nacional cocoa farms. 
Thus, when I set out to gather the data for my dissertation, I did not expect the 
FEDECADE commercialization system to come from a halt as it did in 2009. I did not 
foresee a collapse of the organic market, or the downward premium spiral created as 
more cocoa farmers became certified under Rainforest Alliance. The main goal of my 
dissertation changed from a comparative assessment of the benefits of certification 
schemes and community networking to an analysis of why certification-oriented projects 
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have failed. I was able to change my perspective because of my exposure to readings on 
critical literature of development, globalization, and neoliberalism, and combine them 
with my previous scholarly work in Natural Resources Management. This work, a 
snapshot in time, shows that change. In the writing of my dissertation, I have struggled to 
show farmer’s perspectives and outcomes. In fact, certification— the implementation of 
sustainable development initiatives—can generate improvements in the livelihoods of 
farmers. However, these changes are not necessarily permanent, nor guaranteed. I see that 
the path of sustainable development is painted in shades of gray. Farmers—successful 
gamblers as they are—finally succeeded in teaching me to see the world of cocoa through 
their eyes. Environmental sustainability is a worthwhile endeavor, but it must be 
accompanied by economic development. Furthermore, economic development—at the 
family level—is necessary for insuring social justice in a capitalistic society, given that 
money provides welfare—and a certain protection against the rapacity of capitalism—in 
the absence of a radical transformation of society. 
My study starts by questioning the conventional wisdom that holds that 
partnerships among commodity production farmers, elite manufacturers and wealthy 
northern consumers/activists have win-win outcomes. Paradoxically, although alternative 
trade offers communities opportunities to capitalize on the environmental benefits 
afforded by traditional agricultural practices, the partnerships of farmers with external 
agencies often have unexpected results. I hypothesize that these failures are born out of a 
belief in a universal understanding of sustainability (Luke 2005). A discursive emphasis 
on consensus, equity and mutual benefit (Ashman 2001) hides the fact that what for 
consumers it is a matter of choice, for producers is a matter of survival (Moberg 2005). 
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Thus, while consumers express choice, farmers have no choice but to join alternative 
trade networks—and follow the mandates of these trading schemes—if they are to get 
access to the benefits that come from international investment (Melo and Wolf 2007). 
The growth in consumers’ demand for ecologically and socially labeled products creates 
a race for farmers to meet these standards.  
Furthermore, I argue that this race generates perverse effects. First, producers are 
forced to enter into a global ‘certification treadmill.’ As described by Cochrane (1958) 
for agricultural innovation, early adopters reap benefits out of introducing new practices 
but as more and more latecomers join in, farmers’ face diminishing returns. To sustain 
viability, farmers must race to adopt scheme after scheme, courting consumers as these 
‘global citizens’ add layers of ‘desirability’ to their wish lists (Seyfang 2005). Second, 
the race to meet consumers’ desires for ‘superior’ goods ignores the local need for 
economic sustainability. The superiority of alternative goods depends on meeting the 
ecological perceptions of consumers. Under the lure of premiums, farmers are induced to 
forfeit changes that would have increased the profitability of their farms. Third, even 
when successful, commodity based alternative trade schemes increase the exposure of 
communities to global shocks. Capital investments and premiums for one commodity—
the alternative one—lead farmers to forfeit crop diversification strategies, colloquially 
“putting all their eggs in one basket.” Nevertheless, as in the case with other 
commodities, when the production of certified goods outpaces demand premiums 
collapse.  
The goal of this study is to spotlight some of the shortcomings of alternative 
trade. I explore the tensions and contradictions between local needs and globalized ideals 
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that play out in the context of sustainable development initiatives. For this, I present a 
case study based in the Ecuadorian shade-grown cocoa known as Nacional, and generally 
marketed as “Arriba.” Nacional is a genetically distinctive fine cacao variety with a 
unique floral aroma and flavor given by a combination of farming practices, climate, soil 
and luminosity that occurs exclusively in the shaded cacao farms of Ecuador’s coastal 
lowlands (Motamayor et al. 2008; Deheuvels et al. 2004; Loor et al. 2009; Lerceteau et 
al. 1997; Cambrai et al. 2010). The production of these highly appreciated beans is 
declining, even in the face of substantial investments to develop alternative trade 
networks that reward farmers that preserve this variety.  
This study was designed to address the paradox of decreasing output in view of 
increasing investment and interest. I examine how the agendas of farmers, chocolate 
manufacturers, and development agencies come into play in the setting of Ecuadorian 
Nacional cacao production. The study looks at places where certification 
schemes/sustainable development projects have been implemented. By asking questions 
about connectedness, comparing understandings of sustainability, and establishing the 
local cost and benefits of sustainability alliances, I examine the reasons behind the 
decline of Nacional cacao production even in cases where communities have received 
support designed to stop this loss.  
The present study has three lines of inquiry. The first is to study the connections 
between local Nacional cacao producers and their global partners, as mediated, on the 
one hand, by certification and labeling and, on the other, by the shape and structure of 
each community’s ‘sustainability network’ (Halme 2001). The second is to establish the 
differences between farmers’ and non-farmers’ (i.e., development agencies) discourse 
 8 
 
about the decline of Nacional production and possible solutions. The third is to compare 
local understandings of the challenges and benefits of sustainability with those of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and other 
institutions/actors involved in the Nacional cacao problematic.  
My study describes the responses of communities to sustainability-informed 
alliances, and under which social, environmental and economic tradeoffs these 
partnerships operate. The results of this study show how sustainable development 
practitioners have constructed romantic visions of farmers. I explore how this idealization 
does not do justice to the complexity of a farmer’s socio-economic life.  
My dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter I contains the Introduction, 
Literature review, and Methods.  The dissertation body is composed of Chapter II, III, 
and IV. Each of these chapters is conceived as a publishable, independent journal article. 
In Chapter V, I summarize my findings and present my concluding remarks.  
 I have three overarching aims. I address each aim in one of the main chapters of 
the document. The first aim is to elicit what chocolate manufacturers think consumers are 
looking for—what are the qualities that make alternative goods. Thus, in Chapter II I 
present a case study of the demand side the commodity chain. To understand what values 
are marketed to the consumers of chocolates, I studied the narratives printed on the 
packaging material of chocolate bars that are marketed as made of a high percent (>50%) 
of Arriba, Ecuadorian Nacional, or Ecuador's cocoa beans. My findings suggest that 
market forces encourage manufacturers to make ever more environmentally and socially 
progressive claims on their products. However, the link between progressive marketing 
and benefits for the farmers is tenuous at best.  
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The second aim is to understand how manufacturers’ perception of consumers 
demand are transferred to cocoa farmers. In Chapter III, I present the results of the 
analysis of the alliance between Ecuador’s Federation of Cacao Producers (Federacion 
Nacional de Productores de Cacao del Ecuador, FEDECADE), its Ecuadorian NGO 
counterpart (currently known as Fundacion Alianza CEIDE or CYD), and a 
heterogeneous set of international donors. These projects spanned 10 years (1997-2008), 
and nominally invested roughly US$ 1200 for each of the farmers involved (US$ 
1,436,738 per 1172 families) with the goal of creating an alternative commercialization 
system for Nacional. The key strategy for achieving this goal was to increase farmers’ 
incomes by improving farmers’ access to the markets. This project was leveraged in the 
unique “fine and flavored” quality of the Nacional beans, under the assumption that high-
end chocolate makers would be willing to pay a higher price for value-added beans. For 
six years (2003 to 2008), the project delivered higher-than-average prices for certified 
Nacional. However, in 2009 FEDECADE’s commercialization system ceased to operate. 
In this Chapter, I address the reasons for this failure. I use data from interviews, and 
information available in the archives of FEDECADE and CYD, to establish the factors 
that determined the fate of the commercialization project. I found that the FEDECADE 
project of developing alternative markets for its cocoa was in fact successful. However, 
the success of the project also exposed FEDECADE to risks that lead to the ultimate 
collapse of the initiative.  
The third aim is to understand how farmers make their decisions about growing 
cocoa and other crops. In Chapter IV, I use survey data to analyze the economics  that lie 
behind farmer’s choices. In this chapter I compare the income that small farmers derive 
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from Nacional and CCN-51 cocoa plots. I frame the results comparing two farmer’s 
associations, one of which (APOV)  is actively selling certified organic and Rainforest 
Alliance cocoa, and other where farmers are selling cocoa through local markets 
(FEDECADE). I also include the income of crops grown with cocoa, as well as those that 
are cultivated independently. I also analyze the role of farm employment in cocoa 
farmers’ livelihood. Finally, I address the issues surrounding why a farmer selects a given 
variety. My findings suggest that the arguments of non-farming actors such as NGOs and 
IGOs do not truly reflect the complex choices and options that farmers face on a day-to-
day basis, nor effectively address the economic tradeoffs of these views.  
Literature review 
Globalization is eroding the livelihoods of small farmers, a significant and 
vulnerable class, particularly in the developing world. The cost-price squeeze stemming 
from trade liberalization places farmers in a “race to the bottom” that leads to 
displacement, poverty, and environmental degradation (Porter 1999). Scholars and 
activists have proposed  that alternative trade initiatives offer a unique opportunity to 
reverse this trend by harnessing the power of the markets to reward producers of goods 
with embedded superior cultural, environmental, and social values (Goodman and DuPuis 
2002; Bryant and Goodman 2004; McMichael 2000). Policy makers— influenced by the 
narrative of ‘sustainability through consumption’— attempt to solve allocation issues by 
fomenting partnerships that encourage products that cater to the sensibilities of the 
Northern activist consumers (Bryant and Goodman 2004). Proponents of these systems 
argue that they offer a unique opportunity to harness the power of markets to protect the 
social, cultural, economic and environmental benefits provided by traditional cropping 
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systems. Alternative trade networks are visualized as institutional arrangements through 
which the benefits generated by small-scale, low-input agricultural producers are 
valorized (Moberg 2005; Gómez Tovar et al. 2005; Brown and Getz 2008). Consumers 
get access to high-quality, traceable (safe) and ecologically/ethically superior goods; 
manufacturers and dealers get access to an attractive niche–market, and producers are 
compensated with economic premiums for the environmental and social services of their 
crops (McMichael 2000; Murray and Raynolds 2000; Rice 2001; Ponte 2002; Raynolds 
2002). Thus, alternative trade networks create ‘partnerships of virtue’ that challenge the 
transnationally dominated global food system (McMichael 2000). These new 
mechanisms of trade—mediated by certification labels that inform consumers that the 
product carries attributes that set it apart from its counterparts—are thought of as 
consensual partnerships of producer and consumers. Thus, the labels are symbols that 
overcome the distance that separate producers and consumers since the late eighteenth 
century development of worldwide trade (Polanyi 1941).  
Alternative trade and third-party certifications have become a de facto 
prescription for any location where there is a need to conciliate economic interest with 
conservation imperatives. The wide adoption of this sustainable development tool is 
understandable. Certification schemes allow their proponents to link capitalist logic and 
economic self-interest to sustainability imperatives by creating niche markets for 
products with higher environmental, social or geographical ratings (Goodman and 
DuPuis 2002; Hayes, Lence, and Stoppa 2004; Bramley and Kirsten 2007; Taylor 2005). 
The need for these private actions was born in an era in which globalization and 
neoliberalism advanced an agenda of deregulation, privatization, and liberalization of 
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commerce that dismantled nation-states’ ability to regulate natural-resources-based 
economic sectors (Barbier 2000; Barbier 2003; Barbier 2004; Sonnenfeld and Mol 2002; 
McCarthy 2004). Considering the loss of faith in state-based regulation, scholars and 
activists opted for developing environmental governance arrangements that increase 
consumers’ awareness of linkages between consumption and the impacts of production. 
These tools, which allow consumers to ‘vote with their wallets,’ convert the act of 
shopping in an exercise into global ecological and ethical citizenship, thus feeding the 
advancement of environmentally and socially progressive agendas (Clarke et al. 2007; 
Seyfang 2005). 
Conservation-oriented studies have shown that shade-grown cocoa—as other agro 
forestry systems— provides a refuge for local biodiversity and critical ecosystem services 
(Clough, Faust, and Tscharntke 2009; Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007; Franzen and Mulder 
Borgerhoff 2007; Rappole, King, and Rivera 2003; Donald 2004; Gobbi 2000; Bisseleua, 
Missoup, and Vidal 2009; Schroth and Harvey 2007; Dahlquist et al. 2007; Harvey et al. 
2007). These studies show that the ecological benefits of cocoa plantations are lost if 
these fields are converted to full-sun cocoa or other cropping systems such as bananas 
(i.e., Clough, Faust, and Tscharntke 2009). Full-sun cocoa trees are said to be short lived 
and dependent on fertilizers and irrigation; furthermore, farmers with full-sun holdings 
are said to be more likely to use agrochemicals like herbicides and pesticides (Bentley, 
Boa, and Stonehouse 2004; Donald 2004). However, the empirical evidence to sustain 
some of these claims is lacking. For instance, when an Ecuadorian farmer reportedly said 
that he believed that CCN-51— a local high-yield, full-sun, hybrid cocoa—“could live 
for more than 50 years” the article’s author comments that “this would appear highly 
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unlikely” without explaining the reasons behind the author’s belief (Bentley, Boa, and 
Stonehouse 2004: 260).  
Nevertheless, the agricultural yield of shade-grown cocoa is lower than that of 
these full-sun systems (Franzen and Mulder Borgerhoff 2007; Donald 2004). In fact, in a 
study in Cameroon, scientists found that “yield significantly decreased with increased 
shade cover (Bisseleua, Missoup, and Vidal 2009). In Ecuador, there is a study that 
shows that intensively-managed high-yield hybrid cocoa variety have yields of 4000 kg 
of dry cocoa beans per ha year, compared to 900 kg per ha year for “fine [shade-grown] 
cocoa under the best conditions” (Espinosa et al. 2006). In view of this marked 
productivity difference, scientists routinely propose the use of certification schemes to 
encourage farmers to preserve these low yield ecologically rich systems (Steffan-
Dewenter et al. 2007; Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004). Similarly, calls for 
implementing certification programs are made in practically all the areas in all the tropics 
where cocoa is raised (i.e., Indonesia (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007), Cameroon 
(Bisseleua, Missoup, and Vidal 2009), Ecuador (Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004), 
and Mexico (Greenberg, Bichier, and Cruz Angón 2000)).  
There is an increasing body of critical literature that addresses the conceptual 
failings of alternative trade as visualized by environmentally-oriented scientists. 
Consumption-based efforts—such as certification— respond to Northern definitions of 
sustainability. Generally speaking, the bodies that regulate certification have their 
headquarters in the ‘North’ (for example,  Rainforest Alliance headquarters are in New 
York, Fairtrade Labeling Organization International’s main offices are in Berlin and 
London), while the farms that receive certification are in the ‘South’ (Latin America, 
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Africa and Asia). The fact of this geographical disparity between the locations of those 
who create—and enforce— the standards and those who are subject to them has been 
widely criticized, because it follows the same patterns as did previous colonial relations 
(Gómez Tovar et al. 2005; Mutersbaugh 2002; Mutersbaugh 2005). It also has been 
observed that while Northern consumers may be driven by “aesthetic” interests in the 
tropical regions, they simultaneously constitute the livelihoods of those regions 
inhabitants (Dickinson and Putz 1992 in Price 1994). Poor farmers in the tropics facing a 
choice between economic opportunity and environmental protection will favor the former 
(Price 1994).  
Under the logic of prioritizing ecological values, the role of scientists and policy 
makers—via certification courtship of Northern activists/consumers—is to educate 
farmers about the environmental value of the ecosystem services provided by shaded 
systems (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007). The premiums for certified products produce 
economic incentives that delay the conversion of shaded plantations to more profitable 
agricultural systems (Steffan-Dewenter et al. 2007). Steffan-Dewenter et al (2007) argue 
that the deployment of agricultural intensification techniques—even if these are used to 
minimize pressure over wild forest—is undesirable because it may lead to resources 
concentration in the hands of families that are already above the regional norm (Steffan-
Dewenter et al. 2007). For Steffan-Dewenter et al. (2007), concerns about ecological 
services and tropical biodiversity take precedence over the local desires for economic 
sustainability. Certification is seen as a policy tool to slow down economic 
development—a political project to maintain equalitarian poverty in the tropics. 
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Indeed, some authors have found that the institutional arrangements of 
certification efforts institutional arrangements may perpetuate unequal relationships 
(Mutersbaugh 2005; Mutersbaugh 2002). Certification requires that farmers set up and 
maintain complex management systems because the burden of proof is in their hands 
(Mutersbaugh 2002a). In fact, there is empirical evidence that shows that the 
requirements of certification systems are so complex that a medium-sized developing 
country firm was able to become certified only after receiving loans for US$ 80 million; 
the same study shows that a farmers’ association was able to become certified only with 
the assistance of several international NGOs and IGOs (Melo and Wolf 2007). It is 
unlikely that independent small farmers could fulfill certification requirements in the 
absence of transfers of human, social and financial capital (Melo and Wolf 2007). 
Certification layering—the practice of labeling a product with two or more certification 
labels—only increases the complexity of the management system, and leads to situations 
where farmers perceive that the costs of certification outweigh economic gains (Gómez 
Tovar et al. 2005; González and Nigh 2005; Mutersbaugh 2005; Mutersbaugh 2002). 
Thus, farmers opt out of alterative trade networks in times when premiums are low 
(Taylor, Murray, and Raynolds 2005). Finally, there is evidence that the premium for 
certified goods does not imply a better income for producers. For example, in a survey of 
farmers selling Fair Trade coffee Wilson (2010) found that all of them reported net 
income losses and an increasing amount of outstanding debt.  
Further criticism addresses the question of who reaps the profits of niche markets. 
The complexity of the required environmental management system required to opt for 
organic and other environmental certification schemes favors the economies of scale 
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available to large corporations, which have access to the human and financial capital 
needed for ‘conversion’ from conventional agriculture (Murray and Raynolds 2000). In 
cases where corporations do not get involved in production, corporations may opt for 
acquiring ‘alternative’ brands, which critics suggest leads to the erosion of the 
‘alternative’ meaning (Off 2009). Also, there are  concerns about a possible 
commoditization of fair trade—products, born out the decision of Fairtrade Labeling 
Organizations International (FLO) to grant certification to large plantations (Levi and 
Linton 2003; Jaffee 2007). Low and Davenport (2005) voiced concerns over 
appropriation of the fair trade brand. As certification becomes part of the mainstream, 
large corporations engage in the use of labels without necessarily sharing the 
transformative motive that was behind the ethical trade system when it was put in place 
(Raynolds 2009). Certification stops being a partnership between committed producers, 
manufacturers and consumers, to become a tool for commodity traceability (Raynolds 
2009). 
Methods 
The narratives of chocolate: collection and analysis  
 From 2005 to 2009, I collected 39 chocolate bars from 27 sources/manufacturers. 
For comparison purposes, this represents 37.5% of bars added from 2008 to May 2010 to 
the Chocolate Census™ database of the C-Spot™, a web site designed to be the “ultra 
consumer's guide for premium chocolate” (Mark Christian, email to author, 05/05/2010).  
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Of the 39 bars, 35 were commercially available in the US at the time of 
collection;1
For the analysis, I selected a sub-sample with one bar from each source (n=27). 
For drafting this sub sample, first I selected bars with 70-80% of cocoa. Second, if a 
manufacturer produced more than one bar on this percentage, I selected bars by origin (in 
order: Los Ríos > Guayas > Manabí > Esmeraldas > El Oro)
 one was supplied by a chocolate reviewer [as a scanned image], and the 
remaining three were cocoa producers’ organizations marketing bars sold or given away 
at a farmer's meeting in Ecuador (see Table 1). By source, my sample encompasses bars 
from Argentina (1), Austria (1), Ecuador (12), France (3), Germany (2), Italy (2), 
Switzerland (1) and the United States (US) (5). In the US, the bars in my sample are 
priced in the range of US$ 0.04 to US$ 0.15 per gram (US$ 1.1 to US$ 4.25 per oz). I did 
not include 'super premium' bars (> US$0.7 per gram, ~US$20 per oz) (see Table 1). 
2
 The full texts from each wrapper, excluding the “nutritional information” and “list 
of ingredients,” were entered in a MS Excel worksheet. I also noted presence of 
certification seals (either logos or text), health statements, and contact information. While 
each bar shape, size and packaging ('wrapper') was clearly distinctive, all the packing has 
a 'front' side and a 'back' side. I recorded them separately. I entered text inside (as printed 
inside or in attached marketing inserts) as a different variable. I translated texts in other 
languages to English. For analysis, I used the translated texts. General statistics about 
, for a sub sample of 27 bars 
by source (see Table 1).  
                                                 
1 Hersheys' Cacao Reserve Country of Origin line was discontinued by the end of 2008. 
2 The order reflects “Arriba” historical range.  
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bars were calculated using Microsoft Excel 2002(SP3). Text processing was completed 
with QDA-Miner 3.2.3. Text statistics were conducted with WordStat 6.0, with an 
exclusion list made of articles, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and brand names. 
For qualitative analysis, I used text from the bars and evaluated them against the 
framework I derived from my review of issues covering cocoa production. I contacted 
(by email, in English) the makers of the bars in cases where clarification was needed. In 
practice, the U.S.-based chocolate manufacturers answered my questions, while European 
chocolate makers did not.  
Field work 
The study was conducted on Ecuador's western lowlands, from May to December 
of 2009, in the provinces of Azuay, El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos, Manabí, Santa Elena, and 
Santo Domingo de los Tsachilas (see Figure 1). This study gathered data from three 
sources: a collection of cocoa-related publications and resources collected during field-
work, in-depth interviews with farmers and farmers’ leaders in all the aforementioned 
provinces and an open-answer survey applied to farmers residing in the provinces of 
Azuay, Guayas and Los Ríos. 
The first data source consists of approximately 100 brochures, reports and 
handbooks on the general topic of Ecuadorian cocoa collected during field work; 277 MB 
(~450 files) available in FEDECADE’s computers up to December of 2009; 194 MB 
(~1000 files) of the Conservacion y Desarrollo (CYD) cocoa project, and of 176 
documents made publicly available by CYD at the social publishing website Scribb 
[www.scribb.com].   
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The brochures, reports and handbooks were published by organizations involved 
with cocoa-development projects from 2000 to 2009. Among others, this repository 
contains documents published by farmer’s organizations, cocoa exporters, local and 
international non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, 
government agencies and private companies. These documents range from publicity 
materials to documents dealing specifically with alternative trade networks. All these 
documents are publicly available in Ecuador, although circulation may be restricted 
because of limited number of copies. In addition, I was granted access to the personal 
archives stored in the town of Jesus Maria in the residence of FEDECADE’s President, 
Agr. Victor Chacon Salinas. Relevant files were scanned and converted to digital files.  
The digital archives of FEDECADE and CYD represents the fraction of the 
information produced by these two organizations that has been preserved in the face of 
changing technology, frequent failure of electronic equipment, and lack of backups.  
Finally, my collection of electronic material was complemented with online repositories, 
such as the judicial magazine known as “Derecho Ecuador” which makes copies of the 
Ecuadorian Official Registry freely available [http://www.derechoecuador.com/]. I used 
Atlas.Ti.6.1.1.  for the sorting and processing of all digital files.  
Regarding the second data source, the in-depth interviews script was designed to 
gather information about farmer organizations’ experiences with cocoa 
commercialization, interactions with local and external agencies, and a general feeling 
about the state of the industry from farmers’ perspective. The interviews were conducted 
in Spanish, on the basis of participant willingness and time availability. I interviewed 
farmers and leaders from 12 cooperatives, pre-cooperatives and associations. 
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This study’s third data source consists of an open-answer survey given to 160 
cocoa producers from Los Ríos, Guayas, and Azuay (see Appendix 1 for the Survey 
instrument, Appendix 2 for the list of variables, and Appendix 3 for FIU Internal Review 
Board Approval). These producers were included in the records of one of two farmers’ 
organizations working in these provinces. The first farmer organization, the “Federacion 
Nacional de Productores de Cacao del Ecuador” (FEDECADE) is a federation (union of 
associations and cooperatives) that has about 1100 members associated with 12 farmers’ 
groups located in the provinces of Azuay, Esmeraldas, El Oro and Guayas (see Figure 1). 
The FEDECADE farmers hold up to three certifications (Fair Trade, Organic and 
Rainforest Alliance). To achieve these certifications and develop its commercialization 
system, from 1997 to 2008 FEDECADE received support from several international 
agencies through an alliance with an Ecuadorian NGO called Conservacion y Desarrollo 
(CYD) (Conservation and Development). However, at the time of the study 
FEDECADE’s commercialization system was not operating, and the farmers I 
interviewed were selling their cocoa at the local market.  
The second farmer organization, the “Asociacion de Productores Organicos de 
Vinces” (APOV), has approximately 240 members with farms in or in the outskirts of the 
town of Vinces, Province of Los Ríos (Figure 1). At the time of the study, an APOV 
farmer could hold two certifications (Organic and Rainforest Alliance). Contrary to 
FEDECADE, the APOV had not received any investment from the IGOs-NGOs 
conglomerate. Instead, it was created as a mutual benefit venture of cocoa farmer’s, local 
intellectuals, Vinces’ Agricultural Technology Institute of the University of Guayaquil at 
Vinces, an ex-NGO field agent/organic certification agent, and COFINA—a cocoa 
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exporter that became involved in alternative trade markets via FEDECADE’s experience. 
The APOV commercialization model does bypass local middlemen, but delivers cocoa to 
the exporter COFINA. COFINA then allocates APOV’s Rainforest Alliance and Organic 
Certified cocoa to clients willing to pay for this crop. The APOV is favored by its 
symbiotic relationship with the Agricultural Technology Institute of the University of 
Guayaquil at Vinces. First, the APOV is a tenant of this institute—thus sidestepping the 
need for costly commercialization infrastructure. Second, the APOV farmers have access 
to a continuous stream of young agronomists—some of which receive cacao training 
from the APOV. 
Both FEDECADE and APOV are established in areas that have been long 
dedicated to agriculture: APOV’s Vinces was at the center of the late 1800’s and early 
1900’s first Ecuadorian cocoa boom, and FEDECADE’s farms are located in areas 
opened to the cultivation of cocoa and bananas in the early 1950’s and 1960’s.  
The survey was conducted at each participant’s residence in the case of 
FEDECADE members, and at the communal point-of-sale in the case of APOV’s. I 
conducted the interviews in Spanish. In average, each interview took about 60-90 
minutes. The survey consisted of four parts (see Appendix 1). The first, personal history, 
is made of questions that establish age, gender and background of the farmers in the 
sample. The second, land management, measures the amount of land managed, and the 
level of fragmentation of this area. The third, cocoa and other crop production, asks 
questions about the crops managed by each farmer (including questions about crop 
variety, yield, and age of the crops); it also includes questions about farmer’s perception 
about the benefits and liabilities of cocoa varietals. Finally, the commercialization and 
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income section, asks questions about the income generated by cocoa under different 
selling modalities, and asks for other economic activities that contribute to farmer’s 
income. In addition, APOV supplied individual farmer’s cocoa sales (by variety, price 
and amount) data from their commercialization records. All economic and transactional 
data is presented in US dollars (US$), which has been the Ecuadorian legal tender since 
2000. A detailed list of the variables collected can be found in Appendix 2. 
Farmer’s were recruited in the sample depending on their willingness to 
participate in the study, and on the basis of two criteria: a) de-facto management of the 
land, b) being included in the rolls of associations registered with FEDECADE, or 
membership with the APOV. The application of these two criteria yielded a sample of 
100 farmers (out of 174 possible) registered with FEDECADE’s Nueva Union 
Campesina, 6 de Julio, Camacho and La Florida Associations, and a sample of 60 farmers 
(out of 223 possible) belonging to the APOV.  
In addition to the data gathered from the surveys and previously existing 
databases, I conducted in-depth interviews with farmers that had been or were currently 
involved with their community’s cocoa commercialization team in the case of 
associations affiliated to FEDECADE. This information was complemented with 
interviews with FEDECADE and APOV representatives and staff, government and non-
profit organization officials, cocoa exporters, other farmer’s organizations representatives 
and cocoa town-level middlemen. Both FEDECADE and APOV kindly granted the 
researcher access to an anonymized version of their commercialization databases, and 
other financial and economic information.  
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Survey data analysis 
A farmer’s on-farm gross product is reported as the standardized Farm Gross 
Product in US$ per ha year (FGP ha/year), which is the sum of income for all possible 
on-farm crops standardized by total farm area (see Figure 2). To estimate crop expenses 
for cocoa Nacional and CCN-51, I rely on the Average Management Cost by Province 
published in the Fine Cacao Management Cost Census3
To establish the percentage of farmers whose agricultural income sets them below 
poverty, I compared the GAI values with the values of the Ecuadorian national extreme 
poverty level and the basic income level (INEC’s Canasta Familiar Vital and Canasta 
Familiar Basica) (INEC 2010). The INEC CFV (Canasta Familiar Vital) is set based on 
the survival income for a family of four; families that earn less than this amount are 
classified as extremely poor. The CFB, which is set at a higher level of income, sets the 
level below which a family of four is classified as poor. Given that GAI income data 
presents a yearly estimate based in the prices for October and November of 2009, I used 
the CFV and CFB for these months multiplied by 12 to get a comparable yearly statistic. 
With these caveats, the CFV level is set at a monthly income of $370.25 for an annual 
 (CORPEI 2009). Data gathered 
with the in-depth interviews with farmers were used to estimate management cost for 
other crops (i.e., bananas, passion fruit or plantains). These estimates are used to calculate 
a farmer’s Gross Agricultural Income (GAI), and the Farm Gross Income (FGI), which is 
a farmer’s GAI divided by the area of his or her holdings (see Figure 2). 
                                                 
3 While the Census focused in Nacional, it also includes Management Costs for CCN-51 
plots. 
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value of $4443; the CFB level is a monthly income of $522.46 for an annual value of 
$6269 (INEC 2010). 
When appropriate, general statistics (i.e., mean, median, SD) were calculated 
using Microsoft Excel 2002 (SP3). Linear regression and other tests were conducted 
using Minitab 14. Survey text processing was done using QDA-Miner 3.2.3; interview 
data mining and sorting was done using Atlas.Ti.6.1.1.  
To establish the relationship between poverty, crop diversification and area of a 
farmer’s holding, first I classified farmers in four groups each one set by one type of crop 
diversification schemes I found during field work: Nacional-only, CCN-51-only, both 
Nacional and CCN-51, cocoa (Nacional and CCN-51) and other crops. Second, I 
performed linear regression analysis to establish the relationship of gross agricultural 
income (GAI) as a function of the area held under that specific crop diversification 
scheme. Then, I used the regression equations to find the area of a holding under each 
diversification scheme— all other things being equal— that will generate an income that 
sets that farmer above CFV or CFB by the type of cropping system 
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Figure 1. Area of Study. Ecuador, the Western lowlands (Costa), APOV and FEDECADE associations and cooperatives. 
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(a) Formula to calculate standardized Farm Gross Product (FGP), where YC1 is yield for crop 1; SC1 is area for crop 1; PC1 is 
the reported gate price for crop 1, and TFS is the total area of the farm. 
 
 
 
 
(b) Formula to calculate standardized Farm Gross Income, where YC1 is yield for crop 1; SC1 is area for crop 1; PC1 is the 
reported gate price for crop 1; n stands for crop planted (1-4), and TFS is the total area of the farm. 
Figure 3. Formulas to calculate (a) standardized Farm Gross Product (FGP in US$ ha/year) and (b) standardized Farm Gross 
Income (in US$ ha year) 
 
 
 27 
 
Table 1. Chocolate bars by brand, origin, % of cocoa, and country of origin of 
manufacturer 
 
Name, brand and % cocoa Country of manufacturer 
Amano Guayas 70% USA  
Amedei Ecuador 70% Italy  
Ashumira Shumiral (Azuay) n/d † Ecuador  
Askinosie San Jose del Tambo Nibble Bar 70% USA  
Cacaoyere Cumba (Esmeraldas) 71%; El Eno (Amazonia) 
63%; Las Naves (Bolivar) 82% and Puerto Quito 
(Pichincha) 91%  
Ecuador  
Caoni Esmeraldas 55% and Los Ríos 77% “ 
Chocolat Bonnat Equateur 75% France  
Chocolove XOXOX Ecuador 72% USA 
Corporacion Fortaleza del Valle Calceta (Manabí) 60%† Ecuador  
Dagoba Los Ríos 68% USA  
Domori Cacao Arriba 70% and Cacao Cult Ecuador 70% Italy  
E. Guittard Quevedo (Los Ríos) 65% USA  
Fino de Aroma 45%  Ecuador  
Francois Pralus Equateur Fortissima 80% and Equateur 
Trinitario 75% 
France  
Hachez Cocoa d'Arriba 77% Germany  
Hershey's Cacao Reserve Arriba 50% USA 
Hoja Verde 58% Ecuador  
Kallari 75%; 85% and Roberto’s Recipe 75% Ecuador  
Lindt Excellence Ecuador 75% Switzerland  
Nestle Dark 60% Ecuador  
Pacari Esmeraldas 60% and Manabí 65% “ 
Republica del Cacao El Oro 67%; Los Ríos 75% and 
Manabí 75%  
“ 
Salgado Grand Cru Esmeraldas 70% Argentina  
UNOCACE Floral 75% † Ecuador  
Valrhona Alpaco Ecuador 66% France  
Vintage Plantations 90% Ecuador  
Zooter Labooko Single Machala (El Oro) 60%‡ Austria  
All bars were commercially available at the time of collection unless marked: † 
Promotional bar; ‡ Courtesy of Mark Christian (C-Spot).  
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CHAPTER II. 
LIVING FROM THE FUMES OF THE PAST: ECUADORIAN COCOA AND THE 
BRAVE NEW WORLD OF CHOCOLATE BRANDING 
Introduction and Background 
Consumers in the global North have become increasingly aware that the 
globalization-driven consolidation of agro-food monopolies has left them with less 
freedom to choose between products, exposed them to health hazards, or made them 
accomplices in a process of rural impoverishment (Niles and Jane 2008; McMichael 
2000). It has been proposed that these trends can be reversed by engaging consumers in 
shopping for products that embody superior values (Golding 2008; Shreck 2005; Slater 
2004). Alternative trade is said to maximize the values at both ends of the commodity 
chain: it is visualized as a system that rewards consumers—who receive guilt-free, value-
added goods—and producers—who receive premiums over the market price (LeClair 
2002; Low and Davenport 2005). These networks bypass multinational-controlled 
commodity chains, therefore using market-based tools to challenge the industrialized 
food system (Murray and Raynolds 2000; Raynolds 2000). The global community 
benefits from these relationships, because alternative trade actors become stewards of 
non-transactional public goods such as ecosystem services (Pearce 2004; Bardhan 2006). 
Thus, the act of consumption becomes an act of expressing global citizenship (Seyfang 
2005).  
Under this narrative, environmental, geographical, or social attributes distinguish 
true elite products from the run-of-the-mill corporate product. Facing a cultural 
phenomenon in which ‘standard’ has an ambiguous connotation, the manufacturers of 
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specialty products—like wine, coffee or chocolate—face an increasing pressure to 
position their brands within the alternative discourse (Golding 2008).  
Bryant and Goodman (2004) suggest that all forms of market-driven sustainability 
depend on the courtship of ‘do-gooder’ Northern activist consumers that are willing to 
‘support’ poor —yet heroic —Southern farmers, to protect tropical—magical— 
rainforests, or unique agrarian landscapes. In this chapter, I analyze the effects of this 
trend on chocolate manufacturers branding. Chocolate’s reputation is intimately linked to 
cocoa beans—a tropical crop with a globally significant (and somewhat ambiguous) 
footprint (Franzen and Mulder Borgerhoff 2007). I conduct this research through a case 
study of the packaging material of chocolate manufacturers who produce bars that are 
marketed as made of a high percent (>50%) of Arriba, Ecuadorian Nacional, or Ecuador's 
cocoa beans. My findings are that most manufacturers follow a minimalist approach 
towards bean-to-bar philosophy, with minimal involvement with the producer side of the 
commodity chain. This finding suggests that the rhetoric of alternative trade can be easily 
adopted by manufacturers, without signifying a radical departure from previous practices. 
Market forces encourage manufacturers to make ever more environmentally and socially 
progressive claims on their products. The chapter proceeds as follow. First, the chapter 
covers background information on the economic, social and environmental profile of 
cocoa production worldwide, and on Ecuadorian cocoa specifically. Then, I present the 
sample of chocolate bars, and the methods I used to evaluate these narratives. I then 
present my results and discuss my findings in the context of policy significance.  
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Issues of cocoa production 
 Reversing a previous trend towards consumption of mass-produced candy bars 
(Byskov and Scheu, 1991), the segment of premium chocolates has been increasing. 
Indeed, the International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) states that “consumers have 
embraced dark chocolate as an affordable luxury” (ICCO, 2008). Industry analysts 
reported that sales of premium chocolate have grown an average of 11% per year, from 
US$4.43 billion in the year of 2003 to US$6.95 billion in the year 2007 (Thomas 2008). 
In their 2009 industry forecast, after noting that the market for dark chocolate grew 9% 
during 2009 despite a worldwide economic recession, the experts affiliated with the U.S.-
based National Confectioners Association predicted that this trend will continue (NCA 
2009). 
 There have been several factors propelling this newfound taste, but in this chapter 
I specifically address manufacturer's adoption of the rhetoric of “terroir” or origin, 
originally developed for wine. Under this rhetoric, the quality of a chocolate bar is said to 
come from the place where groves are located, the varietals planted, farmers’ technique, 
as well as from the craftsmanship of the chocolate maker. Nesto (2010:133) considers 
that the trend is for chocolate makers to move “closer to the cacao plant.” This has 
influenced the sourcing of cocoa. While all authors agree that wild cacao (Theobroma 
cacao L.) originated in the upper basin of the Amazon River and its tributaries, the 
process of domestication of this species has given origin to several genetically and 
geographically distinct varieties. Traditionally, cacao has been classified in three groups: 
“Criollos” from Central America; “Forasteros” from the Upper and Lower Amazon River 
basin and “Trinitarios”—a Trinidad hybrid of “Criollos” and “Forasteros.” With one 
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exception, most fine or flavor cocoa—used in fine chocolates and high quality chocolate 
coatings—comes from “Criollos” and “Trinitarios,” while bulk cocoa—used for 
manufacturing cocoa butter and high volume chocolates—comes from Forastero varietals 
(Byskov and Scheu, 1991; ICCO, 2006). The exception is that the Nacional cacao variety 
from Ecuador—although classified as a “Forastero”—is a source of fine cacao. 
Generally, Forastero varietals offer higher yields than the other varietals, and require less 
on-farm management. Also, the post-harvesting management of fine cocoa is more 
complex, time-consuming and expensive. Fine cocoa is scarce (< 5% of the annual world 
production), and comparatively expensive (see Figure 1). Ecuador’s is the largest 
producer of fine cacao, accounting for almost half of the world production. Ecuador’s 
Nacional varietal specific aroma—the Arriba flavor— is said to have premiums of U.S. 
$400-$800 per metric tonne (Byskov and Scheu, 1991; Griffith, 2001) (ICCO, 2006, 
2008).  
 The condition of scarcity and premium price of fine cocoa— a liability for mass-
market candy— is a selling point for dark chocolate. Dark chocolate marketing material 
is rich in statements about varietals, place and the particular conditions that are linked to 
a special flavor. In this, the industry follows the pattern marked in wines, in which 
premium quality is a product of values added by the intersection of geographically 
distinctive physical (i.e., soil and climate) and biological (i.e., variety) factors, specific 
agricultural practices, and traditional know-how (Hayes et al. 2005).  
 In chocolate, the use of fine cocoa has reached a new level with the crafting of 
single varietal / single origin bars, instead of the far more common practice of blending 
cocoa from different varietals and sources to achieve a brand’s taste. Single origin bars 
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offer an opportunity to capitalize on the difficulties of sourcing fine cocoa beans, 
transforming the problem of controlling beans origin and quality on the defining 
characteristic of a unique brand. Manufacturers have adopted the expression “from bean 
to bar,” which was used to describe the process of transforming beans into chocolate, to 
reflect an improved control over the source of the beans. In addition, this same expression 
suggests that it is possible for a consumer to trace the beans on a chocolate bar to the 
place of production. Finally, some manufacturers extend the bean-to-bar narrative 
linkages to include information about the cocoa farmers and the conditions under which 
the production was done (Grimes 2009) 
 However, from a brand perspective moving “closer to the farm” is not without 
risks (Nesto 2010:133). Cocoa production has social, economic and environmental 
footprints, which are intrinsically linked to the nature of the crop. As chocolate makers 
get close to the source of the beans, they get closer to the impacts. A brand’s reputation 
still depends on traditionally-controlled manufacturing quality, but it can also be affected 
by events outside of the manufacturing process. Well-known brands—such as Nestle or 
Barry Callebaut—suffered from bad-reputation ‘spill-over’ from documentaries such as 
child-labor-denouncing Mistrati and Romano’s The Dark Side of Chocolate (2010), or 
the Fairtrade-busting BBC Panorama: Chocolate—The Bitter Truth (2010). Thus, 
chocolate makers face a dual task: to define what their brand is, while simultaneously 
defining what the brand is not (Golding 2008). 
 Contrary to many other crops, cocoa cultivation has not been mechanized, and 
remains labor-intensive. This benefit small farmers, which rely on family labor. 
However, farmers’ families may prioritize work on the fields over schooling for their 
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children (Nkamleu and Kielland 2006). The use of forced labor is a more disturbing 
result of cocoa labor requirements. Cocoa plantations’ dependence on slave and 
indentured labor is a well documented historical fact (see Cardozo 1961; William 
Gervase Clarence-Smith 1993; Satre 2005). There is evidence that the use of forced labor 
continues. For instance, the U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report 
(2009) mentions that forced child and adult labor is used in the cocoa sector of Ivory 
Coast and Ghana, among other countries (USDS 2009). Chocolate makers have been 
dealing with the results of these findings, including the public outrage that accompanies 
them (Blowfield 2003, Berlan 2009). The largest world chocolate processors (Barry 
Callebaut, Cadbury, Ferrero, Hershey Foods, Kraft Foods, Mars Incorporated, and 
Nestle) finance the International Cocoa Initiative, a non-profit organization dedicated to 
“ending child and forced labor in the sector” (ICI 2010). Also, as has happened in other 
products such as coffee (McDonagh 2002), chocolate processors have been keen on 
sourcing cocoa from producers whose compliance with labor standards is verified by a 
third party. Finally, other manufacturers have opted-out of areas identified as prone to 
labor abuses. 
 The rediscovery of the “bitter” or “dark” side of cocoa production also spotlighted 
other impacts that the industry has on the economy and environment of less-developed 
countries. As with any tropical commodity without staple food value, cocoa production 
ties the welfare of farmers to the vagaries of the international markets and the fickle taste 
of Northern consumers (Talbot 2002). Cocoa prices, like those of other commodities, 
suffer from boom and bust cycles. During boom periods, with high world-market prices 
and relatively scarce supply, farmers often replace forest with new plantations (Clough, 
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Faust, and Tscharntke, 2009). Enticed by high prices, farmers also plant cocoa in land 
that was used for food production, which may restrict food availability in the near future 
(Belsky and Siebert 2003). When the production of these new plantings comes into the 
market, overabundance of supply leads to drastic falls of word market prices. Lost 
revenues jeopardize the livelihood of individual farmers and present a threat for regional 
stability (see Figure 2). Indeed, Manzo (2005) suggests that the aforementioned harsh 
labor conditions in Western Africa were born out of farmers need for extreme cost-
cutting measures in response to the fall of word-market prices4
 The expansion of the agrarian frontier that accompanies boom periods also 
generates pressures on local ecosystems. Several studies have found that cacao groves, 
even under low impact management, are not as diverse as the forest they replaced 
(Andersson and Gradstein, 2005; Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse, 2004; Faria and 
Baumgarten, 2007; Greenberg, Bichier, and Cruz Angón, 2000; Haro-Carrion, Lozada, 
Navarrete, and de Koning, 2009; Rice and Greenberg, 2000). When the prices collapse, 
farmers are pressured to either intensify production, or shift to other uses of land (Clough, 
Faust, and Tscharntke 2009). Intensely managed cocoa groves have higher yields than 
shaded groves. However, the environmental impact of intensely managed groves is 
higher, as they have no shade and require more inputs than less intensively managed ones 
(Franzen and Mulder Borgerhoff 2007). Provision of ancillary ecosystem services is 
diminished (Bisseleua, Missoup, and Vidal 2009). Finally, the loss of shaded plantations 
.  
                                                 
4 Cocoa prices reached a historical low by the year 2000. Manzo (2005) indicates that, for 
that period, gate prices were below the cost of production of even the most efficient 
farmer. 
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implies loss of the species' genetic variety, given that researchers have found that cocoa 
farms function as in-situ reservoirs of rare, endangered or ‘heirloom’ varieties (Deheuvels 
et al. 2004; Whitkus et al. 1998; Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004).  
 Interestingly, the development of certification systems and geographical 
marketing offers an opportunity for certain chocolate manufacturer to reap benefits out of 
addressing sustainability issues in cocoa production. For example, the market for organic 
chocolate products has grown 15% per year according to some estimates (Pay 2009). 
Shade-grown, low input cocoa groves are usually organic by default, given that farmers 
cannot afford agrochemical inputs (Barrett et al. 2002). The rise of the consumption of 
organic products offers an opportunity to use this ‘organic by default’ management 
system to enter an attractive market niche. It has also been reported that the market for 
Fair-Trade products in the US has grown about 83% annually since 2002 (Pay 2009). 
Thus Fair-Trade certified products deliver marketing benefits to manufacturers while 
addressing social sustainability issues at the producers’ level. Other certification systems 
generate value out of agronomic particularities of cocoa production. For instance, 
protecting the environmental ancillary services provided by low intensity-shaded- 
plantations was a driver for the involvement of the environmentally-centered certification 
offered by Rainforest Alliance. Finally, two or more certification systems can be 
simultaneously held by a bar aiming to capture potential consumers by creating a 
smorgasbord of meanings and concepts that cater to the sensitivity of a wider audience 
(Browne et al. 2000). 
 However, it has been observed that the narratives that declare that product has 
superior ethical (and environmental) values can in fact hide the distance between 
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producers and consumers (Hollander 2003). Hollander (2003) also suggest that the 
deployment of ethical and geographical marketing creates premiums that are 
disconnected from the commodity production costs.  
Ecuador's cocoa: Living from the fumes of the past? 
 Ecuador’s reputation for fine cocoa was established back in the 19th century, 
when the country was the world’s largest cocoa producer, accounting for 20 to 50% of 
world’s production during the 19th century (Griffith 2004). Cocoa was planted in large 
estates in the Ecuadorian coastal area, mainly in the sub basin of the Guayas River. A 
geographer of the time describes this region as “one great paradise,” with “plantation 
after plantation” and “hacienda after hacienda” extending along the river banks (Wolf 
1893). However, the production of cocoa at the time was not uniform. Van Hall (1914) 
recognized two commercial varieties, a Criollo-type known as Ecuador or Esmeraldas 
Cundeamor and the Forastero-type Ecuador Amelonado. The first variety, the highly 
appreciated Ecuador or Esmeraldas Cundeamor, was commercialized under the name of 
“cacao de Esmeraldas” or “Esmeraldas” (van Hall 1914; Knapp 1920; Whymper 1921; 
Lery 1954). The production of this cocoa was restricted to the province of Esmeraldas (in 
Northwest Ecuador). Van Hall said that it had a close resemblance to Venezuelan 
Criollos cacaos (Van Hall, 1914; Lery 1954). The second of Van Hall's varieties, 
classified as Ecuador's Amelonado (or “cacao Nacional”), was found in four commercial 
types named after the regions of production. Then and now, the Ecuadorian Amelonado 
cocoa is well-regarded by the industry, because of its “strong flavor and scented aroma," 
being an exception to the general rule that ‘fine’ cacaos come exclusively from Criollo-
types (Knapp 1920). Indeed, it is the only Forastero that qualifies as fine cacao. The first 
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commercial type, the famous Arriba, came from the upper basin of the Guayas River and 
its tributaries (arriba means “up,” as in “up-the-river”). The Arriba region roughly 
encompasses the parts of the Province of Guayas, the Province of Los Ríos and a small 
fraction of the Province of Bolívar (Wolf 1893; Parsons 1957; Crespo 1986). Outside of 
this region, fine cocoa was also produced in the other areas, and traded under other 
'market' names. The first among these Nacionales was produced in the wet part of the 
Province of Manabí, near the towns of Chone and Calceta. This cocoa was commercially 
known as “Bahia,” “Caraques,” or “Manabí” (Lery 1954; van Hall 1914; Whymper 
1921)5
                                                 
5 Van Hall mentions that calling this cacao “Bahia” is “inconvenient” because this is also 
the name of the cacao produced in the Brazilian state of Bahia.  
. Cocoa was also produced in the region of “Abajo” (down the river) (Parsons 
1957), in Southern part of Guayas and the coastal area of Azuay and Cañar. The cocoa of 
this region was known as “Balao,” for the name of the area where a still existing large 
plantation is located (Van Hall 1914). Finally, cocoa was also produced in the Province 
of El Oro. This last cocoa type was known as “cacao Machala.” (Parsons, 1957; Van Hall 
1914; Knapp 1920; Whymper 1921). Finally, there is also a late 19th century account of 
large wild cacao plantations along the Napo River (Eastern Ecuador, in the Upper 
Amazon Basin) which was deemed “scarcely inferior to what is known in the market as 
arriba” (Tyler 1894), and two early 20th century reports of wild cacao stands growing on 
the banks of the River Bobonaza (Province of Napo) (Holloway 1932) and Rio Zamora 
(Province of Zamora) (Hermessen 1917), but there are no records that suggest that cocoa 
from this region was exported at the time.  
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  Ecuador's cocoa industry was the main source of income for the country, 
accounting for 71% of the country exports by 1920 (Henderson 1997). However, by the 
1930s, Ecuador's cocoa exporting industry had collapsed. Ecuador's plantations were 
decimated by the attack of two previously unknown fungal plant pathogens, Crinipellis 
perniciosa (known as “witch’s broom,” or “escoba de bruja”), and Moniliophthora roreri 
(known as frosty-pod disease, or “monilla”) (Griffith, 2004; Parsons, 1957)6
  The 1920’s collapse of the cocoa export industry
. The 
severity of the attack of these diseases cannot be overstated. Current reports indicate that 
C. perniciosa can cause yields to drop by 90%; even more serious is the attack of M. 
roreri which can infest and destroy up to 100% of the pods (Hebbar 2007; Griffith 2004; 
Phillips-Mora and Wilkinson 2007).  
 The Nacional genotype, which recent genetic studies suggest were a highly 
homogenous population, proved especially susceptible to the attack of these diseases 
(Griffith 2004). Thus, by 1930 Ecuador's production (14,000 tons) was one-third of what 
was produced in the year of 1920 (39,790 tons) (Lery 1954; Henderson 1997). Ecuador's 
share of the world production fell from 11.7% in 1920 to 2.7% by 1930 (Lery 1954; 
Henderson 1997), and the product accounted for just less than one-fifth of the country’s 
exports (Pineo 2007). 
7
                                                 
6 Griffith (2004) indicates that the first report of Crinipellis perniciosa in Ecuador is 
dated from 1921 and that the first report for Moniliophthora roreri dates from 1917. 
7 It also caused the collapse of Ecuador's economy, and lead to a period of civil unrest.  
 gave origin to three lingering 
trends whose effects have shaped contemporary cocoa production in Ecuador. First, 
Ecuadorian cocoa production survived as a small farmer’s cash crop, in part because they 
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did not have access to the resources needed to convert their holdings to more profitable 
production systems, and in part because shade-grown cocoa tolerates adverse weather 
factors, and thrives in landscapes and soils where other crops do not (Bentley, Boa, and 
Stonehouse, 2004). Second, foreign disease-resistant cocoa varieties were introduced in 
attempts to revitalize the industry (Lerceteau et al. 1997)8. Because these introductions 
did not have the Arriba flavor, naturally-occurring hybridization led to a progressive 
erosion of the Arriba/Nacional genotype up to the point where it has been reported that 
“the Arriba flavor is hardly found” (Petithuguenin and Roche 1995 in Deheuvels et al. 
2004: 23). Thirdly, as early as the 1930’s, scientists were encouraging changes in 
plantations management to combat diseases (Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004). Given 
that both C. perniciosa and M. roreri infestations are more severe under dense canopies, 
farmers were encouraged to regulate the shade covering their groves (Griffith 2004). The 
practice of growing cocoa under shade has been progressively abandoned. Indeed, some 
of the new varieties are not planted under shade at all (Espinosa et al. 2006; Bentley, Boa, 
and Stonehouse 2004). In fact, CCN-519
                                                 
8 However, there are reports of introduction of foreign Trinitarios (locally known as 
Venezolanos) as early 1890 (Van Hall, 1914).  
9 During field work in Ecuador, the first author was able to find a copy from a paper by 
this variety creator, Homero U. Castro. Castro describes CCN 51 as a cross of F1 of 
IMC-67 x ICS-95 by O-1, where O-1 was a cacao ascension collected by himself in a trip 
to Ecuador's Valle de los Canelos (Castro 1981). According to this paper, CCN stands for 
Coleccion Castro Naranjal and 51 stands for the number or the cross that gave origin to 
this variety.  
, a full-sun, high-yield, non aromatic variety 
accounts for 48% of the plantings made within the last 5 years according to Bentley, Boa, 
and Stonehouse (2004). The CCN-51 variety yields almost 4 times that of Nacional 
 45 
 
(Espinosa et al. 2006) and is resistant to fungal diseases, but lacks the Arriba flavor 
(Griffith 2004). The consequence of economic marginalization, genetic erosion and 
changes in management practices have led to a progressive loss of Ecuadorian cocoa 
quality. By 2005, the International Cacao Organization downgraded the country's cocoa 
rating from 100% fine flavor cocoa to 75% (ICCO, 2006)10
                                                 
10 Before this ruling, all of the cocoa beans from Ecuador were rated as “fine.” 
.  
 The ICCO downgrade spurred responses from the government sector. At the time, 
there were three main policies established to address the decline of Ecuadorian cocoa. 
First, the Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle Ranching, Aquaculture and Fishing (Ministerio 
de Agricultura, Ganadería, Acuacultura y Pesca, MAGAP) published Accord 070 of July 
22 of 2005, declaring cocoa as a Ecuador's National Symbol. This declaration cleared the 
way for further actions. The following week the MAGAP published Accord 060 of July 
27 of 2005, in which it bans shipments made of a mix of Nacional and CCN-51 beans. 
Second, in 2006 the Ecuadorian Institute for Statistics and Standardization published the 
fourth revision of the Cocoa Beans Technical Norm (NTE INEN 176:2006) which 
created the legal framework to separate traditional (Nacional) and non-traditional 
(hybrid/CCN-51) varieties, and price them differently. Third, the Institute of Ecuadorian 
Intellectual Property (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Propiedad Intelectual, IEPI), with the 
support of a heterogeneous alliance of cocoa exporters, producers' organizations, NGOs, 
IGOs and government agencies, published and approved the creation of the “Arriba” 
Protected Denomination of Origin (Arriba PDO). In this document, the use of the 
“Arriba” label is restricted to Ecuador's cocoa beans of the Nacional variety.  
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 For chocolate makers, Arriba offers a unique opportunity for showcase their 
brand. First, Arriba has a taste that—in words of the chocolate manufacturer Shawn 
Askinosie—“even people unfamiliar with dark chocolate are able to appreciate.” Second, 
Arriba is a historically acknowledged variety―a must-have in 'single-origin' line―with a 
rich history of quality to back it up. Third, Ecuador's cocoa is the hands of small farmers, 
but there have not been linkages between Ecuador's cocoa production and child labor 
exploitation as has been the case in other source countries11. This gives Ecuador and 
advantage with chocolate makers who are wary of being criticized on social justice 
grounds. Fourth, country-wide loss of shaded fine cocoa plantations can be translated into 
a narrative in which chocolate consumption is tied to protection of these biodiversity-
rich, socially-important agro-ecosystems. Fifth, the Arriba PDO definition was designed 
to cover all Nacional cocoa produced in Ecuador. Legally, any manufacturer can use the 
Arriba label as long as the beans used on the bar come from Ecuador, and are of the 
Nacional variety meaning that the beans do not need to come from the Arriba region 
proper. International trends favoring dark chocolate, Ecuador's reputation for fine cocoa 
quality, and a favorable regulation created the conditions for a boom of products labeled 
“Arriba.” Indeed, the availability of single-origin “Arriba” bars have greatly increased 
from one bar12
                                                 
11 In Ecuador, children labor is used in the banana and cut flowers industries. 
12 The U.S.-based Vintage Plantations Chocolate claims that their 1997 Plantations bar 
was the first single-origin Arriba bar (Vintage Plantations 2010).  
 in 1997 to more than 139 bars by 2010, according to the chocolate expert 
Mark Christian (Mark Christian, phone interview with author, 03/20/2010). Evidently, 
the rapid growth of this market segment suggests that chocolate manufacturers are 
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interested in capitalizing on the marketing value of Arriba cocoa. This rapid growth also 
suggests a market niche with relatively low barriers to entry. I propose that a study of 
products designed to fit into this market-niche provides a unique opportunity to assess the 
effects of the adoption of the alternative trade rhetoric in chocolate products specifically, 
and in consumer's food goods in general. I conduct this study thorough the analysis of the 
use of language on packing material. This material reflects manufacturers’ responses to 
what they perceive to be their consumer's most pressing concerns. I use the on-bar-
narratives to trace the bars to their putative origins. I am also interested in getting 
glimpses of the on-field application of this rhetoric, and assess the effect of the adoption 
of these concerns in changing or modifying manufacturers’ practices.  
The bars: collecting chocolate  
 From 2005 to 2009, I collected 39 chocolate bars from 27 sources/manufacturers. 
For comparison purposes, this represents 37.5% of bars added from 2008 to May 2010 to 
the Chocolate Census™ database of the C-Spot™, a web site designed to be the “ultra 
consumer's guide for premium chocolate” (Mark Christian, email to author, 05/05/2010). 
Of the 39 bars, 35 were commercially available in the US at the time of collection;13
                                                 
13 Hersheys' Cacao Reserve Country of Origin line was discontinued by the end of 2008. 
 one 
was supplied by a chocolate reviewer [as a scanned image], and the remaining three were 
cocoa producers’ organizations marketing bars sold or given away at a farmer's meeting 
in Ecuador (see Table 1). For the analysis, I selected a sub-sample with one bar from each 
source (n=27). For drafting this sub sample, first I selected bars with 70-80% of cocoa. 
Second, if a manufacturer produced more than one bar on this percentage, I selected bars 
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by origin (in order: Los Ríos > Guayas > Manabí > Esmeraldas > El Oro)14
Cocoa from Ecuador, chocolate from all over the world 
, for a sub 
sample of 27 bars by source. 
 The full texts from each wrapper, excluding the “nutritional information” and “list 
of ingredients,” were entered in a MS Excel worksheet. I also noted presence of 
certification seals (either logos or text), health statements, and contact information. While 
each bar shape, size and packaging ('wrapper') was clearly distinctive, all the packing has 
a 'front' side and a 'back' side. I recorded them separately. I entered text inside (as printed 
inside or in attached marketing inserts) as a different variable. I translated texts in other 
languages to English. For analysis, I used the translated texts. General statistics about 
bars were calculated using Microsoft Excel 2002(SP3). Text processing was completed 
with QDA-Miner 3.2.3. Text statistics were conducted with WordStat 6.0, with an 
exclusion list made of articles, pronouns, prepositions, conjunctions, and brand names. 
For qualitative analysis, I used text from the bars and evaluated them against the 
framework I derived from my review of issues covering cocoa production. I contacted 
(by email, in English) the makers of the bars in cases where clarification was needed. In 
practice, the U.S.-based chocolate manufacturers answered my questions, while European 
chocolate makers did not.  
By source, my sample encompasses bars from Argentina (1), Austria (1), Ecuador 
(12), France (3), Germany (2), Italy (2), Switzerland (1) and the United States (US) (5). 
In the US, the bars in my sample are priced in the range of US$ 0.04 to US$ 0.15 per 
                                                 
14 The order reflects “Arriba” historical range.  
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gram (US$ 1.1 to US$ 4.25 per oz). I did not include 'super premium' bars (> US$0.7 per 
gram, ~US$20 per oz). The average cocoa content of the bars was 70% (± 7%), with the 
“Fino de Aroma” bar having the lower percentage of cocoa (45%), and Cacaoyere's 
Puerto Quito having the maximum (91%). Bar codes were present on 35 bars, with the 
notable exception of the Fino de Aroma and Kallari's Roberto's Recipe bars made by the 
Ecuadorian manufacturer El Salinerito, and the expected absence of coding on the three 
marketing bars from cocoa producers’ organizations15
Single origin, varietals, and craftsmanship 
.  
On-bar narratives: addressing issues in cocoa production 
 Analysis of the narratives by source shows that the most commonly used non-
geographical (NG) product descriptor is “dark chocolate,” with all the manufacturers 
using it (or its equivalent in other languages). Other NG quality qualifiers (fine, extra, 
premium and unique) were used in 33% of the cases. A graphical representation of the 
use of terms in the wrappers is found on Figure 3. In this figure, the size of the font is 
proportional to the number of cases in which the word was found (n=27). Other than the 
Ashumira Bitter Chocolate Bar from Agricola Shumiral, the percentage of cocoa in the 
bar was printed on the front side of the packing of all the products. In all cases, this 
percentage was printed in a contrasting, bold and enlarged font.  
 I found a wide variation on the geographical definition of “single origin.” In my 
sample by source, 48% of the manufacturers 'single origin' encompass all of Ecuador and 
                                                 
15 The presence of bar codes indicate that manufacturers expect to sell the bars at the 
retail-level—giving that most supermarkets use these bars for price coding. The absence 
of bar code indicates that the bar is to be sold informally—in fairs, in small manufacturer-
owned shops, or used for marketing purposes. 
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48% of them define origin in terms of a fraction of the Ecuadorian territory (see Table 2). 
The Hachez d'Arriba Classic constitutes a notable exemption, given that the manufacturer 
only specifies that they use “premium cocoa beans from South America” (Hachez, n/d). 
48% of makers describe the varietal used on their bars as Arriba ( “Ariba” sic Chocolove, 
n/d); 11% use “Arriba Nacional;” 11% use Nacional; 22% do not declare what variety is 
used on the bar; 7% describe the variety used on their bars as a rare Forastero but either 
do not specify if Arriba is used (E. Guitard n/d), or declare that they use a variety other 
than Arriba (Salgado n/d); finally, 1% declare that they use a Trinitario bean from 
Ecuador (Pralus n/d).  
 Some manufacturers emphasize the role of their company in rescuing the Arriba 
varietal. For example, Dagoba's label addresses the historical decline of Arriba 
production, “Ecuador's once mighty Arriba Nacional is now on the verge of extinction” 
(Dagoba, n/d), and suggests that the partnership of the company with some “dedicated” 
farmers is necessary to rescue it. Kallari's narrative suggests that the decline on Nacional 
production was caused because it was “over planted in factory farms,” which led to attack 
of diseases and loss of most of the Nacional genotype. However, the Kallari label 
explains that Nacional cocoa “survived and flourished in the Napo region, where it was 
protected by traditional cultivation technique[s]” (Kallari, n/d). 
Who is behind fine chocolate: farmers or manufacturers?  
 Overall, 52% of the manufacturers in my sample acknowledge the role of farmers 
(producers) in protecting, selecting and cultivating cocoa varietals. Manufacturers also 
mention that these farmers follow traditional management practices, generally described 
as raising cocoa under the shade of other trees (i.e., [the farmers] “cultivated the cocoa in 
 51 
 
the traditional way, amid shade trees, bananas and a variety of other plants” (Zooter, n/d). 
Other statements hint at connections but lack specifics. For example, the Amedei label 
(n/d) suggests that making chocolate involves “forming relationships of friendship, 
respect, and partnership with the people who live where cocoa grows, keepers of ancient 
knowledge,” but further details are lacking.  
 Amedei stands in contrast with the narrative of two other bars, Askinosie San Jose 
del Tambo and Kallari's Single Source. Askinosie’s take on the 'bean to bar' premise goes 
to the point of personalizing their San Jose del Tambo Nibble Bar with the portrait of 
Vitaliano Saravia, an Ecuadorian farmer and cocoa growers' leader who was “really 
involved in introducing Shawn [Askinosie] to San Jose del Tambo [village] and who was 
involved in the entire project, including the contribution of beans” (Shawn Askinosie, 
phone interview with author, 04/21/2010). Askinosie’s commitment is stated on the back 
of the bar: “the farmer on the front of this package helped gather and ferment the cocoa 
beans for the bar inside” (Askinosie n/d). The level of involvement of this company with 
the farmers leads to improved traceability, a point made clear with the statement that 
“working directly and personally with this man [Vitaliano Saravia] and other 
farmers−instead of brokers−allows me to help them improve the quality of their beans 
and allows you to know exactly where your chocolate comes from” (Askinosie, n/d). 
While Kallari's bar lacks this personal approach, in the text of the bar it specifies that it is 
owned by the farmers, who harvest and market their own bars. Kallari's text informs the 
reader that its beans come from 850 Kichwa families in the Napo Region of the 
Ecuadorian Amazon, and the particular taste of the bar is owed to farmers harvesting 
“endemic varieties that are available only on these small farms” (Kallari's n/d). Kallari 
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also takes pride out of being a ‘farmer owned’ chocolate company (Kallari n/d). Kallari's 
bar and the three cocoa grower's associations bars (Ashumiral, UNOCACE and Fortaleza 
del Valle) also share the commonality in that the role of farmers, varietals and 
management practices are emphasized while 'manufacturing craftsmanship' is ignored. 
The emphasis on the local is understandable given that these four groups hire other 
companies to produce their bars.  
 I found that the making of a single origin bar is not necessarily straightforward. It 
may include steps done by companies other than the brand name.  For example, in the 
insert of the Chocolove Chocolatour Ecuador Bar, the narrator (whom I assume is the 
manufacturer) comments on travel to Ecuador. The reader learns about the narrator’s 
visits to cocoa farms, where this person saw “cocoa growing almost wild, intercropped 
among the hardwood and fruit trees” (Chocolatour n/d). The narrator also visited “the 
facilities where cocoa is fermented and cured and then ventured off into the forest,” and 
tasted cocoa beans [sic] on the wild (Chocolatour n/d). The bar packaging also shows 
indicators that suggest uniqueness and traceability, such as an “Limited production 
counter,” “Lot number,” and other features that suggests that the manufacturers were able 
to track the cocoa from the farms (that they visited on their trip) to their production 
facility in the USA. However, the manufacturer also mentions that Chocolove is “Made 
in Boulder, CO with Belgian chocolate” (Chocolatour n/d). The process of making this 
bar is less straightforward than what its rhetoric suggests. In Chocolove’s manufacturing 
process, the beans from Ecuador (or any other origin) are transported to Belgium, 
processed into chocolate blocks, and transported to the USA for repacking and selling.  
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 On the rest of the bars, manufacturer's traditional craftsmanship is invariably 
presented as a critical factor to achieve premium quality. For example, in Amano's 
Guayas, the on-bar narrative explains that cocoa's floral aroma16
 The emphasis on craftsmanship is the strongest on the 48% of bars in which local 
factors (farmers and varietals) are not spotlighted. On these bars, manufacturers are said 
to play the key role on defining the quality of final product. However, they have a passive 
role in bean sourcing: they receive, select, and process the beans without the involvement 
described in the narratives of the previous group. A common claim is that manufacturers’ 
expertise is what allows them to select premium beans from abroad. For example, in the 
narrative of the Bonnat Chocolat Equateur, it is said that their Maitre Chocolatier 
Stephane Bonnat plays a key role by selecting premium beans from the unroasted beans 
that arrive at his factory in Voiron (France) (Bonnat, n/d). The Swiss firm Lindt also 
remarks on the importance of selecting beans for achieving premium quality. The 
emphasis on manufacturing knowledge is the strongest suit of Hachez d'Arriba narrative. 
For Hachez, the quality of their bars is given by processing, following a 100 year-old 
“single recipe” that requires of a long processing time, expressed as “conching of 72 
hours.” In chocolate production, “conching” is a process that contributes to flavor 
development. Conching also delivers chocolate with an uniform taste, thus helping 
 is released only after the 
beans are “hand roasted” and ground using an “antique stone grinder.” By using these 
methods the company claims that it is “reviving the art of making chocolate from the 
bean” (Amano, n/d).  
                                                 
16Arriba is known by its floral aroma (described as hints of orange blossoms).  
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manufacturers to account for variability in their supply of cocoa beans. The use of extra-
long conching times produces chocolate with a basic taste. Hachez is the only brand in 
my sample that uses conching to signify quality (Hachez, n/d). The Hachez bar is also 
unique in that it does not state which variety is used on the bar (although it uses 
“d'Arriba” on the brand name), and its source of origin for the cocoa is “South America” 
(Hachez, n/d) 
Ethical and environmental sourcing: small farmers and shade-grown cocoa 
 Social and environmental aspects form part of the narratives of 70% of the 
narratives by source. Of these, both social and environmental issues are covered on 37%; 
exclusively environmental issues are covered on 16%, and exclusively social issues on 
47% of them. However, only 46% of the bars are certified under Organic, Fair-trade, 
and/or Rainforest Alliance certification schemes. Of the certified bars, organic is the most 
frequent certification (50%), followed by Rainforest Alliance (16%), and Fair-Trade 
(7.4%). I found that 16% of the bars exhibited two certification labels, with two possible 
combinations: Rainforest Alliance/ Organic (8%), and Fair-Trade / Organic (8%).  
 As a whole, manufacturers weigh economic, environmental and social issues 
similarly. For instance, Kallari's narrative is consistent with the bean-to-bar holistic 
conceptualization of the brand. In fact, it is one that exhibits both Organic and Rainforest 
Alliance certifications. Also, the narrative of this brand is a text-book definition of 
sustainable development, by stating that “the profits” from the sales of the bars return to 
the cooperative to support “sustainable development, health, and education programs 
while helping to preserve one of Earth's most important climate-protecting, rain forest 
ecosystems” (Kallari n/d).  
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 In another example, the narrative on the Ecuadoriana de Chocolates' Cacaoyere 
bar confronts environmental, social and economic issues upfront. It informs the reader 
that the cocoa comes from shaded cocoa groves owned by small farmers (with holdings 
of 1 to 15 hectares), “in harmony with fruit and timber trees and tropical woodlands” 
(Cacaoyere, n/d). The narrative then reports that “under normal circumstances, these 
farmers’ yearly incomes are from US$ 700 to US$ 1200 (about US$60-100 per month), 
which “is not enough to send their children to school, or to pay for health care” 
(Cacaoyere n/d)17
                                                 
17 The reported monthly income of these farmers, of US$100, is a quarter of Ecuador's 
poverty level monthly minimum income (US$385 per month for a family of five) (data 
for April 2010, INEC 2010m). The income that the farmers get from Cacaoyere, 45% 
higher for about ~US$145 per month, still is a fraction of what is need to feed a family.  
. Then, it reports that through Cacaoyere these farmers receive a better 
price for their cocoa, “45% higher than the local price” (Cacaoyere n/d). It also reports 
that Cacaoyere collaborates with inter governmental and non- governmental institutions 
(the German GTZ and the US financed ACDI VOCA are mentioned). Cacaoyere’s 
narrative suggests that, with the help of the company and these partnerships, the 
cooperatives should be able to reach environmental and economic sustainability. The 
narrative of the Hoja Verde bar indicates that they source beans exclusively from shaded 
plantations, “thereby supporting a balanced natural habitat-ensuring the well-being of 
local communities who live in this fragile and important ecosystem” (Hoja Verde n/d). It 
also links consumption of a Fair-Trade certified goods to economic, social and 
environmental goals: “by choosing this Fair Trade certified product, you are directly 
supporting a better life for farming families through fair prices, direct trade, community 
development, and environmental stewardship” (Hoja Verde, n/d).  
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Finally, other companies gave more emphasis to the socio-economic issues. For example, 
Askinosie “A Stake in the Outcome” statement─which in practice means that the 
company shares 10% of its profits with the farmers who produced the beans (Shawn 
Askinosie, phone interview with author, 04/21/2010.) ─ emphasize fairness in trade 
outside of the Fair-Trade labeling system. Kallari declares that as a farmer owned brand it 
transfers all of the chocolate profits back to the communities (Kallari, n/d) 
 Single-origin on the cheap 
 I found two different views of single-origin, with half of the manufacturers (48%) 
opting for a country-wide definition of single origin, and the other half opting for a 
single-origin which is a fraction of Ecuador's territory. My results suggest that there is an 
inverse correlation between the area of the putative source of cocoa beans and the depth 
of the relationship between manufacturers and farmers as stated in the bar’s narrative. 
Indeed, manufacturers that specifically name a farmer, farmer's group or farmer's 
organization as the source of their cocoa are more likely to have well defined 
geographical sourcing. These manufacturers are also more likely to emphasize the 
contribution of nature (place and variety) and culture (practice and knowledge) to the 
quality of the final product. On the other hand, continental or country-wide sourcing is 
linked to claims about manufacturers' expertise and craftsmanship, paying token attention 
to the farmers on the ground.  
 My findings also suggest that the presence of Fair-Trade or Rainforest Alliance 
certification on the bars increases the traceability of the product. Both Rainforest Alliance 
and Fair-Trade publish an online accessible database with the name of the certified 
producers by country and product, therefore limiting the scope of a search to a few well-
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defined locations. In the case of far more common organic certified products, the process 
of tracing the beans to the point of origin using packing material data is challenging. A 
unified organic certification database is lacking, so information about certified producers 
is dispersed among several certifying companies (three in my sample: Naturland, CERES 
and BCS OKO). However, the sole presence of these certification seals does not supply 
ample evidence about the sourcing of cocoa. Certification acts as a barrier to entry at the 
producer's level (limiting the number of cocoa suppliers for a particular bar), but 
manufacturers can effectively source cocoa from any certified producer.  
 Overall, my results suggest that most chocolate makers are opting for a country-
wide definition of origin that does not allow for tracing the bars to the cocoa-farming-
community where the beans were raised. In my sample of 27 bars by source, only 4 
commercially available bars and the 3 producer's organizations bars supply enough detail 
to trace the cocoa beans to the community of origin, although the narratives of the 23 out 
of 27 bars in this sub sample address the role of farmers in sourcing the cocoa.  
 On the other hand, the experience of manufacturers that are engaged in close 
relationships with producer's groups suggest that establishing these relationships is 
challenging. Shawn Askinosie from Askinosie Chocolates argues that this is because “it 
involves farmers meeting [for the first time] a chocolate maker [and chocolate makers 
meeting farmers], without middlemen. It is difficult because it is new” (Shawn Askinosie, 
interview with author, 04/21/2010). Pierrick Chouard, from Vintage Chocolates, argues 
that the lack of reliability of some of their local [Ecuador] partners has forced this 
company to change sourcing three times over the last 13 years. Chouard also indicated 
that developing [Vintage's] group of 17 Los Ríos-based farmers/suppliers took this 
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company most of the last 9 years, and demanded the expenditure of considerable human 
and financial capital. Chouard argues that developing a true bean-to-bar product requires 
significant investments and a high level of compromise. Bean-to-bar requires that a 
manufacturer bypass the entrenched conventional trading system, therefore creating an 
alternative commodity chain from the ground level (Pierrick Chouard, phone interview 
with author, April 2010). The magnitude of the effort behind developing links is 
daunting. For example, Clark Goble from Amano Chocolates mentioned that there is an 
international competition for the best quality beans. In his words, “sometimes everyone 
wants the same beans” (Goble, email to author, 2010). Relationships with cocoa 
producers are not straightforward: there is competitive demand for high quality cocoa and 
farmers and exporters sell to the highest bidder. This company, which works with small 
farmers as well as large plantations, sometimes has to “work with [a] middleman, if only 
to manage all the regulations of customs and handling transport” (Goble, email to the 
author, 04/28/2010).  
 It can be argued that it is disingenuous to pretend the artisan chocolate makers can 
effectively challenge the multinationals of the candy industry. Indeed in an email to list-
serve subscribers, the U.S. based non-profit Fine Chocolate Industry Association said that 
members of the group “are not out to change the chocolate industry- I just want to 
support and celebrate our small segment of it” (FCIA, email to the author, 05/12/2010). 
From the labels, it is evident that manufacturers are designing products to meet the 
demand of consumers for alternative chocolate—from the forest, high quality, safe and 
traceable, and fair—but the mechanisms for the sourcing of this “alternative” cocoa are 
not clearly stated in the labels of most products, indicating that most consumers are 
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satisfied with vague references to geographical sourcing and supporting-the-farmers 
rhetoric. Environmental and social certifications provide a higher level of traceability, but 
do not necessarily signify a closer and committed relationships among producers, 
manufacturers and consumers.  
I argue that ”at-length” alternative-sourcing is a perilous approach for several 
reasons. First, companies that rely on country-wide or regional sourcing have low control 
over bean quality, making them vulnerable to irregular results. As the Askinosie case 
illustrates, companies that work closely with farmers—and are willing to commit time 
and resources to cultivate these relationships—are likely to secure access to a supply of 
high-quality beans. Companies that opt out of developing relationships with the 
producers will find themselves engaged in an endless race to secure high quality beans. 
Second, at-length cocoa sourcing puts artisan companies in direct competition with the 
large candy multinationals, which are quite interested in entering into these niche markets 
and sourcing high-quality cocoa (i.e., Hershey's and Lindt). Direct trade sourcing—such 
as Kallari or Askinosie—appears to offer a better option for achieving social and 
environmental goals than more “at-length” sourcing, but more research is needed to 
understand the potentials and limitations of this new mechanism for manufacturers-
producers collaboration. 
  My results also suggest that Ecuadorian institutional efforts to protect Ecuadorian 
fine cocoa production are only partially addressing this underlying issue. My results 
suggest that the first problem for fine cocoa production is the use of the Arriba label to 
cover all of the Ecuadorian territory. Arriba may be in fact the best known of all 
Ecuadorian cocoa varieties, but this designation ignored the marketing potential of 
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Ecuador's other historically-strong commercial varieties. A more strict adoption of 
geographical marketing will allow cocoa producing regions to capitalize out of their own 
genetic reservoirs. Historical data suggest that fine cocoa is to be found in other 
Ecuadorian regions, but this issue needs to be explored.  
I suggest that the adoption of new forms of varietal nomenclature (i.e., 
Motamayor et al. 2008 molecular markers proposal of a nomenclature based on 10 
sources of cocoa diversity) may contribute to the rescue of endangered genotypes. 
Centralized efforts to develop Nacional varieties should be focused to restricted 
geographical ranges, trying to identify and propagate locally-adapted ecotypes. The 
findings of Motamayor et al. (2008) are that the Nacional genotype exists in areas other 
than Ecuadorian Western lowlands (i.e., Southern Ecuadorian Amazon region) which 
suggest that farmers in Western and Eastern Ecuador should be able to develop their own 
attractive varieties.  
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Figure 1. Price by weight of cocoa beans (in US$ per tonne), 2004-2007, showing price 
differential for fine versus bulk cocoa beans. Source: FAOSTAT 2010, ICCO 2010.  
Figure 2. World’s cocoa area harvested (in thousands of ha), production (in thousand 
tonnes) and price per weight (in US$ per tonne), 1961-2009. Source: FAOSTAT 2010.  
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Table 1. Chocolate bars by brand, % of cocoa solids, manufacturer and country of origin 
of manufacturer 
Name, brand and % cocoa Manufacturer 
Country of 
manufacturer 
Amano Guayas 70% Amano Chocolate  USA  
Amedei Ecuador 70% Amedei Italy  
Ashumira Shumiral (Azuay) n/d † Agricola Shumiral Ecuador  
Askinosie San Jose del Tambo Nibble 
Bar 70% 
Askinosie Chocolate USA  
Cacaoyere Cumba (Esmeraldas) 71% Ecuatoriana de Chocolates Ecuador  
   El Eno (Amazonia) 63% “ “ 
   Las Naves (Bolivar) 82% “ “ 
   Puerto Quito (Pichincha) 91% “ “ 
Caoni Esmeraldas 55% BLK Corporation “ 
   Los Ríos 77% “ “ 
Chocolat Bonnat Equateur 75% Voiron France  
Chocolove XOXOX Ecuador 72% Chocolove USA 
Corporacion Fortaleza del Valle 
Calceta (Manabí) 60%† 
Pacari Ecuador  
Dagoba Los Ríos 68% Dagoba USA  
Domori Cacao Arriba 70% Domori Italy  
   Cacao Cult Ecuador 70% “ “ 
E. Guittard Quevedo (Los Ríos) 65% Guittard Chocolate 
Company 
USA  
Fino de Aroma 45% El Salinerito  Ecuador  
Francois Pralus Equateur Fortissima 
80% 
Pralus S.A.S. France  
   Equateur Trinitario 75% “ “ 
Hachez Cocoa d'Arriba 77% Hachez Chocolate Germany  
Hershey's Cacao Reserve Arriba 50% The Hershey Company USA 
Hoja Verde 58% Hoja Verde Ecuador  
Kallari 75% Ecuatoriana de Chocolates Ecuador  
   85% “ “ 
   Roberto's Recipe 75% El Salinerito “ 
Lindt Excellence Ecuador 75% Lindt Switzerland Switzerland  
Nestle Dark 60% Nestle Ecuador Ecuador  
Pacari Esmeraldas 60% SKS-Ecuadorian Organics “ 
   Manabí 65% “ “ 
Republica del Cacao El Oro 67% Confiteca “ 
   Los Ríos 75% “ “ 
   Manabí 75% “ “ 
                                                                                                                       (continued) 
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Table 1. Continued 
Name, brand and % cocoa Manufacturer 
Country of 
manufacturer 
Salgado Grand Cru Esmeraldas 70% Sucesores de Jose Salgado 
SAIC 
Argentina  
UNOCACE Floral 75% † Tulicorp  Ecuador  
Valrhona Alpaco Ecuador 66% Valrhona France  
Vintage Plantations 90% Vintage Plantations Ecuador Ecuador  
Zooter Labooko Single Machala (El 
Oro) 60%‡ 
Zotter Schokoladen 
Manufaktur 
Austria  
All bars were commercially available at the time of collection unless marked: † 
Promotional bar; ‡ Courtesy of Mark Christian (C-Spot).  
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Table 2. Sources of cocoa, number of bars, scale of sourcing, place, and area (in sq km) of place 
 
Source of cocoa Bars (n=39) 
Internal level of sourcing 
Area (sq. km) 
 
Province/s Canton Parish  
Continent 
 
     
South America 1    20,421,180 a 
Country       
Ecuador  16    256,369 b 
Region       
Ecuadorian Amazon 3 Morona 
Napo 
Orellana 
Pastaza 
Sucumbios 
Zamora 
All included All included 11,6178 c 
Province       
El Oro 1 El Oro “ “ 5,817 b 
Esmeraldas 3 Esmeraldas “ “ 15,576 b 
Guayas 1 Guayas “ “ 17,140 d 
Los Ríos 3 Los Ríos “ “ 7,151 b 
Manabí 2 Manabí “ “ 18,894 b 
Canton/Parish       
Calceta, Manabí  1 Manabí Bolivar 
Chone 
Portoviejo 
Tosagua 
” 445 
 
e 
(continued) 
 
 
 
  
66 
Table 2. (continued) 
 
Source of cocoa Bars (n=39) 
Internal level of sourcing 
Area (sq. km) 
 
Province/s Canton Parish  
Canton/Parish       
Cumba, Esmeraldas 1 Esmeraldas Atacames “ 511 f 
El Eno, Amazonia 1 Sucumbios Lago Agrio El Eno 448 g 
Las Naves, Bolivar 1 Bolivar Las Naves All included 147 h 
Machala, El Oro 
(UROCAL) 
1 Guayas 
 
Azuay 
El Oro 
Naranjal 
Balao 
Pucara 
El Guabo 
Santa Rosa 
Machala 
Some included 4,951 i 
Puerto Quito, Pichincha 1 Pichincha Puerto Quito All included 683 j 
Quevedo, Los Ríos 1 Los Ríos Quevedo “ 302 k 
San Jose del Tambo, 
Bolivar 
1 Bolivar Chillanes San Jose del 
Tambo 
242 l 
Shumiral, Azuay 1 Azuay Pucara Ponce Enriques 642 m 
Note: Ecuador's subdivisions are as follow: Country> Province> Canton> Parish. “Regions” are used to group provinces but are 
not an official political division category (to May 05 2010). 
Sources: a World Bank (2008); b INEC, 2005; c Calculated from INEC (2005); d Calculated from INEC, 2002a; e Calculated from 
INEC, 2002b and information from Fortaleza del Valle (2010); f INEC, 2002c; g Estimated from INEC, 2002d; h INEC, 2002e; i 
INEC, 2002f, INEC, 2002g, INEC, 2002h, Ponce Enriquez (2010) and information from UROCAL (2010); j INEC, 2002i; k INEC, 
2002j; l INEC, 2002j; m Ponce Enriquez (2010) 
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CHAPTER III. 
ON THE PATH OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT  
Introduction and Background 
Globalization is eroding the livelihoods of small farmers, a significant and 
vulnerable class, particularly in the developing world. The cost-price squeeze stemming 
from trade liberalization places farmers in a “race to the bottom” that leads to 
displacement, poverty, and environmental degradation (Porter 1999). It has been 
proposed that alternative trade initiatives offer a unique opportunity to reverse this trend 
by harnessing the power of the markets to reward producers of goods with embedded 
superior cultural, environmental, and social values (Goodman and DuPuis 2002; Bryant 
and Goodman 2004; McMichael 2000).  
Policy makers— influenced by the narrative of ‘sustainability through 
consumption’— attempt to solve allocation issues by fomenting partnerships that 
encourage the de-commoditization of consumer’s products by creating niche markets that 
cater to the sensibilities of the Northern activist consumers (Bryant and Goodman 2004). 
These initiatives—under the umbrella of ‘sustainable development’ (Brundtland 1987)—
seek to address social, economic, and environmental problems of contemporary food 
systems (Bingen, Serrano, and Howard 2003). Thus, it is posed that parallel systems of 
trade provide solutions to structural problems of commodity production and trade, such 
as an export’s oligopoly, scale-biased regulatory regimes, and markets’ failure to account 
for provision of environmental and social services. Alternative trade networks are 
visualized as institutional arrangements through which the benefit generated by small-
scale, low-input agricultural producers are valorized (Moberg 2005; Gómez Tovar et al. 
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2005; Brown and Getz 2008). Thus, alternative trade networks create ‘partnerships of 
virtue’ that challenge the transnationally-dominated global food system (McMichael 
2000).  
Under the banner of a common understanding of the “necessity, desirability and 
universality” of sustainability (Luke 2005), local and international agencies vie for 
producers to joint alternative trade development schemes. However, the discursive 
concept of a partnership based in equity and mutual benefit (Ashman 2001) belie 
differences at both ends of the commodity chain: what for consumers it is a matter of 
expressing choice, for producers it is a matter of survival (Moberg 2005). The discourse 
of sustainability becomes normative, because producers must meet their international 
partner’s standards to gain access to capital (Melo and Wolf 2007). The disparity points 
to the need to question the effectiveness of these partnerships, given that—underlying the 
design and execution of any sustainable development project—there is a bare-naked 
power differential between rural commodity producers and the globalized technocratic 
elite who lead these programs.  
In this chapter, I analyze the results of the alliance of Ecuador’s Cacao Producers 
Federation (Federacion Nacional de Productores de Cacao del Ecuador, FEDECADE), its 
Ecuadorian NGO counterpart (currently known as Fundacion Alianza CEIDE,18
                                                 
 18 This NGO has been known as Corporacion of Conservacion y Desarrollo (CCD, 1992-
2000), Conservacion y Desarrollo (CYD, 2001-2007), and Fundacion Alianza CEIDE 
(2007-current) (Juan Lecaro, electronic interview with author, 05/04/2010) 
 or 
CYD), and a heterogeneous set of international donors. These projects spanned 10 years 
(1997-2008), and nominally invested roughly US$ 1200 for each of the farmers involved 
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(US$ 1,436,738 per 1172 families). The shared goal of these projects was to create an 
alternative commercialization system that paid a fair value for the farmer’s shade-grown 
fine cocoa known as Nacional. Shade-grown Nacional cocoa plantations are prized by 
conservationists because these multi-strata agro-forestry systems provide environmental 
goods and services—habitat for endangered wildlife species and protection to local water 
courses—that are lost when they are converted to other crops systems (i.e., bananas or 
full-sun cocoa). My focus is in the benefit reaped by farmers in the area of influence of 
FEDECADE and beyond, one year after FEDECADE commercialization system ceased 
to operate. 
Methods 
The study was conducted on Ecuador's western lowlands, from May to December 
of 2009 (Figure 1). Fieldwork was conducted in the area of influence of FEDECADE, in 
the provinces of Azuay, El Oro and Guayas. The study gathered data from three sources: 
in-depth interviews with farmers, farmer’s leaders, and NGOs and founding agencies 
personnel, an open-answer survey applied to 100 farmers, and the physical and digital 
archives of FEDECADE and CYD. Interviews with cocoa exporters, NGO staff, and 
other informants were conducted on an ad hoc basis. 
The in-depth interview script was designed to gather information about the 
experiences of farmer’s organization with cocoa commercialization, interactions with 
local and external agencies, and a general feeling about the state of the industry from a 
farmer’s perspective. The interviews were conducted in Spanish, in an ad-hoc basis, 
based upon participant willingness and time availability. I interviewed farmers and 
farmers’ leaders from all FEDECADE cooperatives or associations. I also conducted in-
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depth interviews with farmers that hold positions of leadership on their community’s 
cocoa commercialization team. The interviews with farmers were complemented with 
interviews with FEDECADE representatives and staff, government and non-profit 
organization officials, cocoa exporters, other farmer’s organizations representatives and 
cocoa town-level intermediaries. 
The second data source consists of an open-answer survey applied to cocoa 
producers from Guayas and Azuay (Appendix 1). These producers were included in the 
records of FEDECADE. At the time of the study, a FEDECADE farmer could hold up to 
three certifications (Fair Trade, Organic and Rainforest Alliance). The survey was 
conducted at each participant’s residence. In total, I conducted 100 of these surveys. The 
survey consisted of four parts. The first, personal history, included questions that 
establish age, gender and background of the farmers in the sample. The second, land 
management, gathered information about the amount of land managed, and the level of 
fragmentation of this area. The third, cocoa and other crop production, asked questions 
about the crops managed by each farmer (including questions about crop variety, yield, 
and age of the crops); it also included questions about subjective perceptions about the 
benefits and liabilities of cocoa varietals. Finally, commercialization and income, asks 
questions about the income generated by cocoa under different selling modalities, and 
asked about the contribution of other economic activities to farmer’s income. Farmer’s 
were recruited in the sample depending on their willingness to participate in the study, on 
the basis of two criteria: a) de-facto management of the land, b) being included in the 
rolls of associations registered with FEDECADE. The application of these two criteria 
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yielded a sample of 100 farmers out of 430 registered with FEDECADE’s Nueva Union 
Campesina, 6 de Julio, Camacho and La Florida Associations.  
The third data source consisted of approximately 277 MB (~450 files) available in 
FEDECADE’s computers up to December of 2009; 194 MB of the Conservacion y 
Desarrollo (CYD) cocoa project (~1000 files), and of 176 documents made publicly 
available by CYD at the social publishing website Scribb [www.scribb.com]. The two 
groups have produced documents that are not included in these repositories, but these 
digital files are an archive that has been preserved in the face of changing technology, 
frequent failure of electronic equipment, and lack of backups. The associations and 
cooperatives of FEDECADE kept their commercialization records on Microsoft Excel 
files, which sometimes had formula or format problems [i.e., errors in SUM range 
assignation, or use of a “comma” for decimal points]. These problems were corrected, but 
the data are otherwise reported as they appear in FEDECADE’s databases. From 2003 to 
2008, FEDECADE associations stocked and sold six types of cocoa [Nacional Faitrade 
Organic, Nacional Organic, Nacional Rainforest Alliance, Nacional conventional, CCN-
51 conventional and monilla19
                                                 
19 The “monilla” or “negro” are beans from pods damaged by frosty-pod disease, 
Moniliophthora roreri. These beans are paid at 50% of the price of “normal” cocoa.  
] to internal and external markets. 
I was also granted access to the personal archives stored in the town of Jesus 
Maria in the residence of FEDECADE’s President, Agr. Victor Chacon Salinas. Relevant 
files were scanned and converted to digital files. Data classification, management and 
sorting was done using Atlas.Ti.6.1.1. 
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In the results, I distinguish between CYD and FEDECADE. There are two caveats 
with this study. First, FEDECADE was made into the beneficiary of CYD-devised 
development projects. Second, CYD was in charge of the projects (from budgeting to 
coordination). Thus, although FEDECADE was nominally given full responsibility over 
certain components of the projects, it was limited to executing CYD’s plans. 
Ecuador’s Federation of Cocoa Producers: then and now  
The Ecuador’s Federation of Cocoa Producers (known as FEDECADE for the 
acronym of its Spanish name “Federacion de Productores de Cacao del Ecuador”) is a 
federated non-profit organization constituted in 1981. The FEDECADE membership 
consisted of 1172 farmers (and their families) grouped in 11 associations located in the 
provinces of Azuay, Bolívar, Esmeraldas, Guayas, and El Oro (FEDECADE 2008; 
MAGAP et al. n/d; Transfair 2005) The farmers affiliated with FEDECADE hold 7900 
ha of cocoa Nacional, of which 3000 ha were certified under the U.S. based Rainforest 
Alliance; 1500 ha were certified as Organic by Germany-based BCS Öko-Garantie 
GmbH, and 600 ha were certified Fairtrade by Germany-based FLO-Cert GmbH 
(MAGAP et al. n/d). Certifications overlapped, thus a farm could be counted under the 
three certification schemes simultaneously.  
The FEDECADE has a long history of activism advocating for the “economic 
interests” of Ecuador’s small and medium cocoa farmers (Victor Chacon Salinas, 
interview with author, 12/10/2007). Guided by a pragmatic turn, FEDECADE has 
evolved from a trade-union organization focused on “defending and advancing Ecuador’s 
small and medium cocoa farmer’s interests” (Victor Chacon Salinas, interview with 
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author, 12/10/2007), to a one whose stated goal is “to produce and export fine and aroma 
cocoa” (FEDECADE-Max_Havellar, n/d)20
                                                 
20 This transition from “trade-union” to “money-oriented” is criticized by some ex 
FEDECADE members, some of which denounced FEDECADE’s Chacon Salinas 
leadership because “it abandoned its role of opposing ‘cocoa exporters’ by becoming one 
of them” (Vincente Pidrahita, interview with author, Vinces, 12/08/2007).  
 
 The change in FEDECADE from a ‘confront-the-establishment’ to an ‘export-
oriented multi-certified organization’ can be traced back to its 1997 involvement with the 
environmentally oriented CYD, an Ecuadorian Quito-based non-gubernamental 
organization (NGO). For the next 10 years, CYD acted as FEDECADE’s main 
intermediary for international donors, launching several projects that were nominally 
focused on maximizing farmer’s profits derived from Nacional cocoa plots. In these 
projects proposals, the alliance among FEDECADE, CYD and international donors was 
presented as ‘win-win’ sustainable development partnership operating under a set of—
assumed—shared values based in a common understating of the problématique of 
Ecuadorian Cocoa. For the donors and NGOs, the development of an environmentally 
oriented certification system for cocoa offered an opportunity to improve cocoa farmer’s 
social and economic welfare while maintaining the provision of environmental services 
coming out of Nacional shaded cocoa plots (Rios et al. 1997). The alternative 
commercialization chain was to challenge the traditional middlemen commodity chain in 
which farmers’ gate price per quintal [100 pounds or 45.35 kg] that was 63% (or less) of 
the market price paid by the exporters in Guayaquil, with the ultimate goal of transferring 
more resources to the farmers (Desarrollo 2000).  
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 For FEDECADE, the alliance with CYD and international donors offered an 
opportunity to address what the agronomist Victor Chacon Salinas—then and now 
FEDECADE President, and a cocoa producer on his own—has long contended were the 
factors that keep small cocoa producers in poverty. Chacon Salinas, in an early 1990s 
document identified four major problems for Ecuadorian cocoa production at the time: 
lack of generation and transfer of technology; low gate prices caused by both a 
malfunctioning local commercialization chain and worldwide cocoa overproduction; lack 
of credits available for long term, seasonal crops like cocoa; and lack of a suitable cocoa 
gene bank from which to identify and propagate suitable high yield Nacional cocoa 
varieties (Chacon Salinas 1990). FEDECADE was hopeful that projects and other private 
initiatives would be able to fill the aforementioned voids. It was also expected that these 
projects would address the lingering issue of lowering quality of Ecuadorian cocoa 
exports, given that the middlemen-mediated chain was said to focus on quantity, not 
quality (Chacon Salinas 1990). Furthermore, by offering premiums for cocoa produced in 
shaded plantations, Chacon Salinas (1990) expected that these developments would 
provide incentives to protect the shade-grown Nacional cocoa ecosystem from the threats 
of deforestation, soil erosion, and pollution.  
 The need for private intervention was amplified by the weakening of the 
Ecuadorian state that followed  neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. A series of changes 
created a situation where there was no clear policy in place, given that new regulatory 
bodies came into existence only to be replaced after a short tenure. For instance, 
Ecuador’s Cocoa National Program (Programa Nacional del Cacao, PNCC) was closed in 
1995 (Rosero 2002). Although financed since 1977 with a 0.5% tax over the FOB value 
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of the cocoa exports, the PNCC has long struggled to fulfill its multiple roles of providing 
extension services, building infrastructure, and conducting cocoa research and 
development with a staff of just thirty extension agents to supply the needs of 58,618 
farms (what amounted to 1,890 farms per extension agent) (Soria 1986). After being 
deemed ineffective, in 1989 its regulatory role was delegated to the privately-run non-
profit Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Productos 
Agropecuarios) (Redaccion Expreso 1991; Rosero 2002). The Stock Exchange was 
financed with 1.5% of the value FOB of the cocoa exports (of which 0.4% of the FOB 
were to be dedicated to develop and implement a cocoa quality certification system, and 
1.1% of the FOB was designated for extension services). When cocoa production reached 
a historical low in 1998, the efforts of “La Bolsa” were found lacking (Guayaquil 1999a), 
and the government transferred quality-control and industry development functions to the 
private Nacional Association of Cocoa Exporters (Asociacion Nacional de Exportadores 
de Cacao, ANECACAO), which then was funded with 0.42% of the FOB value of the 
exports (Rosero 2002). The PNCC extension services were also privatized, with 
controversial results:  (Rivera and Alex 2004; Wong 2006; Flores G. 2007). 
 The retrenchment of the State also influenced the price paid to cocoa producers. 
Attempts to foment the local production of cocoa elaborates21
                                                 
21 Cocoa elaborates, such as cocoa licour, cocoa paste and cocoa butter, are a value-added 
intermediate-step in the industrial process that transforms cocoa beans into chocolate.  
—such as cocoa liquor and 
cocoa paste—were abandoned, after the system of export quotas and price subsidies (for 
local processors) collapsed under pressure by farmers and exporters in the late 1980s 
(Norero Gonzalez 1988). The Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Stock Exchange did 
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not fulfill its promises of creating a “fair and transparent” market for agricultural 
products, and instead tried (unsuccessfully) to remain in control of all cocoa transactions 
(Guayaquil 1990).  
After cocoa was withdrawn from the Agricultural and Animal Husbandry Stock 
Market in 1999 (Guayaquil 1999b), Ecuador’s internal price for cocoa has been generally 
set by supply and demand, with the base of a ‘referential’ price set daily by ANECACAO 
using data from the Stock Exchanges in New York and London (Rosero, 2002). Farmer’s 
gate price is then set by subtracting intermediation costs from this ANECACAO base 
price; thus, the gate price is negatively correlated with the length of the 
commercialization chain.  
Small farmers were especially affected by the challenges posed by these 
institutional changes. While deemed insufficient, the PNCC provided a source of advice 
that farmers were likely to use on an ad hoc basis (Cesar Carrillo, interview with author, 
Jesus Maria, 12/17/2007). Further institutional failure drove a severe decline of cocoa 
quality, which in turn led to the 2005 International Cacao Organization decision to 
downgrade Ecuador’ cocoa rating from 100% fine flavor cocoa to 75% (ICCO, 2006). 
Thus, shaded Nacional plantations came to be seen as an agro-ecosystem under threat. 
The CYD documents of the time mention that cocoa production was being conducted in 
an “institutional void,” and suggested that development projects could address these 
problems (Desarrollo 2000). In general, CYD and FEDECADE shared views about the 
root causes of cocoa production problems, and had a common understanding about ways 
to address these issues (Valdivieso 2008, Victor Chacon Salinas, interview with author, 
July 2009). In this narrative, the decline of Nacional is attributed to agricultural factors 
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such as low productivity (diseases and lack of resources to maintain and replace 
plantations), and economic factors such as an oligopolistic internal cocoa market 
dominated by a few exporters. The loss of cocoa quality was explained as the 
consequence of a middlemen mediated commodity chain that did not transfer premiums 
for quality to the farmers and the lack of a system to reward farmers for the value added 
to Nacional cocoa beans for its fine cocoa quality, as well as for its environmental and 
social benefits (Desarrollo 1998; Desarrollo 2001; Desarrollo 2000). 
However, FEDECADE and CYD shared understanding did not cover all the 
aspects of cocoa production. The conflict FEDECADE-CYD was centered on the cocoa 
hybrid known as CCN-51, a full-sun variety developed by Homero U. Castro—a cocoa-
breeder with an on-and-off friendship with FEDECADE’s president (Victor Chacon 
Salinas, interview with author, July 2009)22. Chacon Salinas considered CCN-51’s high 
yield and disease-resistance characteristics as important assets for increasing the income 
of all cocoa farmers. Chacon Salinas opinion was informed by his years long experience 
with cocoa23
                                                 
22 In a paper found during field work, Homero U. Castro describes CCN 51 as a cross of 
F1 of IMC-67 x ICS-95 by O-1, where O-1 was a cacao ascension collected by himself in 
a trip to Ecuador's Valle de los Canelos (Castro 1981). According to this paper, CCN 
stands for Coleccion Castro Naranjal, where 51 is for the cross number of this variety.  
, and stand in contrast with 1997 CYD views of this full-sun variety. 
23 Chacon Salinas worked for several years as a cocoa field hand and general laborer 
before acquiring his degree in Agronomy. As an agronomist, he was hired as Cocoa 
Assessor for some of the large cocoa haciendas of the Naranjal area, among them Balao 
Chico. During these years, Chacon Salinas carefully documented how plots planted with 
directed hybrids or ‘selected’ clones of “Nacional” (EET series) and other varieties (ICS-
95; IMC 67, and SCA-12) routinely outperformed plots of ‘pure’ “Nacional” genotypes. 
Plots planted with selected genetic materials had “very good” or “extremely good” 
production, yielding 15-20 qq/ha year [681-909 kg/ha year] to those with ‘pure’ National 
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Although CYD personnel acknowledged that CCN-51 has “superior agronomic 
characteristics,” full-sun plantations were seen as a potential environmental threat under 
the assumption that high yield was linked to the management practices of agro-industrial 
“monocultures,” heavily dependent on inputs such as agrochemical and fertilizers (Rios 
et al. 1997). The environmental and ecological value of Nacional shaded plantations was 
spotlighted when comparing these biodiversity-rich agro ecosystems with other local 
crops (i.e., bananas) in an area where forests were already depleted. The CYD believed 
that a market niche could be carved for the fine Nacional cocoa, while CCN-51 would 
have to compete with bulk cocoa (Desarrollo 2000).  
After a slow 1995-1997 starting phase which emphasized the development of 
ecological certification norms24
                                                                                                                                                 
or natural hybrids which yielded 7-9 qq/ha year [318-409 kg/ha year] (Chacon Salinas 
1983; Chacon Salinas 1986). 
24 Compiled under the name of “Normas para la produccion agricola para cacao del 
Programa de Certificacion Eco-O.K.” Aspects of this normative were later adopted by the 
Conservation Agriculture Network, the Sustainable Agriculture Network, and the 
Rainforest Alliance Certified Programs that evolved from this early effort.  
, FEDECADE centered projects took a drastic turn to 
economic development and sustainable development. This shift was caused by the 1997-
1998 El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), which flooded Ecuadorian lowlands (UN, 
1998). The 1997-1998 ENSO affected all of Ecuador’s regional economy ( i.e., 
agriculture, fisheries, shrimp farming, etc), causing losses that amounted to one quarter of 
the total agricultural gross internal product (Vos et al. 1999). Twenty percent of the area 
dedicated to cocoa was flooded, with a loss of 40,000 ha (out of a 1997 estimate of 
340,000 ha). Even areas that were not flooded were affected by the proliferation of 
diseases caused by increased humidity and lower luminosity (Vos et al. 1999). Indeed, 
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the 1998 harvest was 43% of the previous year, (see Figure 2), and by 1999 the number 
of Ecuadorian poor is said to have drastically increased (Vos et al 1999). The economic 
crisis forced farmers to look for other sources of cash, such as harvesting shade trees or 
sending family members abroad (Interview with a farmer, Nueva Union Campesina, 
2009) 25
The key strategy for achieving these two goals was to increase farmers’ incomes 
by improving farmers’ access to the markets. This required three components: 
infrastructure to process and stock high quality cocoa beans; a group of farmers that had 
the know-how about how to buy cocoa from other farmers and sell the beans to the 
. 
The effects of the 1998 ENSO are reflected in the narrative of the CYD projects 
of the time. For example, in its project proposal to INTERMON (a Spanish socially 
oriented fund) for a commercialization scheme, CYD mentions, “by establishing a 
standardized and fair commercialization system, the project will improve the livelihood 
of small farmers’ families” (Desarrollo 2000). In this project narrative, environmental 
certification (which was the leading goal of previously executed projects) becomes a 
“marketing tool” that “will allow for a better product positioning in potential international 
markets” (Desarrollo 2001). The CYD narrative of the time makes economic 
development intrinsically linked to preservation of Nacional cocoa plots, in a shift that 
brings it in close alignment with FEDECADE’s concerns about farmers’ welfare 
(Desarrollo 2001). 
                                                 
25 The economic welfare of all Ecuadorians was affected by 1999-2000 bank crisis (50% 
of all banks were closed or transferred to a state agency); a government decree that 
‘freeze’ half the savings of all Ecuadorians, and 2000 Ecuador’s adoption of the US 
dollar as the country’s currency. 
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exporters, while making turning a “fair” profit; and a commercialization system that 
would be able improve the income of farmers by bypassing middlemen, with the ultimate 
goal of exporting certified Nacional cocoa independently. This project was leveraged in 
the unique “fine and flavored” quality of the Nacional beans, under the assumption that 
high-end chocolate makers would be willing to pay a higher price for value-added beans.  
Investing for Development I: Infrastructure; Training and Extension, and Research 
and Development, 1995-2008 
INTERMON and other donors agreed to finance the projects. The bulk of the 
projects investment—accounting for US$781,200 (54.37% of the total invested until 
2008)—was done from 1999 to 2004, in five years following the 1997-1998 ENSO (see 
Table 1). Leveraged with a considerable local counterpart, estimated in US$567,000 in 
goods and services26
                                                 
26 For example, farmers from 3 de Octubre (Rio Bonito) (3DO), Camacho (CAM) and 
Rio Blanco (Luz y Guia Campesina) donated land used to built stock centers; farmers 
from Rio Bonito, Camacho, working under the shared-work arrangement known as 
‘minga,’ built the stock centers themselves.  
, FEDECADE-CYD built three new stock centers: 3 de Octubre at 
Rio Bonito (El Oro); Camacho and Rio Blanco at Luz y Guia Campesina (Azuay), helped 
pre-associations and farmers groups to built “tendales” (large concrete surfaces used to 
dry cocoa), and updated and upgraded four ex-PNCC stock centers that were ‘on-loan’ to 
the cooperatives of El Progreso (PRO), Nueva Union Campesina (NUC), 6 de Julio 
(6DJ), La Florida (LFL) y La Delicia. Investing in commercialization infrastructure 
amounted to US$ 246,100 from international funds by May of 2003 (Desarrollo 2003). 
Further investments in infrastructure were made to achieve organic and Fair Trade 
certification (GTZ, 2002-2004, US$25,000). Also, FEDECADE and other Ecuadorian 
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farmer’s organizations received infrastructure investment from funds provided by the 
food multinational Kraft, the German international development agency GTZ and the 
Dutch international development agency DOEN—with the goal of increasing Ecuador’s 
overall output of Rainforest Alliance certified cocoa in a project that extended to the year 
200827
Simultaneously, the projects were training farmers to achieve the goals of 
increasing production, becoming certified and commercializing certified cocoa 
(Desarrollo 2000)
.  
As a result of these investments, by 2008 FEDECADE had a network of seven 
stock centers for receiving and processing cocoa from the farmers. The cocoa was then 
transported to the stock center in Nueva Union Campesina, where it was prepared for 
exportation. The stock centers had the capacity for serving more than one community 
(i.e., NUC stock center was stocking cocoa from NUC and 6DJ; LFL stock center was 
serving LFL and ATAIB). At one time, all of these stock centers had state-of-the-art 
multi-story cocoa fermenters, solar and gas dryers, and multi-certification compliant 
storage facilities. 
28
                                                 
27 Later on, Kraft started sourcing their RA certified cacao from plantations in Western 
Africa.  
28 While the main goal of the projects was to commercialize cocoa resources were 
invested in topics of particular interest for the projects’ donor. 
. Thus, Training and Agricultural Extension accounts for 25% of the 
amount invested by the Canadian development agency FECD projects AG-0528 and AG-
0622 (Desarrollo 2001; 1998); US$ 40,000 from the project “Sustainable cocoa and 
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livelihoods” funded by the U.S. based Overbrook Foundation and an undetermined 
amount from the other projects.  
It should be noted that not all of the resources from these projects were directly 
invested in FEDECADE. The CYD operation was costly, given that it required 
mobilizing personnel from Quito to the project area. The CYD counterparts desire for 
control and accountability, expressed in setting a complex set of goals, procedures, and 
standards in order to guarantee project execution, developed into a situation where the 
cost for “project coordination” took as much as 50% of the budget of the amount invested 
by the FECD AG-0528 and AG-0622 (Desarrollo 2001; 1998). Evidently, other projects 
were more efficient but the cost of project administration remained high.  
Overall, research and development was the component that received least 
financing, being limited to US$25,000 (1.74% of the total invested until 2008) from 
Overbrook Foundation in 2002 for the development of greenhouse-plastic-based solar 
dryers (later adopted by  most Ecuadorian cocoa processing facilities). Additionally, there 
was approximately $5,000 from the FECD AG-0622 project that was used to identify and 
replicate cocoa promissory local ecotypes (Desarrollo 2001). Other than this, there were 
no investments in renovating plantations from the project side. 
While it was not possible to establish a direct relation between the availability of 
these training programs and extension services and yield increases, I found evidence that 
shows yields in the area of study have certainly increased. In 1997, a sample of 30 
farmers of the Canton Naranjal shows that the average yield was of 359 kg/ha year (this 
included both Nacional and CCN-51 plots), with Nacional yielding 297.7 kg/ha year and 
CCN-51 yielding 369.5 kg/ha year (ECU-B7 1997: 82-84). In my 2009 survey, a 
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subsample of farmers located in the Canton Naranjal (n=66, 6 de Julio and Nueva Union 
Campesina cooperatives) declared an average cocoa yield (counting both Nacional and 
CCN-51 varieties) of 747.7 kg/ha year (n=66, SD 7.64), with Nacional plots yielding 354 
kg/ha year (n=66, SD 3.93) and CCN-51 yielding 1100.9 kg/ha year (plantings over 5 
years, n=50, SD 3.23). 
Variety wise, my 2009 survey results indicate FEDECADE affiliated farmers 
opted for CCN-51 instead of the more traditional Nacional. Of the farmers that have 
plantings with CCN-51 (n=72), 65 (90%) reported having planted this area within the last 
14 years, and 38 (52%) reported that their CCN-51 plantings were younger than 7 years 
(which falls squarely within the time CYD projects were being executed). Of the 72 
farmers in the survey, only one reported that 8 years ago he had planted a plot with cocoa 
Nacional “de pepa” (from seed). The finding suggests that FEDECADE farmers 
continued to plant CCN-51, although Nacional-focused projects were running in the area. 
Thus, despite the large investments by multiple international agencies, farmers were not 
willing to “put all their eggs in one basket,” preferring rather to maintain multiple cocoa 
varieties. 
Investing for development II: commercialization, 2002-2008 
The FEDECADE commercialization system started operating in 2002, with a seed 
fund consisting of $60,000 (US$10,000 per cooperative) from a no-interest, refundable 
loan that was part of the Ecuadorian Canadian Development Fund (Fondo Ecuatoriano 
Canadiense para el Desarrollo, FECD)29
                                                 
29 Then Fondo Ecuadoriano Canadiense para el Desarrollo (FECD); since 2005, 
Fideicomiso Ecuatoriano para el Desarrollo (FECD) 
 financed AG-0528 and AG-0622 projects, and 
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$25,000 from the Spanish-based INTERMON 3125 project (see Table 1). By 2003, these 
early commercialization exercises were operating in all the cooperatives involved; 
however, “El Progreso,” which was the starting point for this initiative, was selling its 
cocoa to the Union of Cocoa Farmers’s Associations (Union de Organizaciones 
Campesinas Cacaoteras del Ecuador, UNOCACE) (Victor Chacon Salinas, interview 
with author, 12/05/2009)30
The belief that chocolate makers would be willing to pay for Nacional beans 
proved partially true: FEDECADE found clients willing to pay premiums for certified 
Nacional beans, but these clients were also looking for high quality beans with better than 
the norm post-harvest treatment (Pierrick Chouard, interview with author, April 2010). 
The first commercialization scheme, which involved buying dry cocoa beans from the 
farmers, was abandoned when it was found that this practice lead to irregular cocoa 
batches. After a troublesome first experience supplying cocoa to Vintage Chocolates—
which was the first company to launch a Rainforest Alliance-certified Nacional chocolate 
bar back in 2004—FEDECADE and CYD found that quality-wise the best results were 
achieved if farmers deliver unprocessed “cacao en baba” (wet cocoa beans) to the stock 
centers, and then the stock center fermented and dried the beans uniformly. While this 
practice was not new—given that around 10.9% of the farmers previously wet cocoa 
. Commercialization-ready cooperatives—such as “El 
Progreso”—became a prize contested by the NGOs and IGOs involved. The thug-of-war 
among development institutions undermined federated bodies such as FEDECADE.  
                                                 
30 UNOCACE was founded in 1999 and started commercializing cocoa in 2002. This 
organization was financed as a final-product of the European Union-CIRAD-Ecuadorian 
Ministry of Agriculture Project ECU-B7 3010/93/176, “Reactivacion de la produccion y 
mejora de la calidad de cacao en Ecuador” (ECU-B7 1997). 
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beans —most of them preferred to do the post-harvest themselves because middlemen 
generally took a larger discount from the price than from dried or semi-dried cocoa 
(ECU-B7 1997). 
The response of FEDECADE to these concerns was to deal with the farmers as 
fairly as possible, running experiments to find a fair “wet-to-dry” conversion ratio and 
paying a higher overall price. On the other hand, management cost per bean increased, 
given that now the stock centers assumed the costs (labor and inputs) of post-harvest 
management. Thus, while in 2003 and 2004 FEDECADE management costs averaged 
US$ 0.03 to 0.04 per kg of dry cocoa beans (2%-3% of the stock centers expenses), from 
2005 to 2008 the management cost averaged in the range of US$ 0.16 to US$ 0.33 per kg 
of dry cocoa beans (11% to 13% of the stock center expenses). 
By 2004, it become evident that the commercialization funds secured from the 
INTERMON 3125 and FECD AG-0528/AG-0627 development projects did not cover the 
needs of the stock centers. Cocoa farmers were adamant about cash-on-delivery 
transactions, and sometimes would take their beans to another place if there was no cash 
to pay for their crop—even if their farm was certified.  
High expectations were raised with the 2004 creation of the Citibank Foundation 
financed31
                                                 
31 In this case, the financing consisted assuming the legal costs to establish the Trust 
Fund, not a cash donation. 
 FEDECADE’s Trust Fund for Cocoa Commercialization (FTFCC). According 
to CYD, the FTFCC was a financial tool that was designed to grant FEDECADE access 
to international capital (Valdivieso S. 2008). Cocoa production is seasonal, so 
FEDECADE only needed a loan from July to December of each year; at the time, 
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Ecuador’s local banking system did not have the flexibility to grant credits for this sort of 
ventures (Valdivieso S. 2008). Root Capital, (previously known as Ecological Financial) 
a U.S. based non-profit social investment fund that specialized in providing capital for 
rural communities—and that had previously financed FEDECADE under a personal 
guarantee from Chacon Salinas—became the FTFCC’s first partner. Starting with 
US$150,000 in 2004 (Krenke 2004), in 2006, Root Capital loaned US$300,000 to the 
FTFCC at a yearly interest rate of 9% (at the time, the interest rate for a commercial 
credit in Ecuador was 12-15%) (Estudios 2006); in 2007, it loaned the FTFCC 
US$400,000; and in 2008, it loaned the FTFCC US$300,000.  
From 2004 to 2008, Root Capital funded the FTFCC on a non-conditional basis: 
credit was granted to FEDECADE (via FTFCC) to buy cocoa, FEDECADE associations 
stocked cocoa, and FEDECADE sold their stocks to the best offer it could find in the 
market. Produbanco, the local partner of Citibank, managed the cash flow between 
farmers, the exporters, and the FTFCC. Root Capital-financed FTFCC granted 
FEDECADE cooperatives and associations the flexibility to draft weekly loans, based on 
estimates of cocoa local availability. These week-by-week loans allowed the stock 
centers to pay farmers in cash, which was necessary if they were to remain competitive. 
Root Capital’s loan repayment was guaranteed by the FTFCC structure, which collected 
revenue from FEDECADE’s cocoa exports to Europe or US clients (Krenke 2004). 
From 2004 to 2007, FEDECADE’s commercialization system enjoyed a period of 
rapid growth because of the availability of low-interest credit, previous investments in 
infrastructure and training, the ability to source Organic, Fairtrade and Rainforest 
Alliance certified cocoa beans, and strategic NGO and IGO mediated relationships with 
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chocolate manufacturers such as Hoja Verde (Ecuador), ICAM (Italy), Kraft (U.S.), 
Vivani (Germany), Vintage (US), and with cocoa exporters COFINA and CAFIESA. 
Using FCFCC capital, FEDECADE’s stock centers were able to process higher amounts 
of cocoa beans, from 17,081 kg of beans per stock center (2 centers for 34,162 kg 
overall) in 2003 to a maximum of 52,267 kg per stock center in 2007 (261,339 kg 
overall).  
However, in 2008 the stock centers saw a fall to slightly over 2004 levels, with 
24,734 kg of cocoa processed in each of the stock centers involved (74,204 kg of cocoa 
overall). This fall was caused by several factors. First, cocoa international prices changed 
rapidly. Second, FEDECADE lost clients when some chocolate makers opted to 
substitute fine-certified cocoa for cheaper alternatives.  
The year of 2008 saw drastic changes in the price of cocoa. The ICCO statistics 
show that prices went from US$ 3021.76 per MT (US$ 3.02 per kg) in June of 2008 to a 
low of US$ 2067.72 per MT (US$2.06 per kg) in December of that year. This downfall 
implied that FEDECADE’s stock centers were buying conventional cocoa that they 
would later sell at loss. The managers of some stock centers opted for suspending 
commercialization for a “a week or two, to see if the prices stabilized” (Anonymous 
farmer,  NUC, Dec 2009). The wait-and-see strategy minimized losses, but reduced the 
volume of transactions—thus the drastic fall on the amount of cocoa processed.   
The market for premium cocoa beans from FEDECADE (Organic and Rainforest 
Alliance) was unfavorably affected by higher prices. Chocolate manufacturers became 
reluctant to stock value-added fine certified cocoa. Some manufacturers discontinued fine 
chocolate products (i.e. Hersheys’ Grand Reserve); others substituted extra-premium 
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certified fine cocoa for cheaper alternatives, or fall back into chocolate lines made with a 
mixture of fine and bulk cocoa.  
The market for Rainforest Alliance cocoa beans shows how this substitution 
occurs and how it affects producers of fine cocoa. In 2006 and 2007 Kraft Food Inc. was 
an important FEDECADE client—buying several MT of RA certified fine cocoa.  In 
2007 Kraft diversified its suppliers to include plantations in Ivory Coast (Africa) that 
Rainforest Alliance had recently certified. The supply of Ivory Coast Rainforest Alliance 
certified grew cocoa rapidly, as farmers joined a project financed by a partnership 
between Kraft, GTZ, USAID and others (among them the cocoa trader Armajaro32) (Staff 
2007)33. In 2008, Kraft did not source RA certified cocoa from FEDECADE, and other 
Ecuadorian farmer’s organizations that had been supplying cocoa for this company (i.e., 
Aroma Amazonico). Felipe Noboa, then CYD’s project director for the Kraft-GTZ 
project, mentioned that Kraft withdrawal was in part because of quality issues—the 
batches of cocoa it was receiving were irregular34
                                                 
32 In 2010, Armajaro’s business tactics became a subject of controversy in cocoa trading 
circles. In 2010, this company managed to stock 7% of the worldwide supply of cocoa 
beans; this behavior was denounced as one of the causes that drove cocoa prices to an 
historical high. According to a N.Y. Times article, Armanjaro also bid heavily in cocoa 
stock futures, and has been accused of “intentionally” manipulating the price of cocoa 
beans (Werdigier and Creswell 2010). 
33 The Ivory Coast RA-certified list of suppliers grew from 355 farmers in January of 
2007 to 2039 farmers in Fall of 2009 (Hahn and Vogel 2009). 
34 A fact that is not surprising given Kraft was sourcing cocoa from Western and Eastern 
Ecuador. 
 and that Kraft “did not really embrace 
the project” (Felipe Noboa, phone interview with author, September 2010). 
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Rainforest Alliance, in a report on “Overseas Demand for Ecuadorian Cocoa” 
done under contract for the U.S.-based Chemonics, Inc. for the U.S. AID’s Sustainable 
Forest and Coast Initiative, concludes that the “GTZ/Kraft public private partnership” 
shows that “certification alone is not enough to guarantee sustained access to premium 
markets” given that not all the producers groups recruited for this initiative were able to 
meet Kraft’s quality criteria. Rainforest Alliance also reported that Kraft would not buy 
more cocoa from Ecuador until their stocks became depleted (Rainforest Alliance 
2009:19).  
The demand for Fair Trade-Organic cocoa held well, and FEDECADE increased 
its output of this double-certified beans from 29500 kg in 2007 (11% of its 2007 output of 
261339 kg) to 56236 kg in 2008 (75.78% of its 2008 output of 74,204 kg). However, the 
rise on FT/Organic output was not enough to compensate for losing the RA and ‘plain’ 
Organic markets. Thus, while in 2007 the stock centers generated an overall profit of US$ 
16146.66, in 2008 it operation generated profits of just US$ 492.20.  
In 2009, as a response to international credit restrictions and what they saw as 
“chaos in the international cocoa prices” (William Foote, phone interview with author, 
April 2010), Root Capital asked FEDECADE to secure a future sales cocoa contract 
before granting a loan for 60% share of the value of the crop (Christian Pineda, interview 
with author, September 2009; William Foote, phone interview with author, April 2010). 
Future sales contracts are a standard requirement on Root’s loans that had been waived 
previously. However, the cocoa market conditions made Root “less confident” of 
FEDECADE’s ability to find markets (William Foote, phone interview with author, 
2010). Indeed, this condition was not met by FEDECADE. Although from June of 2009 
 96 
 
to December of 2009 FEDECADE’s was avidly looking for a viable commercialization 
partner it found that the premiums offered for even multi-certified cocoa did not cover 
even the stock centers cocoa processing expenses. For example, while from 2005 to 2007 
FEDECADE secured an average premium of US$405 per MT (US$0.4 per kg), in 2009 it 
received an offer with a premium of US$22 per MT (US$ 0.02 per kg), which was not 
enough to cover post-harvest and export costs (Christian Pineda, interview with author, 
September 2009). After stocking cocoa at record prices during 2008, buyers were trying 
to pay less. This is a strategy to average the values of their existing holdings. Under these 
conditions, FEDECADE’s General Assembly decided that it was not possible to 
commercialize cocoa. The Assembly also released FEDECADE’s associations so each 
could negotiate deals with other commercialization schemes35
The [unexpected] results of development projects 
.  
The results of the evaluation of FEDECADE commercialization system (FCS) are 
shown in Table 2 and 3. The FCS transferred revenues for farmers in two ways: as 
members of a cooperative or association who shared on the profits and premiums of the 
commercialization, and as individuals who received a higher price for their product.  
With regard to the first method of revenue generation, FEDECADE data shows 
that from 2003 to 2008 the commercialization system generated profits for US$ 
93,374.08 for the eight cooperatives and associations involved (see table 3). However, 
FEDECADE’s strategy of delegating day-to-day tasks to each association’s 
administration (namely their commercialization committees) resulted in varied financial 
                                                 
35 In 2010, LFL and CAM secured cocoa contracts with UROCAL. 
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performance: some of the committees became adept at generating profits, others 
struggled to stay even and some turned net losses (see Table 4 and Figure 3). Overall, the 
stock centers were profitable only 62% of the time they operated. Gross profit and loss 
margin (GPLM=(P&L*100)/Total Sales) vary widely by years and 
associations/cooperatives; on average, the stock centers GPLM was 3.99% per year (SD 
7.6%), with a maximum profit of 23.75% GPLM recorded for 3DO in 2005, and a record 
loss of 8.35% GPLM for CAM in 2008. The FEDECADE attempted to regulate the 
management of the stock centers by developing and implementing internal regulations of 
increasing complexity.36 The regulations nevertheless failed to guarantee the profitability 
of the stock centers. Current and former committee members I interviewed coincide that 
“learning the cocoa trade” required of them to learn to judge the quality of cocoa in a way 
that outsmarted the exporters “calificador”37
                                                 
36 Thus, the first commercialization experiments were run under a short set of written 
rules (119 words) (Desarrollo 2000); the 2005 CYD-edited “Guide for 
commercialization” amounted to 1262 words (Desarrollo 2005), and the 2006 
FEDECADE’s “Commercialization norms” totaled 2513 words. 
37 A “calificador” is a specially trained employee that is in charge of evaluating the 
quality of each lot of cocoa beans. This is a critical function, given that these people 
strive for judging the quality of cocoa on the spot, using little or none equipment to assess 
the worthiness (in quality terms) of a cocoa lot in a way that secures profits for the 
exporter without disgruntling cocoa sellers. 
 when buying fermented and dried cocoa 
beans (2003-2004) (Anonymous farmer, interview with author, 6DJ). However, they also 
said that they had to use the same skills to judge the cocoa of their fellow associates—
thus becoming what producers nicknamed “our own middleman” (Anonymous farmer, 
interview with author, 6DJ). Buying wet cocoa was simpler, given that ‘fairness’ 
involved experimentation that lead to a empirical/objective conversion rate applied when 
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buying wet raw cocoa for post harvest processing by the association. Stock centers found 
that they needed to adjust their conversion rates for summer or winter, and by location: 
the conversion rate for “cacao de playa” (0-100 meters above sea level) was not the same 
as for “cacao de monte” (100-400 meter above sea level) (Anonymous farmer, interview 
with author, NUC). The main issue with this need for learning and experimentation is that 
it remained a localized activity: this hard-won expertise was not institutionalized and 
remained part of individuals’ experience, which mean that each stock center crew had to 
“learn” by themselves every time they were replaced. 
The second way in which the commercialization transferred resources to farmers 
was by paying a higher gate price than was paid in the local market. On average, I 
estimated that from 2003 to 2008 FEDECADE’s average gate price was US$405 per MT 
(US$ 0.405 per kg) higher than the market gate price. After its six years run, 
FEDECADE had transferred US$ 418,378 to the farmers that sold cocoa to the stock 
centers, for an average of US$ 69,729 per year. The investment by international donors, 
of US$ 1,436,738 according to CYD data, would have been recovered if the 
commercialization scheme had worked for another fourteen years. 
The commercialization system of FEDECADE did benefit farmers that were not 
part of a FEDECADE’s affiliated association. First, the stock centers bought cocoa from 
these farmers, under the “commercial partners” umbrella. This cocoa—which was not 
certified under any scheme—was sold directly to the exporters as “cacao convencional” 
(non-certified, without premium), although the stock centers’ processing costs were the 
same as for ‘certified’ cocoa. However, the stock centers paid a higher than average price 
to these farmers, thus this trade segment—which FEDECADE saw as fulfilling its social 
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role—generated marginal profits (at best) and losses in some cases. Second, the stock 
centers—with their direct links to exporters and chocolate manufacturers—became 
regional price setters, against whom local intermediaries had to compete in order to 
remain in the business. For instance, Justo Paucar, who was the President of the 3DO 
association for the 2004-2005 period remembers that “after the stock centers opened, the 
middleman had to pay twice as much for a can38 of cocoa as before: they paid up to $16 
per can, when before they were paying just about $8.” He said that [the mood at the stock 
center] “was like a party,” with people coming from everywhere and taking turns to sell” 
(Justo Paucar, interview with the author, Rio Bonito/3 de Octubre, October 2009). 
Farmers remember these days fondly; in the 2009 survey, 29% of FEDECADE farmers 
mentioned that selling fermented and dried cocoa to the stock centers was advantageous 
to their household income even though the stock centers had been closed for at least one 
year39
Even at the peak of FEDECADE’s operation, some intermediaries remained in the 
area. Most of them did so because they were the only source of out-of-cocoa-season loans 
for farmers. Farmers developed a split share approach towards the stock centers and the 
intermediaries. They sold a share of their crop to the stock centers attracted by the overall 
higher price, but designated another share to the intermediaries because of this loan-
. In this sense, the FEDECADE commercialization system was successful at 
challenging the intermediaries mediated commodity chain.  
                                                 
38 A “can” (Lata in Espanish) is a volumetric measure for wet cacao. Roughly, 6 cans of 
wet cacao yield 45 kg of dry beans (1 quintal or 100 pounds).  
39 On the other hand, in my 2009 survey just 29% of the farmers reported that they were 
fermenting cocoa, given that the middlemen did not ‘pay’ extra for this labor.  
 100 
 
granting role (Pedro Flores and Domingo Mendoza, interview with author, November 
2009). These cash-for-crop loans are informal arrangements in which the farmer pays for 
the loan by selling his or her cocoa to the loan makers. Although these loans are 
nominally interest-free, middlemen extract profits out of negotiating price, and 
discounting weight to remain profitable (“les da machete en peso y precio,” [cuts down 
the price and plays with the weight], in the words of Pedro Flores and Domingo 
Mendoza, 2009). The CYD and FEDECADE were aware of farmers’ dependence of 
these paid-with-crop loans, but after the collapse of 6DJ commercialization (where 
internally-issued loans that were not repaid) these institutions shunned granting loans to 
farmers (FEDECADE 2004a; FEDECADE 2004b; Desarrollo 2005). By 2009, 
intermediaries in the FEDECADE area were operating as they were before the projects 
started40
On the down side, FEDECADE’s incursion on cocoa exporting also exposed the 
associations to the risks of price-volatility. Stocking cocoa in a period where prices are 
going down could easily wipe out the profits of a year, because the price of sale could be 
lower than the price the association had paid for the cocoa (Anonymous farmer, NUC, 
2009). The price paid to the unaffiliated “socios comerciales” was another source of 
internal discord. The stock centers paid the same price for the “cacao convencional” 
(non-certified) of the unaffiliated farmers as for the “cacao convencional” of the affiliated 
ones. Some farmers thought that there was a level of unfairness (towards the association’s 
farmers) in granting a fair price to individuals that did not cope with the burdens of 
. 
                                                 
40 See Chapter 4 for a description of FEDECADE farmers in 2009. 
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belonging to the associations (i.e., going to meetings, working in the association centers, 
etc) (Anonymous farmer, NUC, 2009). Other farmers were concerned because “cacao 
convencional” did not receive any premium, but processing costs were the same 
(Anonymous farmer, NUC, 2009). My informant concluded that trading “conventional” 
presented diminishing returns to the stock center, given that their processing costs for 
non-premium or premium cacao were the same.  
The administrative tasks of FEDECADE were also increasingly driven by the 
needs of being certified. Each certification system required a dedicated database of 
certified farmers, among other records. Also, the FEDECADE assumed the daunting task 
of training farmers in these programs, in conditions where 68.9% of the farmers had just 
an elementary school education and 8.7% were not able to write or read at all (ECU-B7 
1997). Some of these producers had to be aware and comply with the “internal” 
regulations for the organic certification (4100 words) (FEDECADE 2004b), the 
Rainforest Alliance certification (6200 words) (FEDECADE 2004a), and/or Fair Trade 
certification (a brief one page document).  
Some stock center personnel reported that “certification traceability requirements” 
were in conflict with their “post-harvest management/quality procedures” (Anonymous 
farmer, NUC, 2009). The conflict was born of the fact that cocoa fermentation (a critical 
step to achieve high quality beans) requires a large wet cocoa mass (at least 100 kg) but 
certification requirements asked for separate processing for smaller batches (Anonymous 
farmer, NUC, 2009). Thus, the stock centers were faced with contradictory demands that 
implied sacrificing quality (a selling point) in favor of a certification requirement 
(traceability). 
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The operation of the commercialization systems was another point of contention 
for the associations. In two cases, changes in an association’s directive resulted in those 
association dropping out of the commercialization system. In the case of 6DJ, the 
previous directive had granted loans to farmers to secure cocoa in the face of loan-
granting by intermediaries. A faction of the cooperative’s farmers ran for elections under 
the argument that these “debts” should be covered using the cooperative’s 
commercialization profits. When this group won, it canceled individual farmers’ debts. 
The commercialization fund was depleted, and it closed operations. The response of CYD 
and FEDECADE  to this problem was to ban the diversion of funds from 
commercialization to other uses. This norm was generally accepted until 2008, when the 
NUC directive used part of its funds to acquire a lot to build a police force Immediate 
Response Center (Puesto de Auxilio Inmediato, PAI)41
In a second example of internal struggle, FEDECADE’s internal norms specified 
that the commercialization committee was made up of each Association’s elected 
President and Treasurer. Thus, the “know-how” of an incumbent directive could be lost if 
they were not reelected. This was the case of 3DO, which in 2005 generated a GPLM of 
. This was done because early that 
year several NUC farmers had been victims of violent crime (armed robbery) in their own 
homes. In this case, FEDECADE considered that this diversion of funds was an internal 
matter.  
                                                 
41 Ecuador Police’ is chronically underfunded, so it has limited ability to build new 
infrastructure. In order to house troopers in a place, the community has to build (from 
scratch) their own PAI. Once the PAI is build, the police normally assign a few troopers 
and a vehicle to it. In NUC case, the main benefit of a PAI was that they believed that 
police response time will go down to five to ten minutes (from the 30 minutes or more 
that it took police to come from Naranjal).  
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24%. A faction within the association argued (among other points) that this margin was 
too high, and that profits should be transferred to the farmers instead of the stock center 
fund. This group won the early 2006 election. However, in 2006, under the new directive 
3DO stock center suffered a 3% loss of the total sales. In 2007, this stock center turned a 
profit of 4% of the total sales. In 2008, this association did not operate at all (3DO 
farmers sold their cocoa to other FEDECADE centers) (Justo Paucar, interview with the 
author, Rio Bonito/3 de Octubre, October 2009). 
Lessons learned: shades of gray in a development program 
In summary, from 1995 to 2008 the farmers affiliated with FEDECADE were the 
recipients of a loosely coordinated multi-year development program directed by an 
Ecuadorian NGO, supported by donations from a heterogeneous set of international 
donors, and commercial loans from a socially-aware investment fund. This program’s 
overall goal was to increase the income of farmers planting shade-grown Nacional cocoa, 
an endemic Ecuadorian variety that was deemed endangered by technological and 
economic developments. In 2009, after 6 years of operation, FEDECADE’s 
commercialization system ceased to operate. The project had achieved its generic goal of  
increasing cocoa output per unit of area, and in increasing farmer’s income by creating an 
alternative commercialization system that transferred revenues from cocoa exports 
directly to the farmers. This alternative commodity chain gave farmers an attractive outlet 
for their products, and forced intermediaries to rationalize their profitability. By 
leveraging FEDECADE’s activities with low-interest international capital, CYD project 
acted as an agent of change at the local market and thus apparently harnessed the forces 
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of capitalism in benefit of cocoa farmers. However, in 2009, a series of internal and 
external factors forced FEDECADE to stop its activity.  
 This failure can be explained in several ways. From a structural point of view, 
even the best-financed multi-certified small farmers association is at a clear disadvantage 
in relation to the power of multinational corporations. The collapse of FEDECADE’s RA 
certified cocoa market, after Kraft Foods Inc. started to source RA cocoa from West 
Africa, shows how the worldwide race for achieving certification actually benefits 
multinational companies which have the ability to source commodities from the lowest 
cost (or most convenient) supplier. Certification-based alternative trade systems, which 
were heralded as the great and promising alternative to the multinational dominated 
commodity chain, have become a victim of their own success. Quoting an anonymous 
respondent to a Rainforest Alliance conducted survey: “the price benefit of certification 
only works if demand outstrips supply” (Rainforest Alliance 2009: 20). With producers 
all over the world vying for a “label” to give them a market edge, FEDECADE’s 
experience suggest that certified products have become just another commodity subject to 
cycles driven by supply and demand. Furthermore, when fine cocoa becomes too 
expensive, chocolate makers substitute fine cocoa for cheaper bulk cocoa and spices—as 
they have been doing since Venezuelan and Mexican “Criollos” were substituted with the 
less-well regarded Ecuadorian Nacional and when Nacional was substituted with West 
Africa and Brazil Forasteros (Alden 1976).  
Questions can also be raised about FEDECADE’s approach towards 
commercialization, which called for selling cocoa to the highest bidder. As advertised by 
CYD, this highest-bidder-approach generated revenues in the short term. However, in 
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2009 FEDECADE was not able to secure a purchase order because it lacked a strategic 
partner. Meanwhile, other FEDECADE-like organizations continued to work, favored by 
their long-term relationship with one buyer (i.e., UNOCACE with the French firm Kaoka 
(Interview with Freddy Cabello, UNOCACE manager, Quito, December 2009). 
FEDECADE’s example also raises doubts about the viability of pairing 
developing-country organizations with global financial partners. In these relationships, 
the burden of risk is carried by those in developing economies. When Root deemed 
FEDECADE’s cocoa business was “too risky,” it pulled out (Foote, 2010). FEDECADE 
was not able to find other financer for the FTFCC, which led to its inability to operate in 
2009. While external factors—the worldwide 2007-2008 economic crisis—are the 
underlying causes of Root’s credit restriction, this illustrates the power differential that 
exists between financers and producers, and certainly points to the vulnerability of the 
developing country partners in these alliances. Finally, FEDECADE’s experience also 
shows the failings of leveraging development on what remains a commodity, subject to 
the whims of the international markets. Cocoa prices and stocks have been fluctuating 
wildly in the global markets, reaching historical heights only to fall vertiginously. The 
behavior of Northern stockholders, from small investors to the Armajaro Hedge Fund, 
have deep repercussions on the livelihoods (and hopes) of commodity-producing farmers 
in the developing world. Thus, successful commodity-based development programs 
exacerbate rural communities’ exposure to these risks.  
 Internally, the uneven performances of FEDECADE’s stock centers highlight the 
perils of imposing a for-profit capitalistic enterprise on top of locally existing social-
capital-based structures. FEDECADE’s associations and cooperatives respond to the 
 106 
 
concerns of their constituents, with directives elected by a majority of the votes. On the 
other hand, the stock centers were thought to behave as a community-based enterprise, 
generating profits for the benefit of the community. FEDECADE’s answer for the 
challenge of sustaining internal governance for a revenue-generating venture— 
delegating the stock center management to each community elected directive—responded 
to a belief in self-determination at the association level. However, as the case of 6DJ 
illustrates, the stock centers became hostages of internal politics, with groups within the 
Association bidding for control of the source of revenue (or rents from debt forgiveness). 
The second failing of FEDECADE’s answer was that the hard-won human capital (as 
experience gained by working in commercialization) was lost in democratic elections. It 
can be argued that some of the stock center failures could have been avoided if its 
administration would have been set up with some degree of independence from the 
associations’ directives. From one perspective, CYD’s timid attempt to push 
FEDECADE towards capitalism was certainly insufficient. From the other, these findings 
also suggest an ongoing struggle for defining terms and conditions under which 
development projects operate. On one side stand the values and goals of the NGOs and 
their international counterparts; on the other side, stand the values and goals of the 
farmers. While there are points of commonality among these voices, it is worth 
remembering that the funders, co-opted by a prodding NGO intermediary, decide which 
projects are financed. Local failures—such as that of FEDECADE— are the result of 
imposing a problem-solving agenda, which does not incorporate local viewpoints. On the 
other hand, these results show structural failures in the conceptualization of alternative 
trade. As alternative trade captures a larger share of production, it becomes 
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commoditized; thus, these efforts become a victim of their own success. FEDECADE’s 
Fair Trade experience is also instructive, because although this market held it was not 
large enough to keep the system operating. Also, basic business management concepts—
such as profitability, revenue generation, and how to achieve economies of scale—seem 
to have been lacking from the technological expertise transferred to FEDECADE. 
Finally, the results of the survey indicate that CYD and international donors have 
not succeeded at convincing farmers to remain wedded to Nacional. Only one out of the 
100 farmers I interviewed replanted his farm with Nacional, and that was done eight 
years ago. Meanwhile, in the last seven years (within the period of execution of the 
projects) 38 farmers had renovated their plantations using CCN-51 (out of 100). These 
data suggest that even when the stock centers paid premium prices for Nacional, farmers 
were voicing their choice for agricultural intensification by planting CCN-51. Farmers’ 
assessment was probably guided by three facts: CCN-51 yields three times as much 
cocoa per unit of area as Nacional; the market gate price for both varieties remains the 
same, and finally, trading CCN-51 does not require fulfilling strict and contradictory 
regulations at all, and can be conducted even if stock centers are closed.  
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Figure 1. Area of Study. Ecuador, the Western lowlands (Costa), APOV and FEDECADE associations and cooperatives. 
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(a) Area harvested by year (ha/year) 
 
(b) Production by year (tonnes/year) 
 
      (c)Yield by area and year (kg/ha year) 
 
Figure 2. Ecuadorian cocoa production statistics, 1961-2009. (a) Area harvested 
(ha/year). (b) Production by year (tonnes/year). (c) Yield by area (kg/ha/year). Source: 
FAOSTAT 2010; ANECACAO 2010. 
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Figure 3. FEDECADE profit and loss margin as percentage of sales box plot for all 
associations/cooperatives by year, where × marks average profit and loss margin, box is 
represents first and third quartile, and error bars show inter-associations variability. 
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Table 1. Investing in FEDECADE: Year of execution, project title, donors, and project amounts in US$. 
Year Project title Donor 
Country of 
origin Donor ($) 
Local 
counterparts 
($)† 
TOTAL 
PROJECT 
($) 
1996 Establishment of cocoa certification system Earth Love 
Fund 
UK $5,000 $2,500 $7,500 
1996-
1998 
Development of cocoa commercialization 
system and creation of ecological 
certification norms FOES-154E [152] 
Ecuadorian-
Swiss Fund 
Switzerland $81,538* $25,000* $106,538 
1999-
2000 
Construction of a cocoa stock center and a 
cocoa commercialization business 
INTERMON 3125 
INTERMON 
3125 
Spain $125,000* $5,000* $130,000 
1999-
2001 
Cacao's production and commercialization 
improvement AG-0528 
Ecuadorian 
Canadian 
Fund 
Canada $307,500 $243,600 $551,100 
2001-
2004 
Production and commercialization of fine 
and aroma cacao in Ecuador's South 
Western Region AG-0622 
Ecuadorian 
Canadian 
Fund 
Canada $348,700 $319,680 $668,380 
2005-
2006 
Establishment of certified cocoa chain of 
custody 
Overbrook 
Foundation 
US $40,000 $12,500 $52,500 
2006-
2007 
Sustainable cocoa and livelihoods Overbrook 
Foundation 
US $20,000 $30,000 $50,000 
2006-
2008 
Expand and create production and 
management structures and competencies of 
1500 small scale cocoa producers in order 
to increase production and exportation of 
Rainforest Alliance certified cocoa from 
Ecuador 
Kraft-RA-
Goldamn-
DOEN 
Germany, 
US, 
Netherland 
$235,000 $200,000 $435,000 
(continued)  
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Table 1. (continued) 
 
Year Project title Donor 
Country of 
origin Donor ($) 
Local 
counterparts 
($)† 
TOTAL 
PROJECT 
($) 
2006-
2008 
Expand and create production and 
management structures and competencies 
of 1500 small scale cocoa producers in 
order to increase production and 
exportation of Rainforest Alliance 
certified cocoa from Ecuador 
Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für 
Technische 
Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) 
Germany $189,000 $200,000 $389,000 
  TOTAL INVESTMENT $1,436,738 $1,103,280 $2,540,018 
†This amount was the cash value of local contributions to the projects, donated by FEDECADE’s members (land and work), 
FEDECADE’s local NGO partner (at the time, Conservacion y Desarrollo), or by other agencies. * Estimated value, given that 
amounts were originally reported in sucres (S/.) (by 1999, Ecuador adopted US$ as a currency, to the conversion factor of 
US$1=S/. 25000).  
Source: Archives of Conservacion y Desarollo (Quito, Ecuador) (2010); Archives of FEDECADE (Jesus Maria, Ecuador) (2009). 
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Table 2. Average commercialization parameters for FEDECADE commercialization system, 2003 to 2007. 
 
 
Years 
 Parameters 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
A Associations/Coops (n) 2 4 5 6 5 3 
B Assoc. gate price (AGP) (US$ per kg)† 1.29 1.29 1.53 1.81 2.05 2.60 
C Assoc. sale price (ASP) (US$ per kg) † 1.37 1.36 1.91 2.20 2.56 2.97 
D FOB price (US$ per kg)‡ 1.71 1.45 1.45 1.61 2.38 2.50 
E Market gate price (MGP) (US$ per kg)†† 1.17 0.96 1.03 1.27 1.69 2.02 
F Cocoa bought (kg) 34965.29 112675.28 206979.15 241099.32 270175.94 79719.73 
G Cocoa sold (kg) 34162.78 107012.70 209740.91 227097.05 261339.68 74204.54 
H Management losses (% of D) 3.24% 3.04% -0.97% 2.58% 4.82% 2.50% 
I Management cost (US$ per kg) 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.33 0.22 
 Sources: † Archives of Fedecade 2009; ‡ Anecacao 2010; †† 2004: Guayaquil 2004; 2005-2007: FAO (2010) gate price - US$10;  
2008: Guayaquil 2008 
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Table 3. Expenses; sales; profit and loss, and estimated revenue (in US$) for farmers for FEDECADE commercialization system, 
2003 to 2007. 
 
 Years  
 Commercialization profit and loss 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
J Expenses [(B*F)+(I*G)] (US$) 46536.26 147555.56 362657.01 459686.76 646773.29 216760.61 1879969.48 
K Sales (C*G) (US$) 47422.41 145404.09 400313.99 500030.31 662919.95 217252.81 1973343.56 
L Profit & loss (P&L) (US$) 886.15 -2151.47 37656.98 40343.55 16146.66 492.20 93374.08 
M P&L as % sales [(L/K)*100] 1.87% -1.48% 9.41% 8.07% 2.44% 0.23% 20.53% 
 
 Years  
Revenue for farmers (estimated) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
N Farmer's sales at AGP (B*F) 
(US$) 45223.26 145629.62 315720.22 435639.29 552932.16 207580.96 1702725.51 
O Farmer's sales at MGP (E*F) 
(US$) 40763.88 107872.04 212158.67 307351.17 455360.43 160840.53 1284346.71 
P Revenue (estimated) (N-O) 
(US$) 4459.37 37757.59 103561.55 128288.12 97571.73 46740.43 418378.80 
Sources: † Archives of Fedecade 2009; ‡ Anecacao 2010; †† 2004: Guayaquil 2004; 2005-2007: FAO (2010) gate price - US$10; 
2008: Guayaquil 2008. 
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Table 4. Profit and loss margin 2003-2008 for all cooperatives and associations involved 
with FEDECADE commercialization system 
 
Cooperative or 
Association 
Year 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
NUC 3.76% -3.37% 6.06% 8.30% -2.43% 5.83% 
LFL • -2.04% 1.31% 14.36% 10.55% -0.70% 
CAM • -5.44% 19.67% 11.97% 6.69% -8.34% 
6DJ -3.11% 4.64% 1.45% † † † 
3DO • • 23.75% -2.60% 3.87% † 
PRO • • • 2.31% ‡ ‡ 
ROS • • • 0.87% † † 
FRT • • • • 2.48% ‡ 
NUC: Cooperative Nueva Union Campesina; LFL: Cooperative La Florida; CAM: 
Association Camacho (Luz y Guia Campesina); 6DJ: Cooperative 6 de Julio; 3DO: 
Association 3 de Octubre; PRO: Association El Progreso; ROS: Association Rosalino 
Ortega; FRT: Association Frutas Tropicales. Notes: • Cooperative or association was not 
yet incorporated to the commercialization system; † coop/assoc. did not participate in any 
associative commercialization system; ‡ coop/assoc. continued trading cocoa 
independently or by joining an associative commercialization system other than 
FEDECADE’s. Sources: Archives of FEDECADE 2009.  
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CHAPTER IV. 
COCOA FARMER’S LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES 
Introduction and Background 
Practitioners of sustainable development—in their search for a way to meet the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
theirs—attempt to make development environmentally, socially and economically 
sustainable. What is not to like about finding ways to allow people to satisfy needs in 
ways in which benefits and tradeoffs are negotiated among equals, goes the argument. On 
the basis of the assumption that cooperation offers a better alternative than self-interest, 
sustainable development programs are conceived as alternative trade networks that offer 
mutual benefits to participants. Consumers get access to high-quality, traceable (safe) and 
ecologically/ethically superior goods; manufacturers and dealers get access to an 
attractive niche –market, and producers are compensated with economic premiums for 
the environmental and social services of their crops (McMichael 2000; Murray and 
Raynolds 2000; Rice 2001; Ponte 2002; Raynolds 2002). Alternative trade creates 
networks of virtue, which connect producers and customers in a way that transform the 
daily act of consumption in an exercise on ecological—and ethical—global citizenship 
(Seyfang 2006; Barnett et al. 2005; Clarke et al. 2007; MacMaoláin 2002). However, 
under the discourse of partnerships, equity and fairness—and the perception of the 
sustainability necessity, desirability and universality (Luke 2005) —lies a question that 
haunts Brundtland’s (1987) definition of sustainable development: whose present, and 
whose future? Whose interests, and how, are represented in an alternative 
trade/sustainable development partnerships? (Luke, 2005). 
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In this chapter, I address these questions by analyzing the role that the ideological 
construct of sustainability-through-trade has played in reshaping Ecuadorian cocoa 
production since the late 1990s. This commodity and setting present a useful lens to look 
at the often ignored tradeoffs of sustainability. In the simplified dialectic of current 
Ecuadorian production—developed and implemented by a myriad of nongovernmental, 
governmental and international development agencies—on one side stands the low-yield, 
shade-grown fine cocoa variety known as Nacional—which meets all the ecological, 
social, and quality requirements for alternative trade and sustainability partnerships. On 
the other side, stands the full-sun hybrid cocoa known as CCN-51—which offers high 
yield in exchange of the ecological services of Nacional. Thus—goes the argument— 
Ecuador’s small farmers should opt for alternative trade to protect the unique agrarian 
landscape of shaded cocoa farms. By joining alternative trade networks, “farmers will be 
able to improve their incomes, and gain further benefits from stronger social networks 
and changes in perception towards conservation and biodiversity” (GTZ 2007)—a 
rhetorical argument which carries undertones of a win-win situation that balances 
economic, social and ecological sustainability. However, my findings suggest that the 
arguments of NGOs and IGOs do not truly reflect the complex choices and options that 
farmers face on a day-to-day basis, nor effectively address the economic tradeoffs of 
these views. The emphasis on shared benefits and consensus has obscured the fact that 
power defines who wins and who losses out of sustainability projects.  
Between a rock and a hard place: Ecuador’s cocoa production dilemma 
Ecuador’s cocoa production is marked by Nacional, a scarce shade-grown 
Forastero-type fine cocoa known by unique floral or fruity “Arriba” flavor or aroma 
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(Loor et al. 2009; Motamayor et al. 2008; Lerceteau et al. 1997). This kind of cocoa is 
mostly grown in family farms of less than seven ha. Ecuador’s produces about 50% of the 
world harvest of fine cocoa, which in turn accounts for 3 to 7% of the world’s cocoa 
(Jano 2007; Rosero 2002). Traditionally, Nacional cocoa is grown in a species-rich multi-
story cropping system in which each hectare contains a lower stratum made of 400-800 
cocoa trees and 10-30 plantain plants and other fruit-bearing trees (i.e., citrus such as 
oranges and tangerines), and an upper stratum made of roughly 20 timber trees 
representing several species (Rios et al. 1997; Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004; 
Andersson and Gradstein 2005; Haro-Carrion et al. 2009). Shade-grown cocoa farms 
provide habitat for local species of amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals, which are 
otherwise limited by a regional prevalence of bananas and other monoculture green 
deserts (Soluri 2000; Rios et al. 1997; Greenberg, Bichier, and Cruz Angón 2000; Beer et 
al. 1998; Bentley, Boa, and Stonehouse 2004; Faria and Baumgarten 2007; Franzen and 
Mulder Borgerhoff 2007; Clough, Faust, and Tscharntke 2009; Southgate and Whitaker 
1992; Sierra and Stallings 1998). The mechanism that produced flavor is complex (Luna 
et al. 2002), but the “Arriba” aroma comes from a combination of distinctive genetics, 
farming practices (pre and post harvesting), and environmental factors (such as climate, 
soil and luminosity) that occur exclusively in Ecuador’s lowlands (Motamayor et al. 
2008; Deheuvels et al. 2004; Loor et al. 2009; Lerceteau et al. 1997; Cambrai et al. 
2010).  
However, the quality of Nacional and the richness of the agro-forestry system in 
which it is produced have some agricultural weaknesses, namely disease susceptibility 
and low yield. The Nacional genotype is highly susceptible to two fungal plant 
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pathogens, Crinipellis perniciosa (known as “witch’s broom,” or “escoba de bruja”), and 
Moniliophthora roreri (known as frosty-pod disease, or “monilla”) (Griffith, 2004; 
Parsons, 1957). These diseases caused the collapse of the Ecuadorian cocoa production 
back in the early 20th century, as C. perniciosa can cause yields to drop by 90% and M. 
roreri can infest and destroy up to a 100% of the pods (Henderson 1997; Pineo 1988; 
Griffith 2004; Parsons 1957; Hebbar 2007; Phillips-Mora and Wilkinson 2007); even 
today, these pathogens can cause losses of up to 50% or more of the crop (Griffith, 2004). 
Second, Nacional farms—and the famed Arriba quality—are trapped in a loop in which 
low yields and low-intensity management go hand in hand. In 2008, Ecuador’s cocoa 
yield of 250.3 kg/ ha year was half the world’s average (495.5 kg/ha/year) (FAOSTAT 
2010). The country’s growing exports, given cocoa groves yield remain constant 
overall42
Although the problems of Nacional are chronic (in fact, these issues date back to 
the 1930’s), some of them appear amenable to solutions derived from agricultural 
intensification methods. In fact, by 1965 an Ecuadorian agronomist by the name of 
Homero U. Castro—working independently in Naranjal cocoa farm aptly named 
“Theobroma”— developed a variety known by the abbreviation CCN-51 (which stands 
for Coleccion Castro Naranjal cross# 51)
 are sustained by increasing the area planted with cocoa (See Figure 1).  
43
                                                 
42 Cocoa yield vary from year to year —because of the effects of the climatic phenomena 
known as El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) and its La Niña counterpart, but the trend 
is slightly negative (decreasing yields). 
43 There are reports of other available CCN clones ( i.e., CCN-31 in Rohsius, Matissek, 
and Lieberei 2005); CCN10 and CCN16 in (Zhang et al. 2008). 
 as a F1 cross of IMC-67 x ICS-95 by O-1, 
where O-1 is a cocoa ascension collected by Castro himself in a trip to Ecuador's Valle de 
 125 
 
los Canelos (Castro 1981). The CCN-51 variety  grows in full-sun, is resistant to the 
attack of witch’s broom and frosty-pod disease, and is moderately resistant to 
Ceratocystis cacaofunesta (which causes the disease known as Ceratocystis Wilt of 
Cacao) (Engelbrecht, Harrington, and Alfenas 2007; Sanches et al. 2008). The yield of 
CCN-51 is high, and under “optimal circumstances”—full-sun, high density planting 
(2200 plants/ha), and use of inputs such as irrigation, fertilizers and other 
agrochemicals—yields up to 4000 kg/ha year, although yields of 2000-3000 kg/ha year 
seem to be the norm for this density and intensity of management (Espinosa et al. 2006: 
36). Even at lower planting densities, CCN-51’s yield is 3-4 times the yield of Nacional 
(750-1500 kg/ha year @ 833 plants /ha according to Espinosa et al. 2006). 
On top of superior agronomic characteristics, CCN-51 is freely available in 
Ecuador, given that by the time of Castro’s sudden death (late 1980’s) he had not 
patented the variety (Victor Chacon Salinas, interview with author, Jesus Maria, 
December 2009). Given that CCN-51 plants were available on the haciendas where 
Castro conducted his trials (i.e., Hacienda Balao, Canas and Pechichal), and it is easy to 
graft—according to the grafting professionals I interviewed—there was a boom in the 
planting of this variety in large and medium cocoa farms during the 1980s and 1990s,   
which were looking for an alternative to the ICS-clones that had been found to be highly 
susceptible to Ceratocystis Wilt (Victor Chacon Salinas, interview with author, Jesus 
Maria, December 2009).  
Information about rate of adoption of this variety is scarce, but a 1997 survey of 
304 cocoa farms found that 8.8% of the total area was planted with Nacional, 85% of the 
area was planted with natural crosses of Nacional x Trinitario types, and just 0.3% of the 
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area was planted with CCN-51 (ECU-B7 1997). By 2002, it was estimated that about 5% 
of Ecuador’ area dedicated to cocoa was planted with CCN-51 (9000 ha) (Quito 2001); in 
2008, it was reported that CCN-51 accounted for 6% of the area dedicated to cocoa 
(27827 ha out of 463787 ha) (CORPEI 2008).  
However, the rapid adoption of CCN-51 was met with resistance by high-quality 
chocolate manufacturers, given that it lacks the  aroma of Nacional. This issue was 
amplified by differences between this variety and Nacional in respect to fermentation 
times, by the practice of mixing the production of the two varieties, and an Ecuadorian 
cocoa internal market failure to compensate farmers for post-harvest treatment. Cocoa 
beans must be fermented to develop chocolate flavors and other aromas. Nacional and 
related hybrids develop their particular aroma with a relatively short fermenting time of 
2-4 days (Luna et al. 2002). However, CCN-51—which presents a higher amount of 
mucilage—requires longer fermentation time (6 days, according to Perez Piza 2006). 
Furthermore, the traditional fermenting methods used for Nacional did not work for 
CCN-51, which gained a bad reputation—although when treated well it develops a 
chocolate favor described as “basic-Ghana” (von Rutte 2004).  
Evidently, when the two varieties were mixed the results were worse, given that 
neither Nacional nor CCN-51 received optimal treatment. Jürgen Rausch, of the German 
fine chocolate manufacturer Rausch Plantagen Schokolade, said that the effects of the 
practice of mixing varieties were such that some European clients have returned 
shipments of Ecuadorian cocoa. He said that because of the mix, fine chocolate 
manufacturers were sourcing fine cocoa from other countries, and that “producers and 
exporters that are mixing these varieties [Nacional and CCN-51] will not have the chance 
 127 
 
to sell cocoa as fine and aroma, and they will get paid as if they would be selling 
‘consumer’s cocoa’ [bulk cocoa]” (Rausch in Guayaquil 2010). Finally, since the 1980’s, 
cocoa farmers have been receiving the same price for well fermented cocoa versus cocoa 
that was not fermented. The intermediaries—as was still the practice during my field 
work in 2009—rate cocoa beans exclusively on the basis of their humidity content. Under 
these conditions, farmers have incentives to dry their cocoa as soon as possible, and to 
avoid the labor costs and risks of fermenting the beans. The practice of fermenting was 
abandoned, which led to a significant loss of quality.  
Consequently, in  2005, the International Cacao Organization downgraded 
Ecuador’s cocoa rating from 100% fine flavor cocoa to 75%, and informed Ecuadorian 
exporters that this rating could be further reduced (ICCO 2006). In this context—and 
under the threat of further sanctions—the problem has been framed in a way in which it 
appears that Ecuador’s cocoa farmers must choose between two opposite paths of 
development. The first—the alternative trade/sustainable development model—argument 
is to protect and promote Nacional, and then sell the product for a higher price in 
specialized markets (i.e., organic, ecologic, etc). This model makes three assumptions: a) 
the premium of niche marketing will compensate farmers for the low productivity of 
Nacional farms; b) farmers will gain other benefits from investments on their social 
networks—thus gaining strength from collectivism; c) the economic and social benefits 
will provide incentives to farmers to conserve and protect their shade-grown Nacional 
plantations, therefore turning them into stewards of the ecological services provided by 
this crop. The ultimate goal of this model is to have farmer’s associations that entirely 
bypass the conventional cocoa commercialization chain entirely, thus selling cocoa 
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directly to chocolate manufacturers abroad (Radi and Ramirez 2006; Fischerworring 
2007). However, proponents are willing to settle for developing “associative 
commercialization systems” that simply bypass the local middleman (Freire and Rios 
2007). These actions will increase farmer’s income by about 25%, with the further 
benefit of producers “gaining respect” (Freire and Rios 2007). 
Proponents of the alternative trade model acknowledge that there are substantial 
barriers to the successful implementation of even basic models of alternative trade, given 
that farmers’ associations must make substantial improvements to meet the quality 
requirements of high-end chocolate manufacturers and the standards of certification-
schemes—the gatekeepers of specialized market-niches. Associative commercialization 
depends on having the know-how to run the business and to properly manage cocoa, 
capital for buying cocoa stocks, communications, and infrastructure for post-harvesting 
(fermentation and drying) and bean storage. Thus, the successful implementation of an 
associative commercialization program depends on developing alliances with sources of 
capital to finance training and infrastructure—something that appears accessible given 
the number and coverage of institutions working in Ecuadorian Cocoa (see Table 1). 
However, producers must join in an association to access to these institutional sources of 
capital (Freire and Rios 2007).  
Investment in Nacional is justified by the attractiveness of Nacional as high-
quality fine “Arriba” cocoa, with value added by certification schemes (Radi and 
Ramirez 2006). Fine cacao is scarce, accounting for just 5% of the world production. 
Ecuador’s production accounts for half of this volume. Thus, the demand for “Arriba” is 
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said to be “dynamic and unsatisfied,” and it is argued that this variety “will be always in 
demand by high quality chocolate manufacturers” (Radi and Ramirez 2006).   
 The second model—agricultural intensification—receives considerably less 
attention by NGOs and other institutions. Given that the low yield of existing Nacional 
plantations is caused by its susceptibility to diseases and low investment on agricultural 
technology, the argument is that the farmer’s income will increase by changing varieties 
(adopting either CCN-51 or INIAP’s clones of selected Nacional), and implementing 
better crop management practices via investments in extension services and training. 
Farmers also opt for replacing a fraction of their cocoa holdings for other crops (i.e., 
passion fruit, bananas, plantains, or papaya) which are more profitable than cocoa. The 
NGOs projects generally provide extension services and training, and there are projects 
that certainly are geared towards improving farmer’s awareness about the crop (i.e., 
Farmer’s Field Schools run by the U.S. based NGO ACDI/VOCA). Also, there are 
programs that deliver free or low cost improved plants—generally CCN-51—to farmers. 
The technology to produce plants is simple. For example, the Puebloviejo’s Technical 
High School—a small local institution, with contributions of Ecuador’s MAGAP, INIAP 
and the local municipality—was able to develop and implement a program to produce 
and donate 50,000 CCN-51 plants (enough to plant 50 ha) to “poor farmers” of that 
locality in the Province of Los Ríos (Medrano 2009).  
However, although producing plants is easy, there are reports that suggest that 
farms renovation is uncommon (ECU-B7 1997). There are two reasons that explain why 
farmers do not opt for farm renovation: a) renovation or replanting requires an important 
up-front investment (US$ 2600/ha, according to Quiroz and Agama 2006); b) the farmer 
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must be able to finance the up-keep of the renovated plantation for the 5-8 years it takes 
for it area to regain productivity.. All in all, this requires a period of at 8 years to break 
even. Renovation requires that farmers have access to medium term credit. Given the 
scarcity of this kind of financing, most farmers opt for renovating/replanting small 
extensions of their cocoa holdings on an ad-hoc basis. A similar strategy is used to deal 
with agricultural diversification. 
 Given that each model presents benefits, limitations, and liabilities, in Ecuador 
there is an ongoing debate about which should be planted cocoa, how and in which ways 
it should be produced. Supporters of Nacional put forth arguments based in this variety’s 
status as fine cacao, market-niche potential and for the ecological services provided by 
shade-cocoa. On the other hand, holders of CCN-51 present arguments on the basis of its 
productivity, and think that this variety has been unjustly marginalized in policy circles. 
Fernando Crespo, President of the Association of Producers of Fine and Aroma Cacao 
(Asociacion de Productores de Cacao Fino y de Aroma—which despite its name 
agglomerates producers that have holdings of CCN-51), declared that he was concerned 
that “there are people that are planning to terminate CCN-51” (Fernando Crespo in 
Guayaquil 2010b). Crespo’s fears became reality when in June of 2010 politicians and 
farmer’s groups proposed a “Cacao Law” which aimed to finance a Nacional cocoa 
program with a 1.5% tax on cocoa exports—but it also made an attempt to heavily 
regulate plantings of other varieties (Guayaquil 2010c; Guayaquil 2010d). This proposal 
was rejected by other sectors. Benjamin Rosales Valenzuela—editorialist at Ecuador’s 
most prestigious newspaper “El Comercio”—argues that the proposed ban of CCN-51 is 
foolish, given that this variety’s yields “will allow small farmers to get out of poverty” 
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(Rosales Valenzuela 2010). He also criticizes other aspects of the proposed law—which 
included a tax on chocolate and cocoa elaborated-product44
                                                 
44 Such as cocoa paste, cocoa licour and cocoa butter. 
 exports—and argues that it 
was designed by “retrogrades” and propelled by “neocolonialist mentalities” with the 
ultimate goal of keeping Ecuador’ as a supplier of low cost, unprocessed beans (Rosales 
Valenzuela 2010). Finally, he argued against the idea of creating a Quito-based 
bureaucratic body to administer the tax financed “cocoa program” because the people 
behind this initiative are the same that are trying to stop change—thus keeping farmers 
poor (Rosales Valenzuela 2010). 
Although individual exporters and the ANECACAO’s Executive Director said 
that they shared the need for fomenting production, some argued that the proposed tax 
rate was too high (cocoa exporter Lourdes Delgado, in Guayaquil 2010c). They also 
expressed concerns that the law had the goal of banning further plantings of the CCN-51 
variety, although the designers of the text said “that the goal [of the law] was to advance 
the cause of Nacional” (Vicente Urrutia in Guayaquil 2010c). Vicente Zeller, another 
cocoa exporter, argued that even though CCN-51 had a bad reputation, with the 
development of new fermentation methods this issue has been resolved, and that there is 
a substantial demand for this variety (Vicente Zeller in Guayaquil 2010d). Both Zeller 
and Delgado expressed that instead of banning, or talking about banning a variety, there 
should be a survey to find “farmer’s truth, given that some farmers prefer CCN-51 
because it is more profitable” (Vicent Zeller in Guayaquil 2010d). 
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In this chapter, I address this question by comparing the income that small 
farmers derive from Nacional and CCN-51 cocoa plots. I frame the results comparing two 
farmer’s associations, one of which is actively selling certified organic and Rainforest 
Alliance cocoa, and other where farmers are selling cocoa through local markets. I also 
include the income of crops grown with cocoa, as well as those that are cultivated 
independently. I also analyze the role of farm employment in cocoa farmers’ livelihood. 
Finally, I address the issues surrounding why a farmer selects a given variety.  
Methods 
The study was conducted on Ecuador's western lowlands, from May to December 
of 2009. Fieldwork was conducted in the provinces of Azuay, El Oro, Guayas, Los Ríos, 
Manabí, Santa Elena, and Santo Domingo de los Tsachilas (see Figure 2). This study 
gathered data from three sources: a collection of cocoa-related publications and resources 
collected during field-work, in-depth interviews with farmers and farmers’ leaders in all 
the aforementioned provinces and an open-answer survey applied to farmers residing in 
the provinces of Azuay, Guayas and Los Ríos. 
The first data source consists of approximately 100 brochures, reports and 
handbooks on the general topic of Ecuadorian cocoa. These documents were published 
by organizations involved with cocoa-development projects from 2000 to 2009. Among 
others, this repository contains documents published by farmer’s organizations, cocoa 
exporters, local and international non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental 
organizations, government agencies and private companies. These documents range from 
publicity materials to documents dealing specifically with alternative trade networks. All 
these documents are publicly available in Ecuador, although circulation may be restricted 
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because of limited number of copies. These documents are complemented with several 
digital repositories, among them the judicial magazine known as “Derecho Ecuador” 
[http://www.derechoecuador.com/] which makes copies of the Ecuadorian Official 
Registry freely available.  
Regarding the second data source, the in-depth interviews script was designed to 
gather information about farmer organizations’ experiences with cocoa 
commercialization, interactions with local and external agencies, and a general feeling 
about the state of the industry from farmers’ perspective. The participation on the 
interviews was voluntary. I conducted the interviews in Spanish. I interviewed farmers 
and leaders from 12 cooperatives, pre-cooperatives and associations. 
This study’s third data source consists of an open-answer survey given to cocoa 
producers from Los Ríos, Guayas, and Azuay. These producers were included in the 
records of one of two farmers’ organizations working in these provinces. The first farmer 
organization, the “Federacion Nacional de Productores de Cacao del Ecuador” 
(FEDECADE) is a federation (union of associations and cooperatives) that has about 
1100 members associated with 12 farmers’ groups located in the provinces of Azuay, 
Esmeraldas, El Oro and Guayas (see Figure 2). The FEDECADE farmers hold up to three 
certifications (Fair Trade, Organic and Rainforest Alliance). To achieve these 
certifications and develop its commercialization system, from 1997 to 2008 FEDECADE 
received support from several international agencies through an alliance with an 
Ecuadorian NGO called Conservacion y Desarrollo (CYD)(Conservation and 
Development). However, at the time of the study FEDECADE’s commercialization 
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system was not operating, and the farmers I interviewed were selling their cocoa at the 
local market.  
The second farmer organization, the “Asociacion de Productores Organicos de 
Vinces” (APOV), has approximately 240 members with farms located near the town of 
Vinces, Province of Los Ríos (Figure 2). At the time of the study, an APOV farmer could 
hold two certifications (Organic and Rainforest Alliance). Contrary to FEDECADE, the 
APOV had not received any investment from the IGOs-NGOs conglomerate. Instead, it 
was created as a mutual benefit venture of cocoa farmer’s, local intellectuals, Vinces’ 
Agricultural Technology Institute of the University of Guayaquil at Vinces, an ex-NGO 
field agent/organic certification agent, and COFINA—a cocoa exporter that became 
involved in alternative trade markets via FEDECADE’s experience. The APOV 
commercialization model does bypass local middlemen, but delivers cocoa to the 
exporter COFINA. COFINA then allocates APOV’s Rainforest Alliance and Organic 
Certified cocoa to clients willing to pay for this crop. The APOV is favored by its 
symbiotic relationship with the Agricultural Technology Institute of the University of 
Guayaquil at Vinces. First, the APOV is a tenant of this institute—thus sidestepping the 
need for costly commercialization infrastructure. Second, the APOV farmers have access 
to a continuous stream of young agronomists—some of which receive cacao training 
from the APOV. 
Both FEDECADE and APOV are established in areas that have been long 
dedicated to agriculture: APOV’s Vinces was at the center of the late 1800’s and early 
1900’s first Ecuadorian cocoa boom, and FEDECADE’s farms are located in areas 
opened to the cultivation of cocoa and bananas in the early 1950’s and 1960’s.  
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The survey was conducted at each participant’s residence in the case of 
FEDECADE members, and at the communal point-of-sale in the case of APOV’s. The 
interviews were conducted in Spanish by me and took about 60-90 minutes. The survey 
consisted of four parts (see Appendix 1). The first, personal history, is made of questions 
that establish age, gender and background of the farmers in the sample. The second, land 
management, measures the amount of land managed, and the level of fragmentation of 
this area. The third, cocoa and other crop production, asks questions about the crops 
managed by each farmer (including questions about crop variety, yield, and age of the 
crops); it also includes questions about farmer’s perception about the benefits and 
liabilities of cocoa varietals. Finally, the commercialization and income section, asks 
questions about the income generated by cocoa under different selling modalities, and 
asks for other economic activities that contribute to farmer’s income. In addition, APOV 
supplied individual farmer’s cocoa sales (by variety, price and amount) data from their 
commercialization records. All economic and transactional data is presented in US 
dollars (US$), which has been the Ecuadorian legal tender since 2000. A detailed list of 
the variables collected can be found in Appendix 2. 
Farmer’s were recruited in the sample depending on their willingness to 
participate in the study, and on the basis of two criteria: a) de-facto management of the 
land, b) being included in the rolls of associations registered with FEDECADE, or 
membership with the APOV. The application of these two criteria yielded a sample of 
100 farmers (out of 174 possible) registered with FEDECADE’s Nueva Union 
Campesina, 6 de Julio, Camacho and La Florida Associations, and a sample of 60 farmers 
(out of 223 possible) belonging to the APOV.  
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In addition to the data gathered from the surveys and previously existing 
databases, I conducted in-depth interviews with farmers that had been or were currently 
involved with their community’s cocoa commercialization team in the case of 
associations affiliated to FEDECADE. This information was complemented with 
interviews with FEDECADE and APOV representatives and staff, government and non-
profit organization officials, cocoa exporters, other farmer’s organizations representatives 
and cocoa town-level middlemen. I was granted access to an anonymized version of 
FEDECADE and APOV commercialization databases, and other financial and economic 
information. A farmer’s on-farm gross product is reported as the standardized Farm 
Gross Product in US$ per ha year (FGP ha/year), which is the sum of income for all 
possible on-farm crops standardized by total farm area (see Figure 3).  
None of the farmers in my sample keep detailed accounting of farm expenses, so 
to estimate crop expenses for cocoa Nacional and CCN-51, I rely on the Average 
Management Cost by Province published in the Fine Cacao Management Cost Census45
To establish the percentage of farmers whose agricultural income sets them below 
poverty, I compared the GAI values with the values of the Ecuadorian national extreme 
 
(CORPEI 2009). Data gathered with the in-depth interviews with farmers were used to 
estimate management cost for other crops (i.e., bananas, passion fruit or plantains). These 
estimates are used to calculate a farmer’s Gross Agricultural Income (GAI), and the Farm 
Gross Income (FGI), which is a farmer’s GAI divided by the area of his or her holdings 
(see Figure 3). 
                                                 
45 While the Census focused in Nacional, it also includes Management Costs for CCN-51 
plots. 
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poverty level and the basic income level (INEC’s Canasta Familiar Vital and Canasta 
Familiar Basica) (INEC 2010). The INEC CFV (Canasta Familiar Vital) is set based on 
the survival income for a family of four; families that earn less than this amount are 
classified as extremely poor. The CFB, which is set at a higher level of income, sets the 
level below which a family of four is classified as poor. Given that GAI income data 
presents a yearly estimate based in the prices for October and November of 2009, I used 
the CFV and CFB for these months multiplied by 12 to get a comparable yearly statistic. 
With these caveats, the CFV level is set at a monthly income of $370.25 for an annual 
value of $4443; the CFB level is a monthly income of $522.46 for an annual value of 
$6269 (INEC 2010). 
When appropriate, general statistics (i.e., mean, median, SD) were calculated 
using Microsoft Excel 2002 (SP3). Linear regression and other tests were conducted 
using Minitab 14. Survey text processing was done using QDA-Miner 3.2.3; interview 
data mining and sorting was done using Atlas.Ti.6.1.1.  
To establish the relationship between poverty, crop diversification and area of a 
farmer’s holding, first I classified farmers in four groups each one set by one type of crop 
diversification schemes I found during field work: Nacional-only, CCN-51-only, both 
Nacional and CCN-51, cocoa (Nacional and CCN-51) and other crops. Second, I 
performed linear regression analysis to establish the average gross agricultural income 
(GAI) as a function of the area held under a given crop diversification scheme. Then, I 
used the regression equations to find the area of a holding under each diversification 
scheme—all other things being equal— that will generate an income that sets that farmer 
above CFV or CFB by the type of cropping system. I follow this procedure under the 
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assumption that holding the land (actively managing it) precedes receiving income from 
crops planted in that area.  
Cocoa farmer profiles 
In the survey, I found that the average FEDECADE farmer is 54 years old (with 
ages from 18 to 83 years) and the average APOV farmer is 55 years old (age range 24 to 
83 years old), with a bias towards older farmers (see Figure 4). In both cases, the majority 
of respondents are male (84% FEDECADE, 92% APOV).46
 About half (53%) of FEDECADE farmers learned about cocoa from their 
parents. The other 47% reported that their parents had crops other than cocoa. The APOV 
farmers answers to the family history question indicate that 72 % of their parents had or 
worked in cocoa; only 16% reported that their parents farmed crops other than cocoa. 
 
These similarities in age and gender composition do not extend to other 
parameters. In a question about place of birth, slightly less than half FEDECADE farmers 
were born in a locality other than their current place of residence (49%, <50 km) while 9 
out of 10 APOV farmers said that they were born in the town of Vinces or nearby (90%, 
<50 km). On average, FEDECADE farmers acquired their lands 33 years ago, with 70% 
of them having done so during the 1970’s land reform. The last farmer to have acquired 
land through land reform did so 27 years ago; after that point in time, new arrivals 
reportedly got their holdings by purchasing, renting, or inheritance.  
                                                 
46 The gender proportion in the sample reflects the gender ratio of memberships in both 
organizations, which is skewed towards males. In fact, the gender ratio for the roster of 
the sampled FEDECADE associations is 83% male, 17% female; the gender ratio for the 
APOV roster is 87% male, 13% female (Archives of FEDECADE, 2009; Archives of 
APOV, 2009).  
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Differences in regional history versus family tradition are also felt in the way that current 
farmers acquired their current holdings. The most common way for holding acquisition 
by FEDECADE farmers is through “land reform” (51%), followed by “purchase” (25%) 
and “inheritance” (19%); APOV’s most frequent holding acquisition answer is 
“inheritance” (45%), followed by “purchase” (38%) and “land reform” (11%). A Z-test 
indicates that FEDECADE and APOV results are statistically different for all these 
parameters, with a confidence level of 95% for all other than “Purchase” (which is 
statistically different for a confidence level of 90%).  
The survey results show that 42% of FEDECADE farmers’ depend exclusively on 
cocoa (both Nacional and CCN-51), 31% raise other crops to supplement their cocoa 
income, and 27% rely on off-farm employment to supplement income. Only 10.1% of the 
APOV farmers depend exclusively on cocoa. The large majority of APOV farmers 
(76.3%) supplement their income with other crops, or with off-farm income (13.6%) (see 
Table 2).  
Only 12% of FEDECADE’s farmers and 13% APOV’s have access to loans for 
agriculture; survey respondents said that “there are no loans for cocoa because it yields 
too little,” “the loans are only for short cycle,” and that “the interest was too high.” 
Interestingly, in the case of FEDECADE one middleman originated one-third of the 
loans; this person also bought the product of 12% of the farmers. The APOV farmers said 
that they did not have access to middlemen loans.  
Farm descriptions: holdings, varieties, and yields  
The average FEDECADE holdings are larger (7.93 ha) than the holdings of the 
APOV average farmer (4.58 ha). With regard to variety planted, 27% of FEDECADE 
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farmers reported that they have only Nacional plants, 59% have both Nacional and CCN-
51 in separated plots, and 14% have converted their holdings to exclusively CCN-51. On 
the other hand, 80% of APOVs’ farmers reported that their farms are planted with 
Nacional exclusively; 20% reported that they have land dedicated to both varieties, and 
none of them said that they have converted their land to the new variety. A McNemar 
Test for variety-planted proportions shown no statistically significant preference for any 
variety in the case of FEDECADE; the same test for the APOV is statistically significant 
showing a strong preference for Nacional. However, a farmer stated preference for one 
variety does not influence the amount of land dedicated to each one. The average 
FEDECADE Nacional planting is 5.09 ha (SD 5.75) and are 28 years old (SD 17.14); the 
average APOV Nacional planting is of 4.31 ha (SD 4.34) and 32 years old (SD 32.69). 
The average FEDECADE CCN-51 planting is smaller (2.84 ha, SD 2.74), and 
considerably newer than their Nacional counterparts (5 years old, SD 5.03). The average 
APOV CCN-51plantings are also smaller (average is 1.98 ha, SD 2.26), and newer (6.8 
years old, SD 3.7). Indeed, half of the APOV farmer that got CCN-51 plants reported that 
these were a gift from a government program, and were less than one-year old. The 
average FEDECADE CCN-51-only farm is of 3.78 ha and was planted 7 years ago; as 
previously mentioned, no APOV farmer had a CCN-51-only farm. Finally, the mean area 
dedicated to Nacional by a FEDECADE farmer is statistically similar to the mean area 
dedicated to Nacional by an APOV farmer, the same holds for CCN-51 plantings, which 
indicate that farmer’s in both locations strive for a balance between the yield of each 
variety and other factors ( i.e., lack of capital for converting plots, or strategies of crop 
diversification for risk reduction).  
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The economics of farmers’ decisions: shade-grown but low yield vs. full-sun but 
high yield 
FEDECADE’s average farmer Nacional yield is of 379 kg/ha/year (SD 160.6) 
(which is higher than Ecuador’s average of 250.3 kg/ha/year); for CCN-51, the average 
yield is 721 kg/ha year (SD 508.0). The APOV records show that the average organic 
farm yield is 295 kg/ha year (SD 98.9), with the highest Nacional yields reached in farms 
using APOV’s cocoa organic-farming technological package (OTP). This package, 
consisting of moderate shade reduction, pruning, increased cacao tree density, and use of 
organic approved fertilizers and disease controllers 47, increases Nacional yield to an 
average of 587 kg/ha/year (n=15, SD 150.68). While these results are encouraging, the 
application of the OPT is limited given farmer’s lack of upfront investment capital. The 
APOV farmers reported that CCN-51 yield is 354 kg/ha year, with the average being 
weighted down by recently planted plots which make for half of the respondents48
The FEDECADE data for Nacional shows slight negative correlations between 
age of plantation and yield (-0.317, p-value=0.001). A correlation age of plantings vs. 
.  
                                                 
47 The APOV package was developed under the leadership of the Ing. Julio Cerezo, 
current APOV President and former Director of the Agricultural Technology Institute of 
the University of Guayaquil at Vinces. It consists of replacing low-yielding cocoa trees 
for better plants, increasing cocoa plants density, pruning, shade reduction, fertilization 
and disease control (with organic products). However, the APOV handles a good part of 
these tasks, given that individual farmers lack the equipment and training to perform 
them on their own (i.e., they need an expansive gas-powered mechanical pruning saw, 
and sprayer pumps to apply products). For 2010, APOV is adding irrigation to this 
package. 
48 In fact, about 25% of APOV farmers that have CCN-51 received their plants during 
last year, as a part of a government-funded program that provided each farmer with a few 
(100 to 250) CCN-51 plants. 
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yield for FEDECADE CCN-51 is positive (0.304, p-value=0.015).The results suggests 
that CCN-51’s peak production is reached when the crop is 10 to 15 years old, but the 
later behavior of the variety is unknown given that the oldest registered CCN-51 
plantation in my sample was planted 20 years ago. Information gathered from two large-
sized local farms (30 ha, 25 years old; 70 ha, 5 years old) suggest that CCN-51’s older 
plants yield remains high if adequate inputs are supplied (a farmer reported reaching 
1363.63 kg/ha/year with pruning, weeding, irrigation and fertilization). Data from APOV 
did not show any correlation between age of plant and yield  
The FEDECADE farmers sold their cocoa in two different ways. The first 
modality, selling minimally processed fresh cocoa by volume (a modality know as 
“fresco y desvenado,” fresh and depulped), had an average price of US$117.41 per 45kg 
(or roughly 6 “latas” [cans]) for October and November of 2009 (n=67, SD5.87). The 
second was the more traditional modality of selling dried cocoa (which may have been 
fermented). Dried cocoa had a gate price of US$120.66 per 45 kg (n=78, SD 6.28) for the 
same period.  
More than a quarter of FEDECADE farmers (29%) complain that they do not get 
a better price for Nacional cocoa. Indeed, I found that the difference in prices for wet 
Nacional and wet CCN-51 is not statistically significant: wet Nacional was sold at 
$117.22 per 45 kg (n=83, SD 7.14), while wet CCN-51 was sold at $117.66 per 45 kg 
(n=64, SD 6.76). The APOV farmers get a Nacional premium of $10-15 all year round 
(APOV’s receives CCN-51 at practically Vinces’ market price).  
All APOV farmers sold their cocoa under the fresh and depulped modality for an 
average gate price of US$114.2 per 45 kg for the same period. The APOV sold this cocoa 
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for an average price of US$126.90 per 45 kg; the difference between farmer’s gate price 
and price of sale went to cover APOV’s operational expenses (i.e., post-harvest, 
transportation, repayment of capital for commercialization, certifications, etc). However, 
the APOV gate price was US$ 10-15 higher than Vinces’ market price, thus remained 
attractive to the farmers.49
To visualize these prices in a larger context, when FEDECADE farmers sold wet 
cocoa they received 88% of ANECACAO’s FOB price (ANECACAO 2010). 
 Indeed, APOV consistently delivered higher prices for its 
affiliated farmers, but geographical location certainly matters. 
50 A 
FEDECADE farmer that sold dry cocoa got 92% of the FOB. The APOV farmers only 
sold wet cocoa and received 87% of the FOB price. The APOV (as an institution) got 
paid 97% of ANECACAO FOB for dry cocoa. Overall, FEDECADE and APOV farmers 
received 73% of the value that their crop has in the international markets51
Crop diversification and on-farm income 
 when selling 
wet cocoa.  
Crop selection and on-farm diversification influence the reported FEDECADE 
farm gross product (FGP) and estimated farm gross income (FGI). The FGP of 
FEDECADE farmers that rely on Nacional alone (n=24) is $878.12 per ha/year, while the 
FGP of FEDECADE farmers that rely on CCN-51 alone (n=10) is $2729.65 per ha/year 
                                                 
49 Vinces is located at 100 km from Guayaquil; Naranjal is located at 45 km from 
Guayaquil, and these two points are connected by a main highway.  
50 ANECACAO ASE FOB averaged US$ 130.89 per 45 kg for ASE quality cocoa. Cocoa 
ranked higher than ASE (i.e., ASS or ASSP), fetch higher prices. 
51 Cocoa was traded for US$153.56 per 45 kg for October and November of 2009 at New 
York (NYSEC) and London (LIFFE). 
 144 
 
(n= 10). FEDECADE farmers that hold both varieties (n=32) have a FGP of $ 1568.15, 
with 33 of their gross income coming from Nacional and 66% from CCN-51 (even 
though Nacional plantings are twice as large as those of CCN-51) (see Table 3). APOV 
figures are lower; the average FGP farmers that rely only on Nacional cocoa is of 
$741.63 per ha/year (n=10). The APOV sample of farmers that have CCN-51 old enough 
to be productive stage is too small for generalizations (n=4). 
In the survey, 28% of FEDECADE farmers reported that they raise other crops to 
supplement their cocoa income. While preferences vary according to place, market, and 
local conditions, most farmers chose between four alternative crops: bananas, plantains, 
passion fruit, and citrus. Gate prices for these other crops are relatively uniform across 
the region. Data about average yields and gate prices can be found in table 3 (other 
crops). The best FGP is achieved in farms that grow CCN-51 with another crop (plantains 
or citrus). These farms average FGP is $3078 per ha/year (n=3), with 86% of the FGP 
coming from CCN-51 and 14% of the FGP coming from the other tree crops. The second 
best combination is to have Nacional, CCN-51 and other crops (i.e., passion fruit or 
plantain), which yields a FGP of  $2278 per ha/year (n=11), with Nacional accounting for 
26% of the FGP, CCN-51 for 55% of the FGP, and the other crops for 19% of the FGP. 
Following this is a combination of Nacional, CCN-51 and Nacional-intercropped 
organic/Fair-Trade bananas,52
                                                 
52 The Fair-Trade and Organic certified bananas are sold through two channels other than 
FEDECADE: the El Guabo Association of Banana Producers or the Union de 
Campesinos del Litoral (UROCAL). 
 which produces a FGP ha/year of $1801 (n=7) with 27% 
of the FGP coming from Nacional, 13% coming from CCN-51 and 60% coming from 
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bananas53. The last alternative, planting organic/Fair Trade bananas in association with 
Nacional cocoa, generates a FGP of $1514 ha/year (n=5).54
Instead of fruits, 53% of APOV’s farmers plant what is colloquially known “short 
cycle” (ciclo corto), meaning rice or maize.
 In this case, Nacional 
accounts for 29% of the FGP while bananas account for 71% (see Figure 5).  
55
                                                 
53 The farmers said that they could only cultivate and certify banana planted in 
association with Nacional; they did not plant banana in association with CCN-51. 
54 The farmers reported that the yield of 1 ha of this associated crops yielded 276 “boxes” 
of banana per year [6 Mt/ha/year]. At the time of the study, the gate price for a 22 kg 
“box” of organic certified banana was of $7.00. 
55 In fact, by March 2010 all banana-growers were no longer members of the APOV 
given that they “had started using agrochemicals because their banana plants got infected 
with Sigatoka and the organic remedies were not enough (Ana Nivela, interview with the 
author, July 2010). 
 The average FGP for farmers that raise 
cocoa and short cycle is $2007.3 per ha/year (n=32), with 30% of the FGP coming from 
the cocoa plantings and 70% of the FGP coming from the rice or maize; other alternatives 
(Nacional + bananas, Nacional + bananas + short cycle, Nacional + plantains) average 
FGP is of $2651.1 per ha/year (n=12) (see Figure 5).However, I suspect that the 
contribution of rice or maize  to the APOV farmers’ income is understated for two 
reasons. First, “short cycle” management is input-dependent, and farmers routinely use 
agrochemicals (fertilizers and pesticides) on these crops, which are incompatible with 
APOV’s organically managed cocoa. In order to maintain the all-important cocoa 
certification, APOV farmers have adopted the practice of physically, colloquially and 
mentally isolating—which fences and buffer zones, or by demurring when talking about 
them—these parcels from those under organic management. This “isolation-by-practice” 
may lead to underreporting these crops. Second, at the time of field work Ecuador’s 
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government opted for establishing a ‘fixed official price’ for both rice and maize. This 
price, of $12 per 45 kg of maize and $28 per 45 kg of rice, made farmers reluctant to 
plant these crops given that “at that [official] price, one does not earn enough money to 
pay the production costs” (Anita Nivela,  interview with the author, July 2010). This 
information leads me to believe that in 2009 the APOV farmers planted less of these 
crops than what is normal for them. 
On-farm production cost and farm gross agricultural income 
On farm production costs are shown in Table 5. Data for cocoa management cost 
(for both Nacional and CCN-51) come from the Average Management Cost by Province 
published in the Fine Cacao Management Cost Census (CORPEI 2009); for crops other 
than cocoa, management cost data were supplied by key informants (farmers or local 
specialists). In all cases, the yield and gate price for all crops are an average of the yields 
and prices reported by the farmers in my sample.  
The FEDECADE’s Nacional-only farms FGI average $476 ha/year. In contrast, 
FEDECADE CCN-51-only farmers could earn $1380 ha/year, even though CCN-51 
production costs are higher (see Table 4). The average FEDECADE FGI of farmers that 
have the two cocoa varieties is $811 ha/year. The highest FGI, of $1537 ha/year,56
                                                 
56 Plantains or papaya are used as temporary shade for young CCN-51 plants. Citrus 
(normally oranges and tangerines) are used for permanent shade.  
 is 
achieved by farmers that raise plantains or oranges in association with their CCN-51 
plots. The income from farmers that keep cocoa plots of Nacional and CCN-51, plus 
other crops (passion fruit, papaya or plantain) is $1131.03 ha/year. Farmers with plots of 
Nacional cocoa, bananas associated with Nacional, and CCN-51 plots (not associated), 
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generates an average FGI of $835 ha/year. Finally, the average FGI of farmers than 
combine Nacional and bananas is of $696 ha/year (see Figure 5). 
The FGI of APOV farmers is lower than the FGI of FEDECADE farmers. The 
FGI for farmers that only grow Nacional is $352.73 per ha/year. Farmers that have cocoa 
and other crops (combinations of cocoa, bananas or plantains, and short cycle) fare better, 
with a FGI of $1039.30 per ha/year. Finally, the best result for an APOV farmer is to 
have cocoa and short cycle, an alternative that generates a FGI of $1154.80 ha/year (see 
Figure 5). 
Agricultural income and poverty level 
As discussed in the Methods section, for the purposes of this study the Family 
Vital Requirements (Canasta Familiar Vital, CFV) threshold is set at an annual income 
level of $4443; the Family Basic Requirements (Canasta Familiar Basica) threshold is set 
for an annual income of $6269 (INEC 2010). 
The comparison on farmers’ Gross Agricultural Income (GAI) and Ecuador’s 
poverty level is striking. The annual income of 47% of FEDECADE farmers is below 
what is needed to meet the Family Vital Requirements (CFV), the income of 19% is 
above CFV but below what is needed to meet the Family Basic Requirements (CFB), and 
the income of 33% is above Family Basic Requirements (CFB). The income of 71% of 
APOV farmers is below the CFV; the income of 11% of the farmers is above CFV but 
below CFB, and the income of 18% of the farmers is above CFB. 
The income of FEDECADE farmers that rely on Nacional-only cocoa farms is the 
lowest. The gross agricultural income of 83 % of the farmers that have Nacional-only 
farms is below CFV, the income of 13% is above CFV but below CFB, and the income of 
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4% is above CFB. Farmers with plots of Nacional and CCN-51 fare somewhat fare better, 
with 60% of the farmers below CFV, 20% above CFV but below CFB, and 20% above 
CFB. The two best combinations found for FEDECADE farmers are Nacional, CCN-51 
and Fair Trade bananas, with 29% of farmers below CFV, no farmers in the above CFV-
below CFB range,  and 71% above CFB, and CCN-51 with others, in which the income 
of 100% of the farmers is above CFB.  
In the case of APOV farmers, the gross agricultural income (GAI) of 90% of the 
farmers that rely exclusively on cocoa is below the CFV, and the income of 10% is above 
CFV but below CFB. In my sample, I did not find any APOV Nacional-only farmers with 
income above CFB. Farmers that grow cocoa and short cycle are slightly better off, 
although the income of 70% of them is below CFV, the income of 3% is above CFV but 
below CFB, and income of 27% is above CFB. The GAI of farmers that have cocoa and 
other crops (bananas or plantains and short cycle) is better, thus the income of 59% of the 
farmers is below CFV, the income of 33% is under CFB, and the incomes of 8% sets 
them above CFB. 
The regression analysis shows a positive linear relationship between the area 
managed by a farmer and his income level in all cases (see Figure 6 and Figure 7). In 
general, farmers with smaller farms have less income. However, I found that in 24% of 
FEDECADE cases, and 6% of the APOV, farmers with a comparable area of holdings 
had different incomes (thus the income of one farmer did fall below the poverty level, 
while the income of other was above this level) (see Figure 8 and 9). Given that market 
prices and yield are relatively constant within FEDECADE’s (or APOV’s) area of 
influence, the overlap is explained by differences between cropping systems.  
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Graphically, the slope of the regression trend line in plots of high yield cocoa 
(CCN-51) or multi-cropping systems (cocoa and other crops) is steeper: these systems 
generate more income per unit of area (Figure 6 and 7). For example, if a FEDECADE 
farmer—selling cocoa at the local market price—needs a holding of 3.43 ha of CCN-51 
(or 2.89 of cocoa and other crops, i.e., passion fruit or Fair Trade bananas), for his or her 
income to be above CFV. However, he or she needs a holding of 12.12 ha of Nacional to 
reach the CFV level. The APOV farmers face a similar challenge. Thus, an APOV farmer 
who raises Nacional and other crops (short cycle, conventional bananas) needs a holding 
of 4.11 ha for his or her income to be above CFV. If an APOV farmer raises cocoa 
Nacional-only, this person needs holdings of 12.58 ha for his (or her) income to be above 
CFV. Evidently, farmer’s choice matters. 
Risk reduction: Farmers perceptions about Nacional and CCN-51 
In the survey and interviews, I found that FEDECADE and APOV farmers view 
Nacional similarly. Farmers appreciate Nacional for its organoleptic characteristics of 
aroma, taste and flavor, which is interesting given that farmers do not asses their crop 
under these parameters. Of FEDECADE farmers, 90% mentioned aroma as a positive 
characteristic of Nacional; all APOV respondents also mentioned it. Some of 
FEDECADE’s survey responses suggest external influence: “it is the best cocoa in the 
World,” “[having Nacional] is our [Ecuador’s] privilege;” “because even the Europeans 
say that it [Nacional] is the best cocoa in the world because it’s great flavor and aroma” 
(see Figure 10). On the other hand, 70% of FEDECADE farmers identified CCN-51’s 
lack of aroma as this variety main weakness. 
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Farmers in both locations appreciate Nacional for its final bean weight (after 
fermenting and drying) (49.5% FEDECADE, 34.5% APOV) and low-cost management 
(1.9% FEDECADE, 3.1% APOV). APOV farmers appreciate Nacional for characteristics 
that were not mentioned by FEDECADE farmers, such as hardiness, resilience to adverse 
weather (drought or flooding), “good yield” without inputs, and plant durability. The 
CCN-51 variety is appreciated for its yield (70% of FEDECADE’s farmers), ease of pod 
collection, ease of plant management (18% FEDECADE), and resistance to disease (10% 
FEDECADE’s) (Figure 11). While farmers mention that this variety requires more “care” 
(i.e., fertilizing, irrigating, pruning) they also say that CCN-51’s yield makes it a 
worthwhile investment, and that CCN-51 “si deja platita” [CCN-51 generates profits] in 
the words of an anonymous survey respondent. Also, the amounts of inputs used in CCN-
51 must not be over emphasized—at least in the case of small farmers in Ecuador. The 
self-described “conventional” CCN-51 farmers I interview used herbicides (gliphosates), 
organic fertilizers (treated manure), urea, topical applications of copper-sulfate 
compounds when pruning, and insecticides to control plagues (ants), but the use of these 
products did not reach the amounts and prevalence of use as in other crops in the area 
(i.e., bananas). The FEDECADE has had Rainforest Alliance certified CCN-51 plots 
(although it did not find a market for these beans), and other CCN-51 farmers reported 
that they managed CCN-51 the same way they managed Nacional, with water and 
pruning. Evidently, more research is needed on this topic: the lack of regard for CCN-51 
is generating a bias against  learning about the true risks and benefits of this variety. 
Farmers also agree on variety’s weakness. The Nacional variety susceptibility to 
diseases is seen as a major problem by 71% of FEDECADE farmers, and 75% of APOV 
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farmers. Of diseases and pests of concern, the most frequently mentioned is frosty pod, 
which was identified “as the main cause of crop loss” by 29% of FEDECADE farmers 
and 30% of APOV farmers. An APOV farmer said that “in a bad year, losses to monilla 
[frosty pod] go up to 80% of the pods.” The second most commonly mentioned disease is 
witches broom (27% of FEDECADE and 30% of APOV farmers), followed by parasitic 
plants (locally known as “hierba pajarito” (7% FEDECADE, 2% APOV). The least 
mentioned disease is cacao wilt (‘mal de machete’ or ‘pudricion de la pata’) which is a 
source of concern for 5% of FEDECADE farmers with holdings of CCN-51, but it was 
not mentioned by FEDECADE Nacional-only holders or by any of the APOV farmers. 
One APOV farmer mentioned that, beyond the attack of the “witches broom”, he was 
also concerned about Nacional losses to the disease locally known as “mancha negra” 
(cocoa black pod rot, Phytophthora cf. palmivora).  
While susceptibility to disease (other than the cocoa wilt) is not a major concern 
for CCN-51 farmers, they worry about the water requirements of this variety. 
Additionally, CCN-51 pods’ abundance and easiness of collection—cited as an advantage 
by most farmers—is seen as a disadvantage by others: cocoa-pods thieves strike CCN-51 
plots because in a short period of time (1 hour or so) they can fill sacks with pods and run 
(even at night). Farmers argued that thieves do not hit Nacional plots, because pods are 
scarce, and they would need to work to make it worthwhile.57
                                                 
57 Altought cocoa thievery is a common event (all the farmers I interview have suffered 
from it), it is not reported in crime statistics.  
 Thus, farmers may opt for 
Nacional as a risk reduction strategy in areas where cocoa thievery is high. 
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Finally, one survey respondent argued that his worries about CCN-51 were born 
out of what other people said: “son las amenazas que hay, que esta variedad no ha de 
valer” [there are threats [by others who say] that this variety will be worthless]. The bad 
reputation of CCN-51 appears to be affecting farmer’s view about this variety.  
  On the other hand, farmers that have converted their farms to CCN-51 are 
extremely critical of Nacional. For example, an unaffiliated anonymous farmer from the 
vicinity of El Progreso (Province of El Oro) said that he changed his farm to CCN-51 
about 12 years ago because “Nacional does not give you enough money to live.” He 
mentioned that he was continuously “working on the farm, fertilizing, irrigating, 
controlling diseases” but that “it [Nacional] was good for nothing, the plants did not 
yield.” He received technical support from staff of a development project working with 
the nearby UNOCACE-affiliated [ex-FEDECADE] Asociation of Cacao Producers “El 
Progreso”, but “everything was the same.” He mentioned that although “El Progreso pays 
more for Nacional” (about $20 over the market price per 45 kg, similar to APOV’s 
premium), it “is not enough.” Roughly 12 years after switching to CCN-51, he says that 
his average yield is up to 810 kg/ha year, and that “he gets the same price for CCN-51 as 
others get for Nacional.” He argues that “there is no difference; they say Nacional is 
better but they do not want to pay more.” He finally argued that “[he] did not want 
anything to do with Nacional anymore: not even as a gift” (Anonymous farmer, interview 
with the author, La Cadena).  
The closest to a defender of Nacional who I interviewed is a farmer who said he 
was keeping his Nacional plot because he and his son (an immigrant to the US) “loved 
the trees, the birds, and to have something for other animals.” This farmer has plots of 
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Nacional with shade of both timber and fruit-bearing trees (avocados, zapote, and others) 
and plots planted with a combination of CCN-51 and passion fruit. He said that Nacional 
was “not profitable,” but argued that his other crops were. Thus, he concluded saying that 
he was going to keep his Nacional because the other crops gave him income to feed his 
family. He appreciated his Nacional forest. In his words, “it takes [shade] trees 10, 20, 
even 50 years to growth, and you can cut them down in minutes” (Anonymous farmer, 
interview with the author, Nueva Union Campesina).  
The Secret Economic Life of Cocoa Farmers: wearing four hats (Nacional, CCN-51, 
other crops and off-farm work) 
In-depth interviews with farmers reveal that they make careful analysis of the 
risks involved with certain agricultural choices. While this analysis is inherently done at 
the individual level, the overall results of the interviews suggest that farmer weighs 
information gathered from his/her social network, makes rough economic calculations, 
and makes educated guesses about the risk of a crop before launching himself/herself in a 
short-medium term entrepreneurial investment. For instance, I interviewed an 
independent, non-affiliated farmers from the town of Jesus Maria (Guayas) that decided 
to replace his small (2 ha) banana plantation “about three years ago” with cocoa because 
“[banana] did not really work for us [small farmers] anymore.” This change from one 
crop to the other was not immediate; it is an ongoing process in which cacao plants’ 
acquisition and planting have been done in steps: “[I plant cacao] when I [farmer and his 
family] have the means, and when the weather [rain] favors; if you get some money, you 
buy 600 plants, and you take care of them for a year or so with water when needed, and 
weed control, and one or two sacks of urea for finishing; then you wait until you get more 
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money, and you plant another 900 plants. Meanwhile you have to have another job, 
because the plantain that you use as temporary shade does not yield enough money to 
survive.”  
This farmer planted 360 plants of Nacional “de pepa” (from seed) because “it is 
cheaper this way,” but he sourced CCN-51 plants from a “reputable source in Naranjal, 
because they have one CCN-51 that is very pretty.” He strongly recommended that” one 
has to be careful about sourcing plants,” because “if you do not get good scion and stock 
material you get plants that are all male and later you have to replace them.” This farmer 
planted CCN-51 because “he knew the material, he knew the genetics of the plant.” 
About planting Nacional, he said that he thinks that “when you plant from seed you play 
with dice: you are not sure about anything, so although the upfront cost of CCN-51 is 
higher ($0.35 per plant of CCN-51, $0.10 per plant of Nacional) it is cheaper at the end.” 
This farmer accounting supports this opinion: he reported that his 360 Nacional plants 
yield about “one can a year [7.5 kg; 0.02 kg/plant year];” the others (1140 CCN-51 
plants) yield 8-9 latas [68 kg; 0.06 kg/plant year], even thought he gives both Nacional 
and CCN-51 plants the same treatment. Given that this farmer sold both CCN-51 and 
Nacional for the same gate price, this means that each one of this farmer’s CCN-51 plant 
produces three times the income of a Nacional plant (for the same ‘management’ 
investment). 
Arriba: An unsustainable crop? 
The results of this study indicate that there are parts of the Ecuadorian cocoa 
narrative that accurately portray reality: cocoa holders and their holdings are relatively 
old, and poor. The agricultural income of 66% of FEDECADE and 82% of APOV 
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farmers is below Ecuador’s poverty line; even more, the agricultural income of 47% of 
FEDECADE’s and 71% of APOV’s members is below the extreme poverty line. There 
are points of commonality among these poor farmers: reduced size of holdings, and that 
most of them (96% FEDECADE, 100% APOV) have farms planted with cocoa of the 
Nacional variety. 
The APOV case illustrates the limitations of the alternative trade model. Although 
APOV farmers are selling their cocoa for a price which is higher than what they can get 
in the local market, this premium does not allow them to rise above the poverty level. It 
also shows some of the limits of these trade-models: the APOV (the institution) gets 97% 
of the FOB value of cocoa (while farmers get 87%) yet this difference is needed to cover 
the costs of meeting the quality and certification requirements of its clients. The 
FEDECADE farmers, with the geographical advantage of lower transportation costs, get 
a similar share of the FOB selling at the local market price without the premium afforded 
by certification. 
However, there are factors that farmers control that influence their income. Of 
these, the results show that crop diversification strategies exert a strong influence in 
farmer’s income. Farmers with more types of crops certainly fare better; while the crops 
planted vary according to region and farmer’s personal assessment and preferences, I 
found that several combinations are possible. However, the results also indicate that 
Nacional lacks profitability in all planting schemes.   
Thus, although most farmers still have Nacional (86% of FEDECADE, 100% of 
APOV), this is changing rapidly. Thus, 59% of FEDECADE farmers and 20% of APOV 
farmers have plots with CCN-51, and these plots are younger (mean=5 years old) and 
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more productive than any Nacional plot. In the survey and interviews, I found that two 
factors explain this rapid change. First, simply put, CCN-51 yield by area is up to three 
times the yield of Nacional, even in cases where there has been a constant, long term 
efforts to improve Nacional plantations. In the FEDECADE general area—whose farmers 
had the support of Nacional-oriented NGO projects for the last 10 years—CCN-51 yields 
721 kg/ha year to Nacional 379 kg/ha year. In the APOV general area CCN-51 yields are 
higher (354 kg/ha year) than the average Nacional’ (295 kg ha/year) even thought these 
plots have not yet reached full production. Farmers are aware that CCN-51 is more 
costly, and that it requires more ‘care,’ but they said that this variety’s yield compensates 
them for the extra investment. Second, in the regional markets, a farmer gets paid the 
same price for both varieties; or, if the farmer is associated to a ‘certified’ associative 
commercialization organization that manages to get a differentiated price for Nacional 
cocoa, the amount of the premium does not compensate the farmer for the low yield of 
this variety.  
However, farmers have found three ways around the failings of Nacional, namely 
Nacional-based organic agricultural intensification, multi-crop agriculture, and off-farm 
employment. The first strategy is shown by APOV’s Organic Technology Package 
(OTP), which in preliminary trials delivers a yield of 587 kg/ha year. This result also 
raises questions about what the OTP could do for CCN-51 trees.  While the 
implementation of the OTP package is limited because of its costs and complexity, it 
shows that changes in management result in more productive cocoa farms. Unfortunately, 
the APOV OTP has built-in limiting factors that may prevent it from being readily 
transferred to other locations: it is premised on the APOV alliance with the Vinces’ 
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Agricultural Technology Institute of the University of Guayaquil, and leveraged on the 
supply of young agronomists formed at this institution. Some of the labors of the OTP, 
such as aggressive pruning, and shade control, require tools and training that farmers do 
not have. Even more, these tasks are physically demanding, risky and challenging for 
farmers who on average are on average 54 years old.  
The second strategy is crop diversification. Either by replacing or complementing 
cocoa, crop diversification increases on-farm agricultural income. Evidently, farmers in 
different areas have developed different ways of implementing diversification: APOV 
farmers prefer short cycle; FEDECADE’s farmers opt for bananas, plantains or passion 
fruit. Even the planting of plots of CCN-51 should be viewed from this perspective; it 
provides another source of income. The farmers face two constrains that limits the 
implementation of these practices: first, it is related to personal know-how, and secondly, 
there is a need for capital investment to plant other crops. The survey results show that 
the availability of agricultural loans is limited, which is a severe limitation. Furthermore, 
this strategy cannot be standardized: all the farmers I surveyed and interviewed have a 
different take on what is profitable for them, depending on their experience, labor 
availability, geography, and other factors. Nevertheless, crop diversification offers a 
further benefit: if farmers are making a decent living out of their work, some of them may 
opt for conserving Nacional for its aesthetic values.  
The third strategy is to opt for off-farm employment. The results show that 27% 
of FEDECADE’s and 13.6% of APOV’s survey respondents work off-farm, in 
occupations that go from agricultural labor for other farmers (11% FEDECADE, 1% 
APOV), commerce (tending shops), trades (cleaning houses, bus and taxi drivers, 
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fishermen, extracting crab meat, waiting tables), and professional services (my sample 
included a teacher, a doctor, an economist and a government employee). This last group, 
which accounts for 1% of FEDECADE and 7% of APOV farmers offers a view of a 
possible future for Ecuador’s cocoa farming: all these people reported that the highest 
share of their income came from their professional occupations, and that cocoa was 
secondary. These professionals liked Nacional, because it was easy to keep. 
In conclusion, this study shows weaknesses in the conceptualization and 
implementation of the alternative trade and the agricultural intensification models on the 
context of Ecuadorian cocoa production. Alternative trade—derived from ecological or 
environmental friendly certification schemes, or in varietal attributes—offers at best a 
limited tool to address poverty, unless accompanied by a strong agricultural 
intensification component. In Ecuadorian cocoa, low yield does not lead to profitability. 
However, agricultural intensification does not necessarily mean intensive use of 
agrochemicals and similar inputs. As the APOV case shows, there are other alternatives 
that achieve good results using organic methods. Nevertheless, an emphasis on the 
Nacional variety has resulted in reduced research and development for CCN-51.  
 Farmers have ways of increasing income that challenge the conventional view of 
agricultural intensification as ‘one crop.’ Farmers use their knowledge of local markets, 
their abilities, labor availability, and other agricultural, social and economic variables in 
ways that it maximizes their opportunities and minimizes risks: most the farmers in my 
survey were the survivors of three or more decades of cocoa price swings, botched 
government price fixing schemes, weather phenomena, and fickle markets. For some, 
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their response is opting for one high yield variety (CCN-51); for others, planting crops 
other than cocoa. Even more opt for having Nacional, CCN-51 and other crops.  
Evidently, this suggests the need for a reevaluation of ‘one-crop’ development 
programs. While this sort of projects—on the basis of the expertise of a selected group, 
easily framed in terms of problems and solutions— are attractive for development 
agencies, they lack a farmer’s nuanced understanding of the local growing conditions. 
This understanding—the knowledge of each farmer about himself, his land, the crops—is 
lost when an externally-financed solution are applied wholesale. A common complain 
among Ecuadorian environmentalists is that agrochemicals are used “en plancha” (in all 
the area of a plantation). Paradoxically, these groups apply ‘sustainable development’ and 
‘certification’ projects in the same way. 
The findings also point out to other failings in the contemporary discourse on  
Ecuadorian cocoa production. Indeed, the middlemen are part of the problem. However, 
instead of just ignoring them (at best) or demonizing them, there is a need to see them as 
part of the solutions: if an associative commercialization system is lacking, the 
middlemen—and their practices—remain. If the goal of a policy maker is to improve the 
quality of Ecuadorian cocoa, there is a need to train  these agents in assessment of cocoa, 
following rules and procedures that are as strict as those imposed to the associative 
farmers.  
Finally, there is a need to attack structural problems that cannot be solved by 
alternative trade or agricultural intensification models. There is a lack of credit for cocoa, 
given banker’s perception of the low profitability of cocoa—and farmers cannot improve 
their farms because they lack credit. If some of the resources used in promoting 
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alternative trade were divested for granting low-interest, 10-year term loans, more 
farmers could implement improvements that will allow them to increase their incomes. 
Also, alternative trade does reward farmers for non-transactional goods and services (i.e., 
ecosystem services). The premiums that the market would bear are subject to supply and 
demand; while a farmer’s lost opportunities remain constant. Thus, farmers bear the cost 
of providing these services. 
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(a) Ecuadorian cocoa farms average yield by area harvested, from 1961 to 2009 (in 
kg/ha year). Note: 1981-1981, 1987-1988 and 1997-1998 are years with strong 
influence of El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO). Source: FAOSTAT 2010 
 
(b) Ecuadorian cocoa production (in thousand tonnes) and area harvested (in 
thousand ha) from 1961 to 2009. Source: FAOSTAT 2010. 
 
Figure 1. Ecuadorian cocoa production statistics: a) production by area harvested, 1964-
2009; b) production by area (kg/ha), 1964-2009.  
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Figure 2. Area of Study. Ecuador, the Western lowlands (Costa), APOV and FEDECADE associations and cooperatives. 
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(c) Formula to calculate standardized Farm Gross Product (FGP), where YC1 is yield for crop 1; SC1 is area for crop 1; PC1 is 
the reported gate price for crop 1, and TFS is the total area of the farm. 
 
 
 
 
 
(d) Formula to calculate standardized Farm Gross Income, where YC1 is yield for crop 1; SC1 is area for crop 1; PC1 is the 
reported gate price for crop 1; n stands for crop planted (1-4), and TFS is the total area of the farm. 
 
 
Figure 3. Formulas to calculate (a) standardized Farm Gross Product (FGP in US$ ha/year) and (b) standardized Farm Gross 
Income (in US$ ha year) 
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(a) FEDECADE 
 
 
(b)APOV 
 
Figure 4. Histogram for the frequency of farmer’s age (in years) for (a) FEDECADE 
(n=100) and (b) APOV (n=60). 
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Figure 5. Standardized Farm Gross Product (FGP) and standardized Farm Gross Income 
(FGI) (in US$ /ha year) by crop system by Farmer’s Organization. 
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Figure 6. Regression analysis for yearly agricultural gross income (US$) by area (ha) by cropping system for FEDECADE 
farmers, with guides for yearly Family Vital Income Level (CFV) and Family Basic Level (CFB). 
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Figure 7. Regression analysis for yearly agricultural gross income (US$) by area (ha) by cropping system for APOV farmers, with 
guides for yearly Family Vital Income Level (CFV) and Family Basic Level (CFB).
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Figure 8. Dot plot for FEDECADE farmers with incomes below and above Ecuadorian 
poverty level (CFB) by area of holdings (ha). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Dot plot for APOV farmers with incomes below and above Ecuadorian poverty 
level (CFV) by area of holdings (ha). 
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Figure 10. Tree of cacao Nacional, Nueva Union Campesina, Guayas, 2009 
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Figure 11. Tree of CCN-51 cacao, Nueva Union Campesina, Guayas, 2009   
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 Table 1. List of farmer’s associations (FA), Ecuadorian government agencies (GA), 
intergovernmental organizations (IGO), projects (LFP), local government associations 
(LGA), non-governmental organizations (NGO), private agencies (PA), public/private 
sector partnerships (PPP), and University-level Educational Institutions (UEI) that have 
worked in Nacional related cocoa projects, 2006-2008 
 
Institution Acronym Country of origin Type 
Aroma Amazonico  Ecuador FA 
Asociacion de Productores de Cacao de 
San Carlos [Association of Cocoa 
Producers of San Carlos] 
 Ecuador FA 
Corporation Fortaleza del Valle   Ecuador FA 
Asociacion de Productores de Cacao de 
Atacames [Association of Cocoa Producers 
of Atacames] 
APROCA Ecuador FA 
Organización de Productores de Cacao 
Orgánicos Sabor Arriba  
APROCACA
O 
Ecuador FA 
Asociacion de productores de cacao del 
Norte de Esmeraldas [Association of Cocoa 
Producers of Northern Esmeraldas] 
APROCANE Ecuador FA 
Corporation Integral of Associations of 
Camilo Ponce Enriquez 
CIACPE Ecuador FA 
Federacion de Productores de Cacao del 
Ecuador [Ecuadorian Federation of Cocoa 
Producers] 
FEDECADE Ecuador FA 
Federación de Organizaciones Campesinas 
del Cantón Muisne (Federation of Farmers’ 
Organizations of the Canton Muisne) 
FOCAME Ecuador FA 
Federación de Organizaciones de la 
Nacionalidad Kichwa de Napo [Federation 
of Farmers’ Organizations of Napo’s 
Kichwa Nationality] 
FONAKIN Ecuador FA 
Association Kallari Kallari Ecuador FA 
Union Cantonal de Organizaciones de 
Participacion Social por la Justicia del 
Canton Las Naves [Union of Organizations 
of Social Participation for the Justice of the 
Canton Las Naves] 
UCOCS Ecuador FA 
[continued] 
FA-Farmer’s associations; GA-Ecuadorian government agencies; IGO-intergovernmental 
organizations; IGP-intergovernmental project; LFP-loan financed projects; LGA-local 
government associations; NGO-non-governmental organizations; PA- private agencies; 
PPP-public/private sector partnerships; UEI- University-level Educational Institutions. 
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Table 1. [Continued]  
 
Institution Acronym Country of origin Type 
Union Nacional de Organizaciones 
Campesinas Cacaoteras del Ecuador 
[Union of Rural Cacao Organizations of 
Ecuador] 
UNOCACE Ecuador FA 
Union de Organizaciones de productores 
agropecuarios Moraspungo [Union of 
Agriculture and Cattle Ranching Producers 
of Moraspungo] 
UOPAM  Ecuador FA 
Corporación de Promoción de 
Exportaciones e Inversiones [Corporation 
for the Promotion of Exports and 
Investments] 
CORPEI Ecuador GA 
Instituto para el Ecodesarrollo Regional 
Amazonico [Institute for the Amazon 
Region Ecodevelopment] 
ECORAE Ecuador GA 
Instituto Autonomo de Investigaciones 
Agropecuarias [Autonomous Insitute for 
research in Agriculture and Cattle 
Ranching ] 
INIAP Ecuador GA 
Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia 
[Ministery for Agriculture and Cattle 
Ranching] 
MAG Ecuador GA 
Unidad de Desarollo Norte de la 
Presidencia de la Republica del Ecuador 
[Northern Development Unit of the 
Ecuador’s Presidency] 
UDENOR Ecuador GA 
Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst [German 
Development Service] 
DED Germany IGO 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische 
Zusammenarbeit [German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation] 
GTZ Germany IGO 
Swiss Agency for Cooperation and 
Development  
SDC Switzerland IGO 
Agency for International Development of 
United States of America 
US AID US IGO 
[continued] 
FA-Farmer’s associations; GA-Ecuadorian government agencies; IGO-intergovernmental 
organizations; IGP-intergovernmental project; LFP-loan financed projects; LGA-local 
government associations; NGO-non-governmental organizations; PA- private agencies; 
PPP-public/private sector partnerships; UEI- University-level Educational Institutions. 
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Table 1. [Continued]  
 
Institution Acronym Country of origin Type 
Proyecto de generacion de ingresos y 
empleo para la frontera norte del Ecuador 
[US AID] [Project for the generation of 
income and employment for Ecuador’s 
northern border] 
PRONORTE Ecuador-US IGP 
Programa de desarrollo sostenible de la 
frontera Amazonica Norte(Loan BID 
1420/OC EC) 
[Program for the Sustainable Development 
of the Northern Amazonic Frontier] 
AMAZNOR Ecuador LFP 
Consorcio de Municipios Amazonicos 
[Amazonic Municipalities Consortium] 
COMAGA Ecuador LGA 
Fundacion Altropico  Ecuador NGO 
Fundacion Equinoccio  Ecuador NGO 
Fundacion Jatun Sacha  Ecuador NGO 
Fundacion Same  Ecuador NGO 
Agricultural Cooperative Development 
International and Volunteers in Overseas 
Cooperative Assistance 
ACDI/VOCA US NGO 
Corporación Esmeraldeña para la 
Formación y Desarrollo Integral 
[Esmeraldas’ Corporation for Integral 
Education and Development] 
CEFODI Ecuador NGO 
Conservacion y Desarrollo  
[Conservation and Development] 
CYD  Ecuador NGO 
Fondo Ecuatoriano de Cooperacion para el 
Desarrollo [Ecuadorian Fund of 
Cooperation for Development] 
FECD Ecuador NGO 
Fundacion Ecuatoriana de Tecnologia 
Apropiada [Ecuadorian Foundation for 
Appropiate Technology] 
FEDETA Ecuador NGO 
Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio FEPP Ecuador NGO 
Fundación para el Desarrollo y la 
Creatividad Productiva 
[Foundation for the Development and the 
Creative Productivity] 
FUNDES Ecuador NGO 
Yachana Foundation FUNEDESIN Ecuador/US NGO 
[continued] 
FA-Farmer’s associations; GA-Ecuadorian government agencies; IGO-intergovernmental 
organizations; IGP-intergovernmental project; LFP-loan financed projects; LGA-local 
government associations; NGO-non-governmental organizations; PA- private agencies; 
PPP-public/private sector partnerships; UEI- University-level Educational Institutions. 
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Table 1. [Continued]  
 
Institution Acronym Country of origin Type 
Fundacion de promocion y accion para el 
Desarrollo 
(Foundation for the Promotion and Action 
for Development] 
FUNPAD Ecuador NGO 
Fundaccion Maquita Cusunchik MCCH Ecuador NGO 
Asociacion Nacional de Exportadores de 
Cacao 
[Nacional Association of Cocoa Exporters] 
ANECACAO Ecuador PA 
Bundesverband Großhandel, Außenhandel, 
Dienstleistungen e.V. [Federation of 
German Wholesale and Foreign Trade] 
BGA Germany PA 
Corporacion Ecuatoriana de Cafetaleros 
[Coffee-growers Ecuadorian Corporation] 
CORECAF Ecuador PA 
Biocomercio Sostenible [Sustainable 
Biotrade] 
Biocomercio Ecuador PPP  
Sistema de Capacitación en el Manejo de 
los Recursos Naturales Renovables-System 
for training in Natural Resources 
Management 
Consorcio 
CAMAREN 
Ecuador PPP 
Escuela Politecnica del Ejercito  
[Army Polytecnic School] 
ESPE Ecuador UEI 
Universidad Luis Vargas Torres ULVT Ecuador UEI 
FA-Farmer’s associations; GA-Ecuadorian government agencies; IGO-intergovernmental 
organizations; IGP-intergovernmental project; LFP-loan financed projects; LGA-local 
government associations; NGO-non-governmental organizations; PA- private agencies; 
PPP-public/private sector partnerships; UEI- University-level Educational Institutions. 
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Table 2. On-farm and off-farm sources of income FEDECADE and APOV farmers.  
 
 FEDECADE APOV 
Source of income n % N % 
On-farm     
 Cacao only 42 42.0 6 10.1 
 Other crops 31 31.0 45 76.3 
Total  73.0  86.4 
Off-farm     
 Agricultural 11 11.0 1 1.7 
 Commerce 3 3.0 1 1.7 
 Professional 1 1.0 4 7.7 
 Services 3 3.0 1 1.7 
 Trade 8 8.0 --- --- 
 Multiple 1 1.0 --- --- 
 Pension --- --- 1 1.7 
 Total  27.0  13.6 
 
 
Table 3. Crops systems, number of farmers, standardized farm gross product (FGP) (in 
US$/ha year), proportion of FGP from each crop, standardized farm gross income (FGI) 
in (US$/ha year) and rank of that cropping systems for FEDECADE and APOV. 
 
Crops by farm N FGP ha/year 
(US $) 
Share FGP 
ha/year by 
crop by farm 
FGI 
ha/year 
(US$) 
Rank 
(1 – 7) 
FEDECADE      
Nacional-only 24 878.12 100 476.17 7 
CCN-51-only* 10 2729.65 100 1380.27 2 
Nacional+CCN-51  32 1568.15 33:67 811.65 5 
Nacional +bananas 5 1514.61 29:71 696.47 6 
Nacional+CCN-51+bananas 7 1801.60 27:13:60 835.59 4 
Nacional+CCN-51+other 11 2278.09 26:55:19 1131.03 3 
CCN-51+other 3 3078.52 86:14 1537.93 1 
APOV      
Nacional-only  10 741.63 100 352.73 3 
Nacional +short cycle 32 2007.30 30:70 1154.80 1 
Nacional+others  12 2651.1 30:70 1039.30 2 
*Only CCN-51 plantations older than 5 years were counted.  
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Table 4. Crop (by farmer’s organization), yield (as reported and in standard units) gate price (as reported and in standard units), 
production cost (as reported and in standard units)  
 
Crop Yield [unit]/ha year Yield (Mt /ha 
year) 
Gate price 
($ per 
[unit])† 
Gate 
price† 
Production cost 
($/[unit])‡ 
Production 
cost  
Nacional 
(FEDECADE) 
8.34 qq/ha year‡ 0.38 Mt/ha year $117.48/qq‡ $2584/Mt $1.21/kg $1210/Mt 
Nacional 
(APOV) 
6.49 qq/ha year‡ 0.26 Mt/ha year $114.42/qq‡ $2517/Mt $1.32/kg $1320/Mt 
CCN-51 
(FEDECADE) 
23.31 qq/ha year‡ 1.1 Mt/ha year $117.90/qq‡ $2594/Mt $1.27/kg $1270/Mt 
Bananas* 
(FEDECADE) 
276 boxes˟ 6 Mt/ha year $7/box $318/Mt $3/box‡ $136/Mt 
Bananas 
(APOV) 
276 boxes˟ 6 Mt/ha year $4/box $184/Mt $3/box‡ $136/Mt 
Plantains 857 bunches --- $4/bunch --- $2000/ha year‡ --- 
Others-papaya 600 dozens 7.2 Mt/ha year $8/dozen $666/Mt $2700/ha year‡ $180/Mt 
Others-
passion fruit 
250 sacks+ 17 Mt/ha year $25/sack $367/Mt $2700/ha year‡ $159/Mt 
Others-short 
cycle (maize) 
60 qq/ha year‡ 
 
2.7 
Mt/ha/harvest 
(8.1 Mt/ha year) 
$12/qq* $264/Mt $6/qq‡ $132/Mt 
Others-short 
cycle (rice) 
60/qq/ha/harvest‡ 
 
2.7Mt/ha/harvest 
(5.4 Mt/ha year) 
$28/qq* $616/Mt $1250/ha/harvest $457.6/Mt 
Notes: ‡ qq=quintals=100lb=45.45kg=0.045Mt; ˟ 1 box=42 kg; + 1 sack=45 kg. * Government fixed price. † Average 
October/November 2009. ‡ 
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Table 5. Area (ha) by cropping system and farmer’s association needed for farmer’s 
agricultural gross income to be above Ecuador’s extreme poverty level (CFV) and 
poverty level (CFB) 
 
 
 
Area (ha) 
Farmer’s 
association Cropping System 
income> 
CFV 
income> 
CFB 
FEDECADE 
    Nacional 13.12 19.65 
 CCN-51 3.43 5.01 
 Nacional and 
CCN-51 5.12 7.52 
 Cocoa and others 2.89 5.26 
APOV 
    Nacional 12.58 17.75 
 Cocoa and others 4.11 5.78 
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Table 6. Regression analysis equations for agricultural gross income (US$) by area (ha) by cropping system and farmer’s 
association. 
 
Association Cropping System Regression Analysis: GAI versus Area 
FEDECADE Nacional Only  Regression Equation GAI = 495 + 1153 Area   
  Predictor Coef SE Coef T P 
  Constant 767.0 343.0 2.24 0.036 
  Area 280.16 40.60 6.90 0.000 
  S = 1189.09  R-Sq = 68.4%  R-Sq(adj) = 67.0%   
 CCN-51 Only  Regression Equation GAI = 767 + 280 Area   
  Predictor Coef SE Coef T P 
  Constant 495.4 447.3 1.11 0.300 
  Area 1152.79 62.99 18.30 0.000 
  S = 1118.02  R-Sq = 97.7%  R-Sq(adj) = 97.4%   
 Nacional+CCN-
51 
Regression Equation GAI = 551 + 760 Area   
  Predictor Coef SE Coef T P 
  Constant 551 1164 0.47 0.639 
  Area 760.2 155.7 4.88 0.000 
  S = 2518.42  R-Sq = 46%  R-Sq(adj) = 44.1%   
 Cocoa+Others Regression Equation GAI = 2282 + 723 Area   
  Predictor Coef SE Coef T P 
  Constant 2282 1404 1.62 0.119 
  Area 723.5 153.9 4.70 0.000 
  S = 3271.59  R-Sq = 51.3%  R-Sq(adj) = 48.9%   
(continued) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
179 
Table 6. Continued. 
 
Association Cropping System Regression Analysis: GAI versus Area 
APOV Nacional Only  Regression Equation GAI = 0.0153 + 353 Area   
  Predictor Coef SE Coef T P 
  Constant 0.01527 0.01355 1.13 0.292 
  Area 353.186 0.002 173428 0.000 
  S = 0.0306912  R-Sq = 100%  R-Sq(adj) = 100.0%   
 Cocoa+others  Regression Equation GAI = -66 + 1096 Area   
  Predictor Coef SE Coef T P 
  Constant -66.3 348.6 -0.19 0.850 
  Area 1096.25 57.10 19.20 0.000 
  S = 1570.49  R-Sq = 89.8%  R-Sq(adj) = 89.5%   
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CHAPTER V. 
CONCLUSION 
This study was born out of turning the definition of sustainable development into 
a question: if it is a “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland 
1987), there is a need to ask about whose present and whose future is represented into the 
implementation of this multigenerational project (Luke 2005).  
The aims of this study were: a) to understand to what is chocolate manufacturers’ 
perception of what consumers are looking for—what are the qualities that made 
alternative goods, b) to understand how the perception of consumer’s demand for 
sustainability-enhanced chocolate is translated into the implementation of cocoa-centered 
development projects, c) to understand how the implementation of these projects ignores 
the impacts that these efforts impose on the farmers.  
In Chapter II, I show that chocolate wrappers’ narratives are rich in keywords 
which denote sustainability (i.e., nature, rainforest and farmers), a finding that suggest 
that manufacturers are designing products to meet the demand of consumers for 
alternative chocolate. However, the mechanisms for the sourcing of this alternative cocoa 
are not stated in the labels of most products. Half of the manufacturers use a country-
wide definition of origin, paying a token attention to the farmers in the ground. 
Certification—when present—does not imply the presence of a deep relationship between 
producers and manufacturers. Certification acts as a barrier to entry at the producer's level 
(limiting the number of cocoa suppliers for a particular bar), but manufacturers source 
cocoa from any certified producer. The use of country-wide sourcing, and the lack of 
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commitment of manufacturers also suggest that manufacturers perceive that most 
consumers are satisfied with vague references to “geographical sourcing,” “protecting-
the-environment” and “supporting-the-farmers.” Vague commitments to alternative-trade 
sourcing create risks for chocolate manufacturers—as well as for cocoa producers. From 
the chocolate manufactures perspective, companies that work closely with farmers—and 
are willing to commit time and resources to cultivate these relationships—are likely to 
secure access to a supply of high-quality beans. On the other hand, companies that opt 
out of developing relationships with the producers will find themselves engaged in an 
endless race to secure high quality beans. At-length cocoa sourcing puts artisan 
companies in direct competition with the large candy multinationals, which are quite 
interested in entering into these niche markets and sourcing high-quality cocoa (i.e., 
Kraft, Hershey's and Lindt).  
At-length alternative trade cocoa sourcing also creates risks for producers’ 
organizations. In Chapter III, I show the effects that a producers’ “at-length” alternative-
trade strategy had on the Ecuadorian Federation of Cocoa Producers (FEDECADE).  In 
2009, the commercialization system of FEDECADE ceased to operate after the 
FEDECADE was unable to find a client willing to pay a premium price for its multi-
certified Nacional cocoa. This collapse, after just six years of operation, marked the end 
of a thirteen-years-long (1995-2008) effort financed with over a million dollars of 
investment by international donors The project achieved its generic goal of increasing the 
income of farmers by creating an alternative commercialization system that transferred 
revenues from cocoa exports directly to the farmers. The alternative commodity chain 
organized by FEDECADE gave farmers an attractive outlet for their products, and forced 
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intermediaries to rationalize their profitability. These benefits were lost when in 2009 
FEDECADE was not able to secure a purchase order, because it lacked a strategic 
partner. FEDECADE’s approach towards commercialization was to for sell cocoa to the 
highest bidder—the farmer’s equivalent to chocolate manufacturers “at-length” cocoa 
sourcing. The sell-to-the-highest-bidder strategy generated revenues in the short term, but 
did not lead to long-term sustainability.  
The experience of FEDECADE shows another risk of “at-length” alternative 
trade. The collapse of FEDECADE’s RA certified cocoa market, after Kraft Foods Inc. 
started to source RA cocoa from Ivory Coast (Africa), suggests that certification—the 
basic tool of alternative trade—do not guarantee sustainability. Certified farmers face 
diminishing returns as more farmers join certification programs—lured as they are by the 
promises of NGOs and IGOs with worldwide outreach. In fact, the same actors 
(Rainforest Alliance-Kraft-GTZ) financed the efforts of FEDECADE in Ecuador, as well 
as the efforts of the farmers of Ivory Coast. When the supply of certified goods outpaces 
demand, the premiums for certified goods collapse. The race for certification benefits 
multinational companies, which have the ability to source commodities from the lowest 
(or more convenient) supplier: certified products become another commodity, subject to 
cycles driven by supply and demand.  
The FEDECADE case also raises doubts about the viability of pairing 
developing-country organizations with global financial partners. In these relationships, 
the burden of risk is carried by those in developing economies. When FEDECADE’s U.S. 
financial partner (Root Capital) deemed that the cocoa business was too risky, it pulled 
out. FEDECADE was not able to find another source of capital. There is a power 
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differential between financers and producers, and certainly points to the vulnerability of 
the developing country partners in these alliances. 
Finally, FEDECADE’s experience also shows the failings of leveraging 
development on a commodity like cocoa, subject to the whims of the international 
markets. Cocoa prices and stocks have been fluctuating widely in the global markets, 
reaching historical heights only to fall vertiginously. The behavior of Northern 
stockholders, from small investors to the Armajaro Hedge Fund, have deep repercussions 
on the livelihoods (and hopes) of commodity-producing farmers in the developing world. 
Thus, successful commodity-based development programs exacerbate rural communities’ 
exposure to these risks.  
Finally, the results of my study indicate that the NGOs and IGOs behind the 
FEDECADE project have not succeeded at convincing farmers to remain wedded to 
Nacional. Only one out of the 100 farmers I interviewed replanted his farm with 
Nacional, and that was done eight years ago. Meanwhile, in the last seven years (within 
the period of execution of the projects) 38 farmers (out of 100) had renovated their 
plantations using CCN-51, a high-yield full-sun cocoa hybrid that lacks the Nacional 
flavor. These data suggest that even when the stock centers paid premium prices for 
Nacional, farmers were voicing their choice for agricultural intensification by planting 
CCN-51.  
In Chapter IV, I address the reasons that explain why most farmers opt for the 
CCN-51 variety. I found that crop diversification strategies exert a strong influence in 
farmer’s income. Farmers with more types of crops fare better, because the other crops 
replace or supplement the income from cocoa. The responses to my survey suggest that 
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farmers see the CCN-51 cocoa variety as another source of income. The CCN-51 variety 
is attractive because its yield by area is up to three times the yield of Nacional. In the 
FEDECADE general area—whose farmers had the support of Nacional-oriented NGO 
projects for the last 10 years—CCN-51 yields 721 kg/ha year to Nacional 379 kg/ha year. 
In the APOV general area CCN-51 yields are higher (354 kg/ha year) than the average 
Nacional’ (295 kg ha/year) even thought the CCN-51 plots have not yet reached full 
production. Farmers are aware that CCN-51 is more costly, and that it requires more 
‘care,’ but they said that this variety’s yield compensates them for the extra investment.  
The farmers’ overall preference for the CCN-51 variety is because in the regional 
markets a farmer gets paid the same price for both varieties (but CCN-51 yield is higher 
than the yield of Nacional). In cases when the farmer is associated with a ‘certified’ 
associative commercialization organization that manages to get a differentiated price for 
Nacional cocoa, the amount of the premium does not compensate the farmer for the low 
yield of this variety.  
The results of my study suggest that Nacional lacks profitability. The results also 
indicate that there are two ways in which this variety could survive. First, if farmers are 
making a decent living out of other crops, some of them may opt for conserving Nacional 
for its aesthetic values. Also, in some cases Nacional holdings are in hands of 
professionals (i.e., teachers, doctors, and economists) that reported that the largest share 
of their income came from their professional occupations, and that cocoa was secondary. 
These professionals liked Nacional, because it is easy to keep. 
In conclusion, in Chapter IV my study shows weaknesses in the conceptualization 
and implementation of the alternative trade and the agricultural intensification models in 
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the context of Ecuadorian cocoa production. Alternative trade—derived from ecological 
or environmental friendly certification schemes, or in varietal attributes—offers at best a 
limited tool to address poverty, unless accompanied by a strong agricultural 
intensification component. In Ecuadorian cocoa, low yield does not lead to profitability.  
 Farmers have ways of increasing income that challenge the conventional view of 
agricultural intensification as ‘one crop.’ Farmers use their knowledge of local markets, 
their abilities, labor availability, and other agricultural, social and economic variables in 
ways that it maximizes their opportunities and minimizes risks: most the farmers in my 
survey were the survivors of three or more decades of cocoa price swings, botched 
government price fixing schemes,58
                                                 
58 From farmer’s perspective. 
 weather phenomena, and fickle markets. For some, 
their response is opting for one high yield variety (CCN-51); for others, planting crops 
other than cocoa. Even more opt for having Nacional, CCN-51 and other crops.  
Evidently, this suggests the need for a reevaluation of ‘one-crop’ development 
programs. While this sort of projects—on the basis of the expertise of a selected group, 
easily framed in terms of problems and solutions— are attractive for development 
agencies, they lack a farmer’s nuanced understanding of the local growing conditions. 
This understanding—the knowledge of each farmer about himself, his land, the crops—is 
lost when an externally-financed solution are applied wholesale. A common complaint 
among Ecuadorian environmentalists is that agrochemicals are used “en plancha” (in all 
the area of a plantation). Paradoxically, these groups apply ‘sustainable development’ and 
‘certification’ projects in the same way. 
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The findings also point out to other failings in the contemporary discourse on 
Ecuadorian cocoa production. Indeed, the middlemen are part of the problem. However, 
instead of just ignoring them (at best) or demonizing them, there is a need to see them as 
part of the solutions: if an associative commercialization system is lacking, the 
middlemen—and their practices—remain. If the goal of a policy maker is to improve the 
quality of Ecuadorian cocoa, there is a need to train these agents in assessment of cocoa, 
following rules and procedures that are as strict as those imposed to the associative 
farmers.  
Finally, there is a need to attack structural problems that cannot be solved by 
alternative trade or agricultural intensification models. There is a lack of credit for cocoa, 
given banker’s perception of the low profitability of cocoa—and farmers cannot improve 
their farms because they lack credit. If some of the resources used in promoting 
alternative trade had been used instead in a fund for granting low-interest, 10-year term 
loans, more farmers would have been able to improve their farms in ways that would 
have allowed them to increase their incomes. As it is working, alternative trade does 
reward farmers for non-transactional goods and services (i.e., ecosystem services). The 
premiums that the market would bear are subject to supply and demand; while a farmer’s 
lost opportunities remain constant. Thus, farmers bear the cost of providing these 
services. 
In summary, my findings suggest that manufacturers perceive that most 
consumers are satisfied with vague references to “geographical sourcing,” “protecting-
the-environment” and “supporting-the-farmers.” This vague commitment to alternative-
trade sourcing—which I call “at-length” alternative trade—create  risks for chocolate 
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manufacturers as well as for cocoa producers. Companies that opt out of developing 
relationships with the producers will find themselves engaged in an endless race to secure 
high quality beans, and in direct competition with the large candy multinationals, which 
are quite interested in the alternative trade niche markets. 
I also found that the implementation of “at-length” alternative trade-sustainable 
development projects at the producers’ side offer at best a mixed bag of success and 
failures. After 13 years and over a million-dollar investments that propped an alternative 
trade effort with the broad goal of addressing poverty by raising farmers’ income, I found 
that farmers’ incomes got a temporary boost from alternative trade. These projects 
achieved the goal of forcing cocoa middlemen and exporters to rationalize their behavior, 
transferring a larger share of cocoa market value to the farmers. However, by 2009 this 
effort collapsed. The collapse is partially explained because the FEDECADE (the 
farmers’ organization involved in this project) opted for the producers’ version of “at-
length” alternative trade, selling certified cocoa to the highest bidder. The lack of 
commitment of producers’ groups mirrors the lack of commitment of chocolate 
manufacturers. The FEDECADE commercialization system failure the evidence suggest 
that  alternative-trade  and premium commodities remain subject to supply and demand. 
Farmers face diminishing gains as more farmers opt for certification. A worldwide race 
for achieving certification actually benefits multinational corporations, which regain the 
power to source commodities from the lowest cost (or most convenient) supplier. In 
addition, the results question the strategy of leveraging sustainable development projects 
on a commodity, subject to the whims of the international markets. Even if successful, 
these projects only exacerbate rural communities’ exposure to these risks. Finally, the 
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results show how power plays a role at setting the terms, goals and results of 
sustainability partnerships. It is necessary to remember that funding institutions 
(international agencies, non-profits, and the likes) decide which projects are financed. 
Rhetorical price of partnership aside, sustainable development projects are biased 
towards the agenda of these agencies—and their perceptions of the wishes of Northern 
consumers.  
Finally, the results of my study show a linkage between poverty and farmer’s 
reliance in the low yield fine cacao known as Nacional—the darling of alternative traders. 
I found that the premiums paid for this variety—fine cocoa, shade-grown, organic, 
certified—do not compensate farmers for the low yield. Plain and simple, Nacional lacks 
profitability. Even more, outside of associative commercialization systems, farmers get 
the same gate price for both varieties. These findings point out to a new consideration of 
alternative trade schemes. Alternative trade should be seen as a way to fund a self-
financed farmer’s organization that provides services to farmer’s groups. The goal of this 
association must be to help farmers optimize their activities, via agricultural 
intensification, crop diversification and similar local thought schemes. If equality and 
fairness are put at the forefront, it is not fair that farmers bear the costs of the ecological 
services of shaded plantations—if the cost of this keeping is that they remain in poverty.  
Thus, the findings of this study point at the need for careful assessment of 
whether the needs of the present generation are being met. Self-reliance and self-
awareness are part of the way of farming: the cocoa farmer’s in my sample have survived 
to 30-years or more of commodities volatility, changes government, social upheaval, and 
fickle markets. Alternative trade/sustainable development projects emphasis on 
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consensus, expertise, instrumentality, and pursuit of Northern consumer’s via 
certification forfeits the values of farmers’ experiences—thus fail. After all—when the 
funding for projects dries up and the army of NGO’s and IGO’s consultants move 
towards greener pastures—the farmers are who remain in the land, left behind.  
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APPENDIX 1 
SURVEY 
ABANDONADOS: EL DESTINO DE LOS AGRICULTORES EN LA ERA DEL 
DESARROLLO SUSTENTABLE 
Cristian Melo 
Department of International Relations 
Florida International University 
University Park DM 430 
11200 SW 8th Street, 
Miami Fl 33199 
 
Genero:   Hombre  Mujer    Edad: 
1. Localidad y Afiliación 
1.1 Localidad/Cooperativa/Asociación:  
1.2 Afiliación:  FEDECADE  APOV INDEPENDIENTE/NINGUNA 
 Otro Grupo Cacaotero: 
1.3 Donde nacio? 
1.4 Si nacio en otro sitio (fuera del area), hace cuanto tiempo vive aqui? años. 
1.5 Esta pregunta es sobre tenencia de tierra. Como adquirio sus tierras? Heredo, compro, 
arrienda, o le dieron tierra por reforma agraria? 
1.6 Sus padres era cacaoteros, o tenian otra actividad? 
1.7 Y cuando usted ya no este, quien cree que va a trabajar la tierra? A alguno de sus 
hijos le interesa la agricultura, o tienen otras profesiones? 
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2. Extensión, tenencia y uso del suelo 
2.1 Cuanta tierra tiene, maneja o renta usted (anotar respuesta)? Unidad: 
2.2 Conversión a hectáreas 
2.3 Tenencia de tierra:  PROPIA  RENTA  COMUNAL 
 Otra: Si renta, puedo preguntarle cuanto paga por la tierra? 
2.4 Que cultivos tiene y que superficie de la tierra dedica a este cultivo? 
Cultivo Superficie Unidad Edad 
(años) 
Superficie 
(has) 
2.4.1  Cacao Nacional     
2.4.2  Cacao CCN5     
2.4.3  Cacao OTRA/s 
VARIEDAD/es: (*) 
    
2.4.4  Banano en Huerta     
2.4.5  Banano Separado      
2.4.6 Otro 1:     
2.4.7 Otro 2     
2.4.8 Otro 3     
2.4.3.1 * Otras variedades: 
2.5 Que plantas y arboles tiene usted para sombra de cacao (las mas comunes)? 
3.1 En su opinión, cuales son los problemas que usted tiene con el cacao? 
3.2 Hay diferencia entre el Nacional y el de ramilla CCN-51? Que tiene de bueno y malo 
cada una? 
3.2.1 Que tiene de bueno el Nacional? 
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3.2.2 Que tiene de malo? 
3.2.3 Que tiene de bueno el ramilla CCN-51? 
3.2.4 Que tiene de malo? 
3.3 Tiene usted en la finca?  Tendal de caña   Tendal de cemento 
 Marquesina-secadora solar   Secadora a gas    Secadora a leña 
 Caja de fermentación 
3.4 Como y donde fermenta el cacao? Cuanto se demora? Cual es el precio de cacao 
fermentado respecto al precio de cacao sin fermentar? 
3.5 Como y donde seca el cacao? Cuanto se demora? Cual es el precio de cacao seco 
respecto al precio de cacao fresco? 
3.6 Tiene alguna ventaja tiene vender cacao fermentado y secado? No? 
3.7 Cuanto tiempo le dedica al cultivo en dias por mes? dias 
3.8 Trabaja solo? Le ayuda alguien mas? 
4. Production, costos y rendimiento 
Cultivo Rendimiento 
(qq/ha/año o 
cajas/ha/año) 
Costos de 
produccion 
Ultimo fecha y 
precio de venta 
4.1  Cacao Nacional    
4.2  Cacao CCN-
51/Ramilla 
   
4.3  Cacao OTRA/s 
VARIEDAD/es: (*) 
   
 200 
 
4.4  Banano en Huerta    
4.5  Banano Separado     
4.6 Otro 1:    
4.7 Otro 2    
4.8 Otro 3    
 
4.9 Donde generalmente vende el cacao? Que tanto del total vende en este sitio? Que tal 
es el precio? Le pagan mas por Nacional? Lo mismo que por el CCN-51? 
4.10 Hay otro/otros sitios donde vende cacao? Que tanto del total vende en este sitio? 
Que tal es el precio? Le pagan mas por Nacional? Lo mismo que por el CCN-51? 
5. Otros Ingresos 
5.1 A parte del cacao, tiene usted otra fuente de ingreso? Trabaja en una bananera, en una 
hacienda, otra actividad?  SI   NO 
5.2 Y en que trabaja cuando se acaba la cosecha? 
5.2.1 Que tan lejos es? 
5.2.2 Y quien se queda en la finca? 
5.3 Tiene usted acceso a préstamos antes de la cosecha? A un préstamo que se pague con 
cacao? 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 
Variable Description Type Coding 
GEN Gender Nominal F, FEMALE; M, 
MALE 
AGE Age Continuous  
PLA Place Nominal SDJ, 6 DE JULIO, 
GUAYAS; LFL, LA 
FLORIDA, AZUAY; 
CAM, CAMACHO, 
AZUAY; NUC, 
NUEVA UNIÓN 
CAMPESINA, 
GUAYAS; VIN, 
VINCES, LOS 
RÍOS. 
AFL Affiliation Categorical 0, INDEPENDENT; 
1, FEDECADE; 2, 
APOV; 3, UROCAL. 
BOR Place of birth Nominal  
TOR Time of residence Continuous  
OWN Land ownership  Binary  
REN Rent or Lease amount (US$/ha/year) Continuous 
 
 
WOO Way of ownership Categorical BOUGHT, 
BOUGHT AND 
INHERITED; 
BOUGHT AND 
LAND REFORM; 
BOUGHT, LAND 
REFORM AND 
RENT; GIFT; 
INHERITANCE; 
INHERITANCE 
AND LAND 
REFORM; LAND 
REFORM; LOAN; 
RENT. 
RCG Relatives were cacao growers Binary  
RFG Relatives were farmers (other crops) Binary  
PCG Expectations about progeny 
remaining cocoa growers 
Binary  
FRA Number of plots owned Continuous  
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Variable Description Type Coding 
    
SUR Surface owned (total) Continuous  
NAC Farmer grows cacao Nacional Binary  
AGN Nacional groove age (average years) Continuous  
SUN Nacional groove surface (ha) Continuous  
CCN Farmer grows cacao CCN-51  Binary  
AGC CCN-51 groove age (average years) Continuous  
SUC Nacional groove surface (ha) Continuous  
BAN Farmer has banana associated with 
cacao 
Binary  
SUB Associated banana/cacao groove 
surface (ha) 
Continuous  
OCR1 1st other crop Binary  
OCT1 1st other crop type Nominal  
OCS1 1st other crop surface (ha) Continuous  
OCR2 2nd other crop Binary  
OCT2 2nd other crop type Nominal  
OCS2 2nd other crop surface (ha) Continuous  
OCR3 3rd other crop Binary  
OCT3 3rd other crop type Nominal  
OCS3 3rd other crop surface (ha) Continuous  
SHA Farmer has shade-grown cacao Binary  
COS Shadow complexity (number of 
species mentioned during survey) 
Continuous  
INF Cacao post harvest infrastructure Categorical 0, NONE; 1, 
TENDAL DE 
CEMENTO; 2, 
SOLAR DRYER; 3, 
LPG DRYER; 4, 
FERMENTATION 
BOX 
FER Farmer ferment cacao (any method) Binary  
DIF Difference on price for fermented 
cacao vs. non-fermented cacao 
Categorical 0, NO;1, YES;-, does 
not answer/does not 
know  
DRY Farmer dries cacao before sale Binary  
TIM Time dedicated to cacao 
(days/month) 
Continuous  
SLA Source of farm labor Categorical 0, works alone; 1, 
works with family 
help; 2, hires labor; 
3, both family help 
and hired labor  
YIN Nacional cacao yield (qq/ha/year) Continuous  
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Variable Description Type Coding 
DAN Nacional last cacao sale Continuous  
SPN Nacional last sale price (in US$ per 
qq) 
Continuous  
YIC CCN-51 cacao yield (qq/ha/year) Continuous  
DAC CCN-51 Date of last cacao sale Continuous  
SPC CCN-51 Last sale price (in US$ per 
qq) 
Continuous  
POS Place of sale Categorical 0, farm’s gate; 1, 
town middleman; 2, 
exporter; 3, farmer’s 
association; 4, both 1 
and 2 
OPS Other place of sale Binary   
SEC Farmer has another economic 
activity 
Binary  
TSE Type of another economic activity Categorical 0, none; 1, farming 
(other crops); 2, labor 
for neighbors; 3, crab 
artisanal industry 
(fishing or 
processing) 4, 
transportation 
industry 
(taxis/pickups); 5, 
commerce/sales; 6, 
construction worker; 
7, arts; 8, services; 9, 
teacher, government 
or municipal 
employee; 10; other 
ATL Access to loans Binary  
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